Preamble

The House met at Half past Two o'Clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL NAVY

Sea Cadets

Sir Patrick Hannon: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty the measures contemplated and in process for the maintenance and expansion of the Sea Cadet movement; the facilities available for the supply of uniforms and equipment to officers and cadets; and if financial support will be provided for suitable premises as headquarters for instruction and training of cadets.

The Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. John Dugdale): As the answer is necessarily long, I will, with permission, circulate a statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Sir P. Hannon: Are we to understand from that sympathetic reply, for which I thank the hon. Gentleman, that we are to have something really helpful and consistently maintained in the way of concessions for officers' uniforms and equipment of headquarters?

Mr. Dugdale: The attitude of the Admiralty in this respect will be consistently helpful, as it always is.

Commander Noble: Will the Minister do everything he can to ensure that Sea Cadets, when they are called up, go into the Royal Navy?

Mr. Dugdale: That is another question.

Mr. Shurmer: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there is little encouragement for these boys to join the Sea Cadet Corps which is the only cadet corps where

boys are not allowed to go into the Service for which they have trained?

Mr. Dugdale: I cannot possibly allow that to pass. They are allowed to go into it, but there are not always enough vacancies.

Mr. Shurmer: Never.

Following is the statement:

The Sea Cadet movement is organised in two ways. Open Units are controlled through the Sea Cadet Council which includes representatives both of the Admiralty and of the Navy League, the latter body having accepted responsibility for the welfare and social activities of the Corps. Units are allowed a considerable amount of independence of action in their local administration and by virtue of its constitution, the maintenance and expansion of the Corps must to a great extent, rest largely on the efforts of Unit Officers and Committees, who give their services voluntarily and have accepted their responsibilities with enthusiasm. Annual grants are made from Navy Votes amounting to 17s. 6d. for each qualified cadet, together with grants for each cadet reaching a specified standard of proficiency. The Admiralty also supply equipment for training purposes including boats where practicable.

The Closed or School Units are administered direct by the Admiralty and similarly receive grants for training, equipment and boats. It is expected that many of these units will be absorbed in the Combined Cadet Force, the formation of which was announced by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence on the 9th June. It is also hoped that this scheme will result in the formation of additional naval sections.

Cadet uniforms are provided free and grants are made towards the cost of officers' uniforms. Units Headquarters are used both for instructional and social purposes, and the provision of headquarters is the responsibility of the Unit with aid from the Navy League when required. In view of present-day difficulties, however, the Admiralty has allocated a number of huts and surplus craft for use as temporary headquarters for those Units who have been unable to obtain suitable accommodation.

Ships (Transfer to Foreign Governments)

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty what naval vessels have been sold to foreign Governments since the war.

Mr. Dugdale: As the answer is necessarily rather long and contains a number of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mr. Hughes: Would the hon. Gentleman tell us, when these arrangements with foreign Governments are made, if the possibility of selling these old vessels for scrap iron is also taken into account, and if that is weighed up against the possibility that these ships may be used against us in a future war?

Mr. Dugdale: Certainly, that is always taken into account, along with other considerations.

Mr. Stokes: If my hon. Friend cannot give the details—and I understand that—can he give us the global amount involved?

Mr. Dugdale: The whole of the details are given in the statement. It is a very long one.

Mr. Stokes: I do not want the details; I want the amount.

Mr. Dugdale: Frankly, I cannot give the global amount. It includes a large number of ships of different tonnages, and to add them all together would not make sense.

Mr. Donner: If the minimum cruiser strength of 50 is regarded as essential to the safety of this country, and the actual strength is only 34, why should any cruiser be sold to a foreign country?

Mr. Dugdale: That is quite another question.

Following is the answer:

WARSHIPS SOLD TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1945.

China: One cruiser, 8 harbour defence motor launches.

Denmark: Two frigates, 1 corvette.

France: Six frigates, 2 landing craft tank, 6 motor launches, 2 lifting craft.

Netherlands: One light fleet carrier, 7 destroyers, 1 submarine, 8 minesweepers, 16 motor minesweepers, 3 open launches. 3 river

minesweepers, 2 harbour defence motor launches, 6 landing craft tank, 1 medium speed picket boat, 1 motor fishing vessel.

Norway: Seven destroyers, 5 submarines, 3 corvettes, 2 minesweepers, 2 motor minesweepers, 10 motor torpedo boats.

Portugal: Four anti-submarine/minesweeping trawlers, 1 minesweeper, 2 harbour defence motor launches.

Siam: Two corvettes, 1 minesweeper.

Turkey: Two minesweepers. 4 motor minesweepers.

Commander Noble: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether he has any further statement to make on the negotiations regarding the transfer of H.M.S. "Ajax" to the Government of Chile; and if the date of transfer has yet been fixed.

Mr. Dugdale: No, Sir.

Commander Noble: Does not the Minister consider it rather illogical that we should be considering transferring a ship to a country with whom we have an outstanding dispute before the International Court?

Mr. Dugdale: I have said that the matter is under consideration. In due course, a statement will be made.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: Has the Board of Admiralty taken into consideration the feelings of the Royal Navy when they see the historic "Ajax" flying the Chilean flag in Valparaiso harbour?

Mr. Dugdale: I have no doubt that we shall certainly take into consideration the feelings of the Royal Navy, and they will be expressed to us by those now serving in the Royal Navy.

Vice-Admiral Taylor: Is not the Parliamentary Secretary aware that when H.M.S. "Ajax" is sold to Chile, the cruiser force will be reduced and that a force of 50 cruisers is totally inadequate for this country in the event of war?

Sir Ronald Ross: Will the Parliamentary Secretary make it a condition precedent of the sale of a ship to any foreign country that that foreign country should evacuate any illegally occupied British territory?

Mr. Dugdale: No, Sir. Obviously, that is a question for my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary.

Greenwich Hospital (Land)

Brigadier Thorp: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty what is the acreage of the property of Greenwich Hospital which is under afforestation in the constituency of Berwick-on-Tweed; how many acres have been cut; and how many acres planted since 1945.

Mr. Dugdale: Six hundred and twelve acres of Greenwich Hospital property in the constituency of Berwick-on-Tweed are under afforestation. Nineteen acres have been cut and nine acres planted since 1945.

New Capital Ships (Names)

Mr. Gammans: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty if he will give an undertaking that as soon as possible one of the new capital ships or cruisers being constructed for the Royal Navy will bear the name H.M.S. "Malaya," to take the place of the ship which was presented to the Royal Navy by the people of Malaya, and to maintain the link between that country and the Royal Navy.

Mr. Dugdale: The hon. Member's suggestion will be borne in mind, with others, when the names of future ships of these Classes are being considered.

Mr. Gammans: Cannot the Minister do better than that? Cannot he say definitely that at an early date one of the new ships shall be named H.M.S. "Malaya"?

Mr. Dugdale: One consideration which we have to bear in mind is that we have to ask the Government of Malaya whether the people of Malaya want it to be so named.

Sir R. Ross: In sympathetic response to the suggestion will the Admiralty lay down a capital ship?

Mr. Kirkwood: Come up to the Clyde.

H.M.S. "Malaya" (Presentation Pictures)

Mr. Gammans: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty what has happened to the plaque and pictures presented to H.M.S. "Malaya" by the people of Malaya; and if he will arrange

for them to be returned to the Government of Malaya as a small token of the appreciation of the Admiralty for the gift of this ship to the Royal Navy.

Mr. Dugdale: With the concurrence of His Excellency the Governor of the Malayan Union, the plaque of silver and copper recording the history of H.M.S. "Malaya" from 1918–46 has been lent to the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich where it will be exhibited until there is once again an H.M.S. "Malaya" in service. In accordance with Admiralty instructions for safeguarding trophies during the war, the pictures, which had been presented individually by eight residents of Malaya on 19th June, 1919, were landed at Alexandria in September, 1939. I regret that they were found to be missing in November, 1944, after a burglary at the premises at which they were stored, and police action failed to recover them.
As a token of the Admiralty's appreciation of the generosity of the people of the Malayan Union, the ship's bell of H.M.S. "Malaya" was presented to the Victoria Institution Kuala Lumpur, on 12th September, 1947, the second anniversary of Liberation Day, in the presence of His Excellency the Governor, the Sultan of Selangor, the Raja Muda of Perak (representing His Highness the Sultan of Perak), and Officials of the Malayan Union. Photographs of H.M.S. "Malaya" and of the history shield have also been presented to the Malayan Union for display in the Federal Legislative Council Chamber, and in each of the Council of State Chambers of the former Federated Malay States.

Commander Noble: Can the Minister say whether the pictures that were stolen were insured?

Mr. Dugdale: No, Sir, I cannot say that, but I can say that they were not pictures of any outstanding value.

Portsmouth War Memorial (Names)

Sir Jocelyn Lucas: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty why the names of deceased Naval personnel, who were born and lived all their lives in Portsmouth but who may have been based elsewhere, are debarred by his Department from inclusion in the Portsmouth


War Memorial; and whether, at the request of their parents, these names may be included on this Memorial rather than at some port with which they had no real connection.

Mr. Dugdale: The Naval War Memorial at Portsmouth as at other naval ports was erected to commemorate those of the Port Division who were missing in the first World War and it had been intended to add to the memorial the names of those who were missing in the last war on the same basis. My noble Friend is considering whether the suggestion of the hon. Member could be adopted and I will communicate with him further in due course.

Engineering College, Manadon

Mrs. Middleton: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty what building development is contemplated in connection with the Royal Naval Engineering College at Manadon in the near future; what will be the cost of the building which is being projected; to what purpose will it be devoted; when is it expected that the building will be commenced; and how many men will be employed on the site this year and next.

The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Walter Edwards): The building development now contemplated at the Royal Naval Engineering College, Manadon, consists of an extension of the instructional block and the erection of a workshop and boiler house. The cost of the work will be of the order of £480,000. These facilities are required for the training of Engineer Officers of the Navy in marine, gunnery, and aeronautical engineering for whom facilities are at present inadequate. It is improbable that actual work on the site will start before the beginning of 1949. The number of men to be employed next year will probably not exceed 300.

Mrs. Middleton: Will by hon. Friend give an assurance that, whatever may be the labour force used in this construction work, it will not interfere with the supply of labour for housing projects in the City of Plymouth?

Mr. Edwards: Whatever labour force is used will be taken from the allocation given to the Admiralty for actual building work.

Headquarters Organisation, Bath

Mr. I. J. Pitman: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty if it has yet been decided that any part of the Headquarters organisation of the Admiralty shall remain at Bath.

Mr. Dugdale: It has been decided that a considerable part of the Admiralty Headquarters organisation is to be permanently located at Bath. Broadly speaking, that part will comprise those departments which are concerned with the construction, maintenance and supply of the Fleet and its establishments, and with contracts and accounts. Under this decision certain departments now in London will in due course be moved to Bath. The time required to put it into effect will depend upon reductions in the size of those departments now at Bath and on the provision of additional housing there.

Mr. Pitman: Would the Minister consider, in making his permanent arrangements, the early release of hotels and the removal of those hutments which are unsightly; also, would be consider the question of greater protection in the event of war, because Bath wishes to be attractive to certain visitors in peacetime and unattractive to other visitors in wartime?

Mr. Dugdale: With regard to the second part of the question, that is not exactly a matter for the Navy. It is a question which might perhaps be addressed to other Ministers. In reference to the first part of the question, as the hon. Member knows, already a large number of buildings have been derequisitioned. We are fully aware of the desire of the citizens of Bath that as many as possible should be derequisitioned as soon as we can conveniently do so.

Mr. George Hicks: May I ask the Parliamentary Secretary whether the people of Bath agree with the observations recently made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bournemouth (Mr. Bracken)?

Mr. Dugdale: No, Sir. I understand that the observations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bournemouth met with some disapproval in Bath. The "Bath and Wilts Chronicle and Herald" said:


If we may say so of one who is blessed with a distinguishing crown of red hair"—
[Interruption.] I am sorry if some hon. Gentlemen do not want to hear this, but it is rather interesting and I think that some hon. Members would like to hear it. The paper said:
If we may say of one who is blessed with a distinguishing crown of red hair, Mr. Bracken went somewhat too bald-headedly at his subject. Indeed, there will be many in Bath who will feel that the former First Lord of the Admiralty, so far from hitting the deck, missed it altogether.

Commander Noble: Will the Admiralty be able to give up Queen Anne's Mansions and other accommodation in London which is urgently needed for housing?

Mr. Dugdale: I said that this was a long-term project. I could not possibly agree that we could suddenly release Queen Anne's Mansions.

Mr. Stokes: Can the Minister explain to the House why, now that we have a much smaller Navy, it is necessary to overflow the Admiralty to Bath? Surely, they ought to be able to come back again?

Mr. Dugdale: The suggestion that some of the Admiralty staff should be at Bath is part of the general move that is being made in other quarters for the decentralisation of certain offices from London.

Mr. Henry Strauss: Is the Minister satisfied that the supplementary question put by the hon. Member for East Woolwich (Mr. Hicks) was in the exact terms which the Minister agreed beforehand?

Mr. Dugdale: I should never dream of trying to explain to an hon. Member of the standing of my hon. Friend the Member for East Woolwich the terms in which he should put any question, or even what question he should put.

Sir Wavell Wakefield: In view of the retention of premises in Bath, could the Minister say what premises in London will be given up by the Admiralty?

Mr. Dugdale: Not without notice, Sir.

Mr. Pitman: As an hon. Member who, apparently, is alleged to be not equal in standing to the hon. Member for East Woolwich, in that he has taken at dictation from the Minister the wording of the

Question put down, might I protest on this and ask the Minister whether he is aware that, in point of fact, there are two schools of thought in Bath—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—and that what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bournemouth said is a viewpoint which has a considerable following in Bath?

Mr. Dugdale: I was trying to explain that I thought that possibly the views of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Bath (Mr. Pitman) were more representative of Bath than the views expressed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bournemouth (Mr. Bracken).

Oral Answers to Questions — POST OFFICE

Food Parcels (Wrong Delivery)

Mr. Touche: asked the Postmaster-General if he is aware that a cable addressed to the Council Offices, Dorking, from the Mayor of Rangiora, Canterbury, New Zealand, asking for the names of 100 Dorking people to whom food parcels could be sent, was wrongly delivered to the Council Offices, Barking, who promptly replied, with the result that the food parcels were sent to Barking and not to Dorking; and what reparation he proposes to make to the people of Dorking.

The Postmaster-General (Mr. Wilfred Paling): A mistake was made in the transmission of the telegram to this country and the office of destination appeared as "Borking." As there is no such place in this country, the receiving telegraphist should have sought a correction from New Zealand; but unfortunately, though not unnaturally, he jumped to the conclusion that the telegram was intended for Barking. I sincerely regret the mistake; but I am glad to say that the people of Dorking will receive their food parcels, and the New Zealand senders with characteristic generosity are sending parcels to Barking also. The question of reparation does not arise.

Mr. Touche: Is the Minister aware that the cable was addressed, "Chairman, Council, Dorking," and that it was delivered addressed, "Chapman, Council, Barking"? There were two mistakes,


and will he not consider some compensation in view of the fact that many mistakes are made now that Cable and Wireless has been nationalised?

Mr. Paling: My information is that the mistake was that which I have read out.

Mr. Wilson Harris: Did the telegraphist forget Bocking, which seems to have some reason to feel aggrieved?

Staff Associations (Recognition)

Mr. J. Langford-Holt: asked the Postmaster-General why 22 members of the National Association of Women Civil Servants employed by the Post Office were granted special leave to attend their delegate conference in view of the fact that they are not a recognised association as such.

Mr. Wilfred Paling: The National Association of Women Civil Servants, is not wholly unrecognised in the Post Office. The extent of its recognition has recently been much reduced and I propose to review the facilities allowed to its members in the light of the outcome of discussions now in progress on the National Whitley Council.

Mr. Langford-Holt: asked the Postmaster-General whether he will give an assurance that he will grant recognition to the National Association of Postal and Telegraph Officers as soon as they have recruited sufficient members.

Mr. Wilfred Paling: If and when the National Association of Postal and Telegraph Officers can show that it has in membership 40 per cent. of the organised Postal and Telegraph Officers in the Post Office, I shall consider the question of recognising it.

Mr. Langford-Holt: Could the Minister, therefore, assure the House, without discussing the merits of trade unions, that he is not attempting to set up or obtain a monopoly of any sort in this situation?

Mr. Paling: I have indicated to the hon. Member more than once that we have a well-recognised course of conduct in this business, and that 40 per cent. is the percentage generally recognised.

Mr. W. R. Williams: Will my right hon. Friend make it clear that, despite the

insistent political pressure placed upon him, it is not his intention to give an assurance of the kind which may tend to encourage the leaders of minority cecessionist movements in the Post Office to try to promote disunity amongst the workers, thus jeopardising the good relationships between the Post Office and the trade unions which are recognised already?

Mr. Langford-Holt: Bearing in mind the unanimity of the Transport and General Workers' Union, will the right hon. Gentleman now give an answer to the question I put a few moments ago?

Channel Islands Liberation (Stamp Issue)

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: asked the Postmaster-General in what values the stamps issued to celebrate the liberation of the Channel Islands are available to the public; and why there is no indication on them of their association and object.

Mr. Wilfred Paling: 1d. and 2½d. The scene depicts a familiar local activity and was selected as typical of the Channel Islands; the object has been announced widely in the Press.

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: Does not my right hon. Friend recognise that there is no indication on the stamps that they are in any way associated with the Channel Islands; and will he explain why there has been this absurd mistake, so that philatelists are writing in and complaining to the Post Office that it does not know its job?

Mr. Paling: We have had no complaints at the Post Office. The Channel Islands people were taken into full consultation on this matter, and it was done with their consent.

Dr. Segal: In view of the fact that the penny stamp depicts a refuse cart drawn by one horse, and that the 2½d. stamp depicts a refuse cart drawn by two horses, could not the right hon. Gentleman add a few more horses and issue a few more stamps of a higher denomination?

Sir R. Ross: Have the people of the Channel Islands insisted that they must have stamps bearing these carts, horses and seaweed?

Mr. Paling: This design was approved by the Channel Islands people themselves.

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: Would not either potatoes or tomatoes have been a more suitable emblem for these stamps?

Mr. Paling: I am not sure that that would have been appropriate to all the Islands.

Mr. Langford-Holt: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell me if these stamps are usable in this country, since I had a letter posted in the United Kingdom and received by me in London, bearing a Channel Islands stamp?

Mr. Paling: Yes, they are.

Air Mail, East Africa (Newspapers)

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: asked the Postmaster-General if he will reduce the present cost of carriage of newsprint by air to East Africa, in order that British newspapers may be made more easily available to dwellers in the East African territories.

Mr. Wilfred Paling: The possibility of extending to East Africa, and other Commonwealth destinations, facilities for the transmission of newspapers and other second class mail by air at reduced air postage rates, is being considered in consultation with the Ministry of Civil Aviation and British Overseas Airways Corporation, but I am not in a position to say when it may be possible to introduce such facilities.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Is the Minister aware that his reply will give a certain amount of satisfaction in the territories concerned; but is he further aware that, at this moment, an air mail copy of "The Times" costs 3s. 4d. in Nairobi, that is, 4d. for the newspaper and 3s. for air freight, and that other newspapers are practically unobtainable there, and will he do something urgently to remedy this state of affairs?

Mr. Paling: I have said that this matter is being considered at the moment.

Mr. Skeffington: Is my right hon. Friend aware that opinion in many of these territories is that, even if it is a question of subsidisation, it is the sort of thing we ought to do for Imperial relations?

Mr. Paling: We may be able to help.

Oral Answers to Questions — BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION

Political Broadcasts

Sir Waldron Smithers: asked the Postmaster-General if he will take the necessary steps to ensure that anyone broadcasting on a matter of political or other importance shall do so under his or her real name, and state to what political party he or she adheres.

Mr. Wilfred Paling: The answer is, "No, Sir."

Sir W. Smithers: In view of the fact that the Prime Minister himself has acknowledged the danger of Communism by instituting a purge in the Civil Service, will he extend that purge to the staff of the B.B.C? Can I have an answer? On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the fact that you have ruled that we have some difficulty in asking Questions about the B.B.C. and other nationalised industries, when I do ask a Question why cannot the Postmaster-General answer it?

Mr. Paling: I have no intention of applying any purge to the B.B.C.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is it to be understood that the hon. Member for Orpington (Sir W. Smithers) may now broadcast from Moscow under an assumed name?

Staff Associations

Mr. Ernest Davies: asked the Postmaster-General what steps have been taken by the B.B.C. to carry out the requirements of Clause 8 of its Charter.

Mr. Wilfred Paling: The Corporation has informed the Minister of Labour and National Service and myself that within the terms of Clause 8 of its Charter it has recognised the B.B.C. Staff Association as a negotiating body. The Corporation has received representations from the T.U.C. for similar recognition of a number of trade unions. A meeting between the Corporation, the T.U.C. and the Unions directly concerned has taken place and the Corporation expects further meetings.

Mr. Davies: Is not my right hon. Friend aware that it is now 18 months since the Charter came into effect, that these representations were made shortly after the Charter came into effect, and that speed is called for in this matter, in as much as


a large section of the B.B.C. staff are not members of the Staff Association, and do not wish to be members of it, but are members of the legitimate trade unions, and wish to have their unions recognised for collective bargaining and other purposes?

Mr. Paling: I have said that the matter is being considered and is still proceeding.

Oral Answers to Questions — TELEPHONE SERVICE

Priority

Mr. Donner: asked the Postmaster-General why bookmakers are given priority in the matter of obtaining a telephone and clergymen are not.

Mr. Wilfred Paling: In the matter of obtaining a telephone, bookmakers are not given priority, whereas it is the general practice to accord a measure of priority to clergymen.

Mr. Donner: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a senior official of the postal organisation in Southampton informed a canon in my constituency to this effect, and will he take steps to reprimand that official?

Mr. Paling: I understand that that is not so, and that the clergyman in question got an entirely erroneous impression of what was said.

Mr. Chetwynd: Could my right hon. Friend ask the two people concerned in this case to share a telephone to their mutual advantage?

Mr. McGovern: Could my right hon. Friend say why those who are tipping for the future, should be given preference over those who are tipping for the present?

Lee Green Exchange

Mr. Skeffington: asked the Postmaster-General whether he is yet in a position to offer telephone subscribers on the Lee Green Exchange a better service.

Mr. Wilfred Paling: I am pleased to say that our records show a marked improvement in the service at Lee Green exchange during the last six months.

Mr. Skeffington: Can my right hon. Friend explain why this service, even compared with that of other exchanges in the neighbourhood, is so appallingly bad, and why something more effective has not been done two years after the war has ended?

Mr. Paling: I think this is one of the few manual exchanges still left. If it had not been for the war, it might have been replaced before now, but the war stopped a great many of these things. I might also say that there has been great trouble in getting telephonists, and, at this time last year, the number of people leaving was about 50 per cent. That meant that we always had to take a number of untrained people into the exchanges, but it is much better now, and I am glad to say they are being replaced.

Mr. H. Hynd: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the service at Lee Green Exchange cannot possibly be any worse than that at Clissold?

Mr. Berry: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Lee Green Exchange shares with Greenwich and Tideway the unenviable reputation of being the worst in London?

Mr. Paling: I have said that this is one of the few manual exchanges still left.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL AIR FORCE

Air Training Corps (Recruitment)

Sir P. Hannon: asked the Secretary of State for Air what special arrangements have been approved for the encouragement of recruitment to the Air Training Corps; what is the present strength of the A.T.C. organisation; what financial provision is being made to provide officers uniforms and essential equipment for A.T.C. units; and if financial support will be given to the provision of suitable headquarters where necessary.

The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas): A number of special measures have been introduced to encourage boys to join the A.T.C. and I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate details in the OFFICIAL. REPORT. The results of these measures are now being seen; the strength of the Corps,


which is now 49,600, and its efficiency have both risen appreciably since the autumn of last year.

Sir P. Hannon: While thanking the hon. Gentleman for his reply, may I ask whether it means that some concessions will be made to officers in respect of uniforms, essential equipment and the provision of headquarters, and that the general encouragement of the work of the A.T.C. will be on better lines than those at present pursued by the Government?

Mr. de Freitas: Both those points are covered in the statement, and I am sure the hon. Gentleman will find it encouraging.

Following is the statement:

Apart from providing training which will be valuable to a cadet in civil life, the A.T.C. offers many opportunities for interesting service while a cadet is a member of the Corps, and many advantages when he joins the R.A.F., either for National Service or Regular Service. There are opportunities for visits to R.A.F. stations and flights in R.A.F. aircraft, including long-distance flights to stations overseas. Glider instruction is given at more than 50 schools. Cadets can take certain courses at local technical schools at public expense. Several flying scholarships have been endowed by civil flying clubs, business firms and private individuals—whose generosity is much appreciated—and a number of A.T.C. cadets have thus been trained to fly up to the "A" licence standard.

The R.A.F. offers special advantages to A.T.C. cadets. Proficient cadets are guaranteed entry into the R.A.F.; the period of recruit training is reduced; and they have certain privileges in choosing the trade in which they wish to serve. Proficient cadets whose general education has reached School Certificate standard and who wish to apply for permanent commissions are excused the open competitive examination for Cranwell. The formation of the Combined Cadet Force in schools and the reduction of the age of entry into the A.T.C. from 15 to 14 are other measures which will, it is hoped, increase the number in the Corps.

The principal items of officers' uniforms are issued without charge from service stocks; an allowance of £7 10s. is also

paid to newly commissioned officers. A wide range of equipment is supplied to units free of charge and the cost of accommodation needed by A.T.C. headquarters is met from public funds.

Westwood Aerodrome

Mr. Tiffany: asked the Secretary of State for Air what personnel are to be catered for by Air Defence Unit at the Westwood Aerodrome, Peterborough; from what area or areas is the personnel to be drawn; and what buildings or huts will be required.

Mr. de Freitas: This unit will have a strength of 565 officers, airmen and airwomen. They will be drawn from an area of 30 miles radius around Peterborough. The unit will require the block containing the officers' mess and living quarters, the married quarter and eight huts.

Mr. Tiffany: Is there no possibility of this air defence unit being taken to a nearby aerodrome, thereby releasing Westwood for local essential purposes?

Mr. de Freitas: I am afraid not. This R.A.F. station is in the centre of the area from which the recruits are to be drawn, and the airmen and airwomen, who, of course, are civilians, will be able to reach it by public transport because it is there.

Mr. Tiffany: asked the Secretary of State for Air on what date was Westwood Aerodrome or parts thereof declared as surplus to the requirements of the Air Ministry and handed to the Ministry of Works for disposal.

Mr. de Freitas: At different dates since January, 1947, as the needs of the R.A.F. at the airfield contracted. Except for the huts and buildings that are needed permanently by the R.A.F., all accommodation at the airfield has been surrendered.

Bombing Range, Berkshire Downs

Sir Ralph Glyn: asked the Secretary of State for Air whether he has considered the representations from racehorse trainers and from farmers using the Berkshire Downs concerning the proposal to utilise the Odstone bombing range for intensive high and low bombing by day


and by night; and whether he is in a position to make any statement on this matter.

Mr. de Freitas: These representations are being examined and replies will be sent as soon as possible. Meanwhile there will be no change in the present use of the range.

Sir Hugh Walmsley (Speech)

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Secretary of State for Air how many recruits were obtained for the Auxiliary Air Force as the result of the display addressed by Sir Hugh S. P. Walmsley, in Edinburgh, on 14th June; and what was the cost of this display.

The Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Arthur Henderson): Fifty candidates for the Royal Auxiliary Air Force came forward on the afternoon of this display. The flying was part of normal training and involved no additional cost. The publicity was arranged by the local Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Association, and cost about £100.

Mr. Hughes: Is the Minister aware that this appeal for recruits by this Air-Marshal was on the assumption that we were going to be at war with Soviet Russia? In view of the fact that last week it was stated that this was not the policy of His Majesty's Government, have steps been taken to tell this Air-Marshal not to make similar speeches in future?

Mr. Henderson: In reply to the second part of the supplementary question, there is another Question on the Order Paper which I will answer later on. As to the first part of the supplementary question, the policy of my Department to seek to recruit to the Reserve forces of the Air Force had been in operation long before this speech was made.

Major Tufton Beamish: Can the Minister say how many recruits have been obtained for the Royal Air Force as a result of speeches made by the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes)?

Wing-Commander Hulbert: Does not the right hon. and learned Gentleman consider this result very satisfactory for the very small amount of money spent?

Mr. Henderson: Yes. Sir.

Air-Commodore Harvey: Does not the Minister agree that the actual response to the recruiting campaign was because the Air-Marshal spoke the truth?

Mr. Piratin: asked the Secretary of State for Air what disciplinary action he has taken in the case of Air-Marshal Sir Hugh Walmsley for the speech he made on 12th June without the authority of His Majesty's Government.

Mr. A. Henderson: I have spoken to Air-Marshal Walmsley on this matter and I do not propose to take any further action.

Mr. Piratin: Is the Minister satisfied that he has carried out completely the terms laid down in paragraph 541A of King's Regulations in the same way as they would be carried out if it was not a senior officer of the Air Force who was involved?

Mr. Henderson: Yes, Sir. I have reminded the Air-Marshal of what should be said and what should not be said by a serving officer, and I am satisfied that he fully understands the position.

Mr. Gallacher: Is the Minister aware of the simple elementary fact that in view of the condition in which this country is now, talk of war is talk of national suicide, and will he stop it?

Mr. Henderson: I have previously replied to a Question on this matter, and have indicated that the reference in the speech to Soviet Russia did not represent the policy of His Majesty's Government.

Wing-Commander Hulbert: Was it not the Air-Marshal's speech which helped recruiting so much at that meeting?

Mr. Henderson: I must clear up that point. In fact, the recruits were not present when that speech was made.

Czechoslovakian Refugees (Transport)

Mr. Piratin: asked the Secretary of State for Air how many Czechoslovakians have arrived in this country by R.A.F. transport in the last four months.

Mr. de Freitas: None, Sir.

Mr. Piratin: Is it not the case that on 16th June an R.A.F. transport arrived at


Manston containing a number of Czechoslovakians? Should not they be included in the answer to this Question?

Mr. de Freitas: That is not the case. That is why I said "None, Sir."

Mr. Piratin: asked the Secretary of State for Air why a R.A.F. transport was provided for newspaper reporters to go to Manston on 16th June in order to meet Czechoslovakians who were landing there.

Mr. de Freitas: R.A.F. transport and an escorting officer were provided because Manston is an aerodrome which the Press are not allowed to enter without permission, and because it was desirable, in the interests of the refugees and of their relatives, that certain precautions should be observed when they were interviewed.

Mr. Piratin: Is it not the case that these journalists were transported to Manston in a R.A.F. transport in order to meet the Czechoslovakians who were arriving there?

Mr. de Freitas: Yes, Sir; that is perfectly true. The journalists wanted to go, and, therefore, a R.A.F. coach was laid on to take them. They went together in the coach.

Mr. Blackburn: Will my hon. Friend make it clear that these facilities will be provided without any form of political discrimination, and that they may include Communist refugees from what the Cominform has officially described as "the Turkish terrorism of Tito in Yugoslavia"?

Air-Commodore Harvey: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that some of these Czechoslovakians fought for Great Britain in the Battle of Britain, and that we should do everything to facilitate their arrival in this country?

Mr. de Freitas: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Piratin: Can the Under-Secretary give an assurance that at least his Ministry is not interfering in another country's affairs?

Mr. de Freitas: That has nothing whatever to do with this Question.

Low Flying, Norwich

Mr. John Paton: asked the Secretary of State for Air what steps he proposes

to take to lessen the nuisance to the people of Norwich and to teachers and pupils in the schools arising from the manœuvring of aeroplanes over the city.

Mr. de Freitas: I am sorry for any disturbance that the R.A.F. may be causing to the people of Norwich, but I can assure my hon. Friend that we have reduced to the minimum the amount of flying over the city.

Mr. Paton: While I am grateful for the Minister's sympathy, may I ask if something more could not be done to put an end to this almost intolerable nuisance? Could not St. Faith's be closed and one of the unemployed aerodromes in Norfolk be used, far removed from populated towns?

Mr. de Freitas: I am sorry to have to tell my hon. Friend that during the last two years we have gone into this point on many occasions. This station was built as a permanent fighter station; it cost a great deal of money, and on strategic and financial grounds we must stay there.

Mr. Paton: Is it not the fact that this station has been so badly planned that it is only possible for aeroplanes to gain height by flying over the city of Norwich, and is that not a good reason for abandoning it?

Mr. de Freitas: It is quite true that the aircraft must fly over the city of Norwich. It is most unfortunate, but this airfield was built in 1937, a great deal of money was spent, and we cannot afford either financially or strategically to move from there.

Mr. Pritt: Has the Minister considered that if there were a war somebody would come along and destroy not merely the aerodrome, but the city as well. Is not that a good reason for moving?

Mr. de Freitas: The airfield was sited there by people whose job it is to know the best strategical siting for airfields, and I am content to accept their view.

Mr. Pritt: How much did they know about 1948 in 1937?

Mr. de Freitas: Nothing, but, as I have already said, this question has been reexamined several times within the last two years.

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL AVIATION

Corporations (Aircraft)

Wing-Commander Hulbert: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation if he will circulate, in the OFFICIAL REPORT, details of the aircraft owned by the three Airway Corporations.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation (Mr. Lindgren): No, Sir. I do not think I should be justified in requiring from the Corporations information of this kind which appears in their annual reports.

Wing-Commander Hulbert: Surely, the hon. Gentleman agrees that it is very desirable that the public who now own these Corporations should know what aircraft they have.

Mr. Lindgren: Yes, Sir. They get that information as and when it is published in the annual reports of the Corporations.

Passengers (Priority Seats)

Mr. Beswick: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation whether he will make a further report on the allocation of priority seats to air passengers.

Mr. Lindgren: I am glad to say that as from 1st July next, the Corporations will be entirely free from priority control.

Mr. Renton: Can the hon. Gentleman say how many air passages have been lost to the nationalised air services by the over-booking of priority seats?

Mr. Lindgren: Not without notice.

Corporation Executives (Financial Interests)

Mr. Ernest Davies: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation if he will direct the airways corporations to require that none of their high executives shall hold a financial interest in private aircraft companies operating in or from the United Kingdom.

Mr. Lindgren: No, Sir. This is a matter which may safely be left to the discretion of the Boards of the Corporations.

Mr. Davies: Does not my hon. Friend consider it an undesirable practice that an executive employed by the Airways

Corporation should hold an interest in companies with which the Corporation has an agreement at the present time?

Mr. Lindgren: No, Sir. The association or interest is not in any air line or any air company which is associated in any degree with the Corporation of which the man is an executive.

Mr. Rankin: Is it not the case that there are executives who are directly associated with charter companies which are carrying on work for one or other of the corporations? Does the hon. Gentleman think that is advisable?

Mr. Lindgren: No, Sir, it is not so. The only case is that of Mr. Whitney Straight, who is chief executive to B.O.A.C. and who has a financial interest, but not a managerial interest, in Western Airways.

Mr. Davies: Would it not be better if he were disassociated from this company in the same way as in any other nationalised concerns members of the board are not allowed to hold interests which conflict with their work in the nationalised undertaking?

Mr. Lindgren: In the opinion of my noble Friend that conflict of interest does not exist and would not exist unless, in fact, there was a responsibility for management. My noble Friend feels it is exactly the same position as that of a Member of His Majesty's Government who may have a financial interest but is required to give up a managerial interest on taking office.

Air-Commodore Harvey: Would the Parliamentary Secretary say if Mr. Whitney Straight made his position clear when he accepted an appointment under the Corporation?

Mr. Lindgren: Yes, Sir: that is so.

Nationalised Services (Staff Economies)

Wing-Commander Hulbert: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation if, in view of the urgent need for economy in the operation of nationalised air services, he will state what economies in staff have been effected since 1st January, 1948, in the three Corporations, respectively.

Mr. Lindgren: No, Sir. This is a matter of management.

Wing-Commander Hulbert: Surely the hon. Gentleman will agree that, as these Corporations lose large sums of money, more and more in the year, we ought to know what economies, if any, have been introduced?

Mr. Lindgren: The view taken by my noble Friend is that for a given amount of work, the given number of staff required to perform it is one of the responsibilities of management of any undertaking.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Would it not be in the interests of the Corporations themselves, if, as has been said, they are making large reductions in staff that we should know about them and not have to wait a year before we know what they are?

Mr. Lindgren: The information will be given, I have no doubt, in their annual reports.

Tudor IV Aircraft

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation when permission will be given to British South American Airways to purchase Tudor IV aircraft.

Mr. Lindgren: British South American Airways already have three Tudor IV's. A further 16, which were constructed as Tudor I's and are being modified to Tudor IV's, have hitherto been earmarked for British Overseas Airways Corporation. Any re-allocation of these aircraft as between British Overseas Airways Corporation and British South American Airways Corporation will depend on the outcome of certain wider discussions now in progress.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Is it not a fact that B.S.A.A. want these Tudors and B.O.A.C. do not, and is it not rather foolish of His Majesty's Government to continue to press a Corporation which does not want them to have them, and not to allow a Corporation which does want them to make speedy purchases?

Mr. Lindgren: Those are the very points which are now under consideration.

INDONESIAN PASSPORTS

Mr. Platts-Mills: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs why instructions have been given to British diplomatic missions in the Far East no longer

to honour Indonesian Republican passports.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): The hon. Member has, I think, misunderstood the position. There is no question of a change of policy or attitude. The only instructions issued to His Majesty's Representatives abroad relate to the affixing of British visas to passports issued by the Republican authorities. As a result of a review of the situation created by the Renville Agreement, His Majesty's Government decided that it was inappropriate for British visas to be affixed to these passports, since they are not internationally recognised travel documents. There is no question of seeking in any way to restrict the travel of Indonesians by these arrangements.

Mr. Platts-Mills: Has my right hon. Friend borne in mind, in discontinuing the practice of recognising Indonesian passports, that the latest conduct of the Dutch in unilaterally breaking off relations and in their endless procrastination is being condemned by all three members of the Security Council's Commission now in—

Mr. Speaker: It is not a question of the Dutch. It is a question of honouring Indonesian passports. That is the Question and it is that to which the hon. Member must apply his mind.

Mr. Platts-Mills: On a point of Order. I was seeking to get the Foreign Secretary to apply his mind to giving the House reasons for our failure to give recognition to these passports. Might I complete my Question?

Mr. Speaker: It is no use making charges against another country.

Mr. Platts-Mills: On a point of Order. Might I not draw attention to the fact that the Security Council's good-will Commission, now in Batavia, have used certain phrases about the Dutch?

Mr. Walter Fletcher: Would it be much use taking these passports down to Victoria?

MIDDLE EAST (POLICY)

Mr. Platts-Mills: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what is the scope of the understanding between His


Majesty's Government and the U.S. Administration to keep each other informed regarding policy developments in the Middle East; and whether he will seek to extend this bilateral arrangement to include the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Bevin: His Majesty's Government exchange information and views with other friendly Governments, including the United States Government, about developments in the Middle East and in other parts of the world as occasion arises. His Majesty's Government have not concluded any special bilateral agreement or arrangement for this purpose. The second part of the Question does not, therefore, arise.

Mr. Platts-Mills: Does the working of this understanding with the United States include, as Mr. Sumner Welles has just asserted, United States backing for the Foreign Secretary—

Hon. Members: Reading a speech.

Mr. Platts-Mills: —and of the Foreign Secretary's encouragement, which just preceded the truce, of Syria and the Lebanon intensifying their campaign, particularly in the case of Syria—

Mr. Speaker: That is a supplementary question which is so obviously being read out that it is quite contrary to our custom. Supplementary questions should not be long statements; they should be short and snappy and to the point.

Mr. Gallacher: While I agree with your Ruling on that question, Mr. Speaker, a whole series of questions was asked earlier this afternoon, and we had the most laboured and long drawn-out arguments from an hon. Member on the other side, whose constituency I do not remember but who put down the original Question. It was a long, laboured, drawn-out argument directed to the Minister. Nobody protested, and I think a little allowance might be made for the solitary hon. Member behind me.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) will remember that the long, laboured questions were started by a question which came from the opposite side of the House and which had really not very much to do with the original Question.

Oral Answers to Questions — YUGOSLAVIA

Archbishop Stepinac

Mr. Stokes: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether further representations will now be made for the release from prison of Archbishop Stepinac now serving a sentence of 16 years imprisonment and hard labour in Yugoslavia.

Mr. Bevin: No, Sir. I have nothing to add to previous statements on this subject.

Mr. Stokes: Does my right hon. Friend realise what a large body of opinion in this country and elsewhere is outraged by this, and would it not be a most prudent, wise and humane act on the part of Marshal Tito at this stage to set Archbishop Stepinac free?

Mr. Bevin: I am afraid I cannot interfere in this matter. I have answered the Question.

Mr. Leslie Hale: Does my right hon. Friend realise that the news of this sentence was received by His Majesty's loyal Catholic subjects with a feeling of real horror and that it is against the consciences of many people that a man of this eminence and this distinction should be kept in prison for these many years? And is this not a very convenient moment when representations might be made that it would be for the good of relations with Yugoslavia for some action now to be taken?

Mr. Bevin: I do not think the attitude of Yugoslavia has changed as a result of what has happened in another sphere. The horror of this sentence is shared not only by His Majesty's Catholic subjects, but by every decent person, but I am afraid I cannot add to the answer.

Mr. Gallacher: Can the Foreign Secretary tell us how many clergymen were killed by the Black and Tans in Southern Ireland?

Detainees, Germany and Italy

Mr. Stokes: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that 20 Yugoslavs are now detained


in prison at Esterwegen in Germany and have now been detained there, or in Italy, for more than 18 months; and whether he will give instructions for their immediate release.

Mr. Bevin: The cases of all these persons have now been decided, and instructions sent to Germany for the decisions to be carried out. In six cases the decision is the joint responsibility of His Majesty's Government and the United States Government.

Mr. Stokes: Can my right hon. Friend tell us, now the decisions have been taken, how many of them are to be released?

Mr. Bevin: I must have notice of that Question.

Mr. Stokes: But that is what I asked in the original Question.

BURMA (MURDERED BRITISH SUBJECTS)

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in what circumstances Mr. H. J. Forbes, British manager of an oil estate in Shan State, Burma, and his wife, were murdered; and whether he will make a statement.

Mr. Bevin: I regret to inform the House that Mr. H. J. Forbes, the British manager of a Tung-oil estate near Maymyo in Burma, and his wife, were attacked and shot dead on 22nd June by a gang of about 30 dacoits, believed to include deserters from the Burmese Army and also Communists. One of the attackers has been captured. The Burmese Government have expressed their regret to His Majesty's Ambassador in Rangoon, and assured him that a full investigation will be made and that everything possible will be done to bring those responsible to justice. I will send my hon. Friend any further information on this matter which reaches me.

Mr. Keeling: As Mr. and Mrs. Forbes were constituents of mine, will the right hon. Gentleman also send the information to me?

Mr. Bevin: Certainly.

UNITED NATIONS APPEAL FOR CHILDREN

Mr. Warbey: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will ask the Economic and Social Council to authorise the United Nations Appeal for Children to organise a further world-wide appeal during the year 1947–48.

Mr. A. R. W. Low: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether His Majesty's Government propose to ask the Economic and Social Council to authorise the continuance of making the United Nations Appeal for Children.

Mrs. Jean Mann: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the urgent need to continue help for the suffering children throughout the world, he will support the continuation of organised help for children within the United Nations Organisation.

Viscountess Davidson: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will support the continuance of the United Nations Appeal for Children until their needs are satisfied.

Mr. Bevin: His Majesty's Government are keenly aware of the importance of the tasks of the United Nations Appeal for Children; but our attitude towards the continuance of the Appeal will be determined in the light of the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which will be made to the Economic and Social Council next month. I would like to take this opportunity of saying that while the general response to the Lord Mayor's Appeal in this country has been satisfactory, there are certain areas in which little or nothing has been subscribed. I hope that all hon. Members will emphasise to their constituents the importance of giving generous support to the Appeal.

Mr. Warbey: When my right hon. Friend is giving further consideration to this matter, will he bear in mind that this appeal is the first activity of the United Nations which has given the individual citizen in each country the feeling that he can participate in a world-wide effort of a constructive and humanitarian character?

Mr. Bevin: I have broadcast twice on the matter, and I regret that many constituencies of hon. Members have sent so little money. I wish they would buck up.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (BRITISH DELEGATION)

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who are to represent His Majesty's Government at the forthcoming meeting of the Economic and Social Council.

Mr. Bevin: The United Kingdom delegation to the meeting of the Economic and Social Council in July next will be led by my right hon. Friend the Minister of State. He will be supported by a small delegation of officials drawn from the United Kingdom Delegation at New York, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Labour.

Mr. Lindsay: Will my right hon. Friend see that whoever goes gives sympathetic consideration to the subject of the four previous Questions put by hon. Members on all sides of the Houses?—I mean the Questions about the United Nations appeal for Children.

Mr. Bevin: Certainly.

SINGAPORE BASE

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Minister of Defence whether he will give an assurance that, before proceeding further with expenditure on the base at Singapore, he will consider representations from senior officers on the spot who regard the base as outmoded and indefensible.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. A. V. Alexander): When deciding upon the reconstruction of the Singapore base, His Majesty's Government took full expert advice from all appropriate sources.

Mr. Hughes: Can the Minister contradict the statement made in the "Daily Telegraph" that naval officers on the spot have definitely been against this idea? Is he satisfied that we are justified in spending another £800,000 on the base?

Mr. Alexander: I do not take my views from newspaper correspondents. I ask for all the expert advice I can get. No

senior officer, as inferred in the Question, has taken a contrary view.

Vice-Admiral Taylor: Is it not a fact that the base at Singapore is of the utmost importance in the event of the outbreak of war?

Mr. Rankin: Does it not seem rather far away from the shores of this country?

Oral Answers to Questions — FOOD SUPPLIES

Children's Meals (Pamphlet)

Mr. De la Bère: asked the Minister of Food whether, in view of the fact that the rations advocated in the pamphlet issued by his Department on "How to plan meals for children from one to two years," are in many cases not obtainable, and the recommendations suggested are not considered suitable by a large body of medical opinion, will he withdraw this pamphlet.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food (Dr. Edith Summerskill): No, Sir. The quantities of food recommended are available from the present rations. The leaflet was prepared in consultation with medical officers experienced in maternity and child welfare work, and it has proved useful to mothers of young children.

Mr. De la Bère: Will the hon. Lady tell us whether it is not a fact that well informed medical opinion suggested that the recommendations would not be of benefit to the children; whether it is really true that rations are available; and whether this pamphlet is not now going to be taken out of print and a new one issued? Why waste money and paper?

Dr. Summerskill: I welcome this opportunity to tell the hon. Gentleman what is the standing of the well-informed medical opinion of which he speaks. The allegations in this Question first appeared in the "Sunday Express" of 20th June, in the form of an interview with a so-called Harley Street consultant. This man criticised my Department, and, indirectly, the eminent medical advisers who ad vise my Department. I am quite sure that the hon. Gentleman will be relieved to learn that this man is not on the medical register.

Mr. De la Bère: Is the hon. Lady aware that I did not say he was, and that I did


not say it had anything to do with the Press? I said this was the opinion of medical practitioners, who demonstrated that this was not a suitable diet. I could produce that opinion in half an hour for the hon. Lady.

Dr. Summerskill: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will tell me the name of the doctor who gave him this opinion?

Mr. De la Bère: Certainly.

Mr. Churchill: I suppose the hon. Lady wants to victimise him.

Bread (Wrapping)

Mr. Assheton: asked the Minister of Food whether he will take steps to remove the ban on wrapping bread.

Dr. Summerskill: The ban only relates to wrapping by machine in specially prepared paper, and must still be retained because waxed paper is scarce. There is nothing to prevent bread being wrapped in ordinary paper at the time of sale, and I should encourage the practice, so far as supplies permit.

Mr. Assheton: Is the hon. Lady hopeful that the ban on the other kinds of wrapping will soon be removed?

Dr. Summerskill: Paraffin wax is needed for wax wrapping, and that means dollar expenditure. I am hoping that there will be more of the other paper very soon.

London Docks Strike (Food Losses)

Mr. Donner: asked the Minister of Food if he will now state the quantity and value of food which became unfit for human consumption owing to delayed unloading as a result of the London dock strike.

Dr. Summerskill: The food which has been condemned because of the London Dock strike comprises 13 tons of canary tomatoes, 17 tons of cucumbers, three tons of melons and half a ton of peaches, together valued at approximately £1,800.

African Groundnuts Scheme

Mr. Wingfield Digby: asked the Minister of Food what is the total area of bush now cleared at Kongwa and in the Southern Province of Tanganyika, respectively.

Dr. Summerskill: The only figures available so far from the Overseas Food Corporation are these of bush flattening, because the preparation of the ground for planting will be done later in the year. In 1947, 12,730 acres of bush were flattened in the Centre Province. In 1948 an additional 16,958 acres in the Central Province and 2,524 acres in the Western Province had been flattened by 5th June. Clearing has not yet begun in the Southern Province.

Mr. Digby: In view of those disappointing figures, can the hon. Lady say what steps are being taken to speed up bush clearance?

Dr. Summerskill: I think my right hon. Friend in his statement to the House made it quite clear that the whole project was a year behind schedule.

Mr. Oliver Stanley: Do not these figures show they are more than a year behind? Should not they have reached 150,000 acres in the first year?

Dr. Summerskill: I think my right hon. Friend said 150,000 acres up to the end of 1948.

Wrapping Materials

Sir R. Glyn: asked the Minister of Food whether he has considered the unsatisfactory conditions under which retailers of perishable foodstuffs have to serve customers on account of the shortage of materials for wrapping up fish, meat, etc.; and whether he will assist retailers in obtaining returnable plastic containers for their customers' use on a deposit payment.

Dr. Summerskill: My right hon. Friend is aware of the difficulties under which retailers work, but supplies of wrapping paper are about 20 per cent. higher than at the end of the war and should be adequate for minimum requirements. I doubt whether returnable plastic containers would be welcomed by the public or whether they would always remain hygienic. However, I understand that supplies of plastic materials are sufficient to meet demands.

Strawberries (Canning)

De la Bère: asked the Minister of Food what is the reason for the reduction in his canning programme for strawberries; why such short notice was given


to the canners instructing them to reduce the size of their pack; and what is the connection between this reduction and the increased export of tinplate for the canning industry, which has been brought about by sending overseas supplies urgently needed by the home producers and home consumers.

Dr. Summerskill: The Ministry's programme for the canning of strawberries, which is more than twice that of last year, has not been reduced: and the second and third parts of the Question therefore do not arise.

Mr. De la Bère: Is the hon. Lady aware that that programme was agreed by all sections of the trade in March, and that it has been reduced? Why is it, when we want to obtain additional food from home production, that we send tinplate abroad, and so make it impossible to increase supplies of home grown food? The hon. Lady is not going to get that one over on me.

Dr. Summerskill: I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman is constantly misinformed. The programme was agreed in March at 1,050 tons, and that is the amount we are producing.

Mr. De la Bère: Is the hon. Lady aware that I am informed of the facts from knowledge of them in my own division of Evesham?

Glucose Barley Sugar

Colonel Stoddart-Scott: asked the Minister of Food to what extent the decision of some pharmacists to reduce by 50 per cent. the quantity of glucose barley sugar supplied against medical prescription is due to the decision of his Department not to replace raw material from which glucose barley sugar is made.

Dr. Summerskill: There are ample supplies of glucose barley sugar available to meet all demands against medical prescriptions, although it may not always be possible to meet the demand for the product of a particular manufacturer.

New Ration Books

Colonel Wheatley: asked the Minister of Food why the issue of new ration books by post was not permitted before 3rd July; and what was the reason for not making this information public.

Dr. Summerskill: We do not prevent people from applying for a ration book by post, but it would be impossible to operate a return-of-post service at a time when food office staffs are manning the extra distribution centres which are set up to help personal applicants. We do not, therefore, encourage people to apply by post during the early part of the ration book distribution.

Egg Allocation (School Holidays)

Mr. C. S. Taylor: asked the Minister of Food whether he is aware that school children who are home on holiday from boarding school are unable to obtain an egg allocation; and whether he will now instruct retailers to supply eggs on emergency cards issued to these children.

Dr. Summerskill: I know that difficulties sometimes arise in supplying eggs against temporary ration documents. An allowance over and above the ordinary allocation is, however, given to retailers for new and temporary customers and this should normally be adequate to meet the requirements of the holders of emergency cards. In cases of difficulty the food office can usually help.

Mr. Taylor: Does not the hon. Lady realise that these children, who are badly in need of eggs, cannot get them during the holiday period, and cannot she give instructions to the retailers specially to look after these children?

Dr. Summerskill: Instructions are given and the food offices generally help. I must remind the hon. Gentleman that this is not a ration. We cannot guarantee it, because during the holidays the children of London may go to Margate, Southend, and all round the coast, including Eastbourne. We cannot guarantee that every child will get eggs in the same period.

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[19TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Orders of the Day — CIVIL ESTIMATES, 1948–49

Considered in Committee.

[Major MILNER in the Chair]

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a further sum, not exceeding £30, be granted to His Majesty, towards defraying the charges for the following services connected with Germany for the year ending on the 31st March, 1949, namely:


Civil Estimates, 1948–49



£


Class II, Vote 1, Foreign Office
10


Class X, Vote 6, Foreign Office (German Section)
10


Class VI, Vote 1, Board of Trade
10


Total
£30"


—[Mr. Glenvil Hall.]

Orders of the Day — GERMANY

3.32 p.m.

Mr. Eden: The Foreign Secretary in his comments to the House on the German situation last Friday referred to its delicacy. I do not suppose that anybody in the House would dispute that fact, and we shall all, no doubt, wish in this Debate to speak with a full consciousness of our responsibility. At the same time, there are occasions when the House of Commons should make its point of view felt. This seems to me to be such an occasion. It is not an issue upon which this House can keep silent. My own words will be few. I want to refer first, briefly, to the successive actions of the Soviet Government which have brought conditions in Berlin to their present pass, and secondly, to make plain what in our judgment should be the determined policy of His Majesty's Government in these conditions.
The Soviet Government's intentions, as it seems to me, were first made plain in respect of Germany by their deliberate and continuous violation of the Potsdam principle of keeping Germany as an economic whole. That was the agreed basis for work between us as Allies—the basis which had been accepted by the Soviet Government, and the only one which could give practical expression to co-operation between the Allies if a

desire for such co-operation really existed. That was the first occasion. The next was when the Soviet Government rejected the Four-Power Pact which proposed, as the Committee will remember, a joint guarantee against German rearmament. This proposal was put forward by the United States with the general agreement of His Majesty's Government and of the French Government.
Let us consider for a moment what an immensely significant gesture it was for the United States to make an offer of that kind, with all the history of that country's previous attitude towards such engagements. Soviet propaganda frequently shows—we keep reading statements to this effect—that the Western Powers are trying to build up Germany against them. If they really feel that, if they are really sincere in that belief, how can they reconcile it with their rejection of the Four-Power Pact against German re-armament, which pact, I must remind the Committee, copied word for word the Allied Military Agreement which was reached in Berlin—and which I remember very well because I was still Foreign Secretary at the time—in early July, 1945, between the military commanders, including the Russian military commander, Marshal Zhukov.
Yet, a year later, when this agreement was offered with the guarantee of the United States, Mr. Molotov tried to add all sorts of political and economic conditions to the military guarantee. In fact, he tried to turn a pact, which was a guarantee against a fear of the revival of German military power, into a peace treaty giving effect exclusively to Soviet desires. When that draft was brought forward twice later, each time it was rejected. I am bound to say, in view of all that—although I say it with reluctance—that I do not see how the Committee can escape the fact that ever since the Moscow Conference of 1947 and its failure, every attempt that has been made to enable Germany to play some part, as she must play some part, in the revival of European economy, has been frustrated by the attitude of the Soviet Government. I cannot see how we can avoid that conclusion from the premises which I have given to the Committee.

Mr. Gallacher: That is not correct.

Mr. Eden: I cannot see how we can avoid it. It is not, I ask the Committee and others to believe, that we in this country have forgotten the recurrent acts of German aggression. Of course we have not. Of course the utmost caution will have to be used in the supervision of the development of German industrial power. No one proposes to give Germany opportunities for rebuilding her military armaments. We understand and sympathise with our French friends in their feelings on that subject. At the same time—and this we declared even while we were waging war, and at the time no exception was taken by our Allies—we made it plain that it was essential that Germany should be put in a position economically to play her part in the recovery of Europe. Otherwise, not only does Germany suffer but we all suffer, and disintegration sets in which can benefit no one except those who want to see Europe in anarchy and ruin.
This Soviet refusal to co-operate has resulted in many months going by without any constructive step being taken to put into effect an agreed policy towards Germany. Now, at length—and as I think rightly—the position has been reached when the economic reconstruction of the Western zone, including currency reform, can wait no longer, and we must go ahead without the Soviet Union. Equally, the period of stagnation in the political sphere cannot be allowed to continue.
What is the present position? The Soviet Government have chosen to regard this decision as a challenge and have retaliated with a blockade of Berlin, which is an act openly directed against their Allies. It is also a callous threat of untold suffering and hardship to 2,000,000 of the civilian population in Berlin. As my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said, speaking on Saturday, we are in complete agreement with the Foreign Secretary's statement of 4th May:
We are in Berlin as of right. It is our intention to stay there."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th May, 1948; Vol. 450, c. 1122.]
I do not ask the right hon. Gentleman today to tell us by what means the Government propose to give effect to the policy contained in that statement. I have no doubt that this has been thought out. The 2½ million citizens of our sectors must be taken care of.
I have read many times, and I have heard it said, that it would be impossible to supply by air our sectors in Berlin, with their large civilian population. Well, that may be so, but I should not personally be completely dogmatic about it: remarkable achievements stand to the record of the R.A.F. and the American Air Forces in the war. There is the brilliant record of the American Air Forces in flying supplies to China over the hump, which my right hon. Friend remembers so well, and which certainly made history in efforts of that kind. There was the 14th Army in Burma which advanced on the wings of the Royal Air Force, and was supplied entirely by the Royal Air Force. Since the war there has been the Allied effort in air trooping, which resulted in so many tens of thousands of men being brought home by air for demobilisation.
I only say that it would be rash to assume that air effort cannot meet, to a very considerable extent, the need for supplies in Berlin. Anyhow, if this could be done, whatever effort the Royal Air Force and the joint air forces make, they will be making that effort not in war but in the cause of peace; they will be working to supply a civilian population exposed to cruel suffering; and this time they will be dropping on Berlin not bombs but food.
But however that may be, and whatever the mechanical means by which the Government determine to give effect to their policy, it must be made plain to the Soviet Government that sincere as we are, and sincere as we always have been, in desiring their friendship, we are not prepared to be intimidated by brute force or by blackmail. If there remains in the Soviet mind any possible doubt on this subject, as to our attitude and the attitude of our Allies, then I urge the Foreign Secretary, in the clearest and firmest terms, together with our Allies to make a joint communication to the Soviet authorities, not in Berlin where the power is limited, but in Moscow where the ultimate decision lies. I say to the right hon. Gentleman and to the Committee that in the light of what he told us on 4th May—which I have just quoted—it is unthinkable that we should now draw back. Were we to do that the effect on our authority and that of the Western Allies in Europe would be catastrophic.
Germany is today a prostrate and defeated nation; millions of Germans are now looking to the Western States to see whether, in truth, we mean what we say, and we have an obligation to them. We have a greater obligation to the 2½ million in our Allied zones in Berlin, who appear to be showing, in the face of every form of intimidation, a steadiness which we must respect and applaud. But most of all, I suggest, we have an obligation to the smaller but still very important number of Germans who have definitely come forward to try to play their part in building up a free life in Western Germany—a free life in the sense in which we in these islands know it. We cannot, we must not, let these people down. It is essential that our case on this issue should be firmly and clearly presented to the German people, and from what I have been able to learn I am not yet convinced that this is being very effectively done.
Before closing I ask the Committee to picture for a moment what would happen if decisions were taken to withdraw from Berlin the forces of the Western Allies. Within 24 hours, perhaps less, thousands of Germans who had been co-operating loyally with the British American and French military authorities would be torn from their homes and would be placed under arrest. We know then what their fate would be. Newspapers which had been appearing as the organs of information of the Western Powers would disappear overnight. For the rest of the population the whole process of Soviet requisitioning and Soviet confiscation would begin.
But over and above all these things, what would be the effect on our authority and on our position in the remaining free nations of Western Europe and the world? The shock to Austria would be completely devastating; it would seem to amount to an open invitation to the Soviet Forces to repeat in Vienna what had succeeded in Berlin. And what would be the effect throughout the Mediterranean and in the Middle Eastern lands? Particularly, it would be highly discouraging to those forces among the Eastern European satellite States—amongst which we must now perhaps include Marshal Tito—who had sought to show their dislike for Kremlin control.
Finally, if such an event happened how could we, how could this country, really

hope to build up a Western Union and to bring Italy within its orbit? Powerful Communist elements in France and Italy would receive a sweeping accession of strength. How could we allay the fears, for instance, of the Scandinavian countries if we ourselves had run away from Berlin?
There is another motive which must be present in our minds, and I should hope in the minds of everybody in this Committee, of whatever party, when we decide—as I think we must decide—that this is above all an occasion upon which we must stand firm. That consideration, which I want to put to the Committee, is one which ought to be in the minds of the Soviet leaders, too. It is essential that we should stand firm in the interest of ultimate good relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. In spite of its numerous provocative acts, I cannot believe that the Kremlin today intends war. But any vacillation on our part now would only encourage the rulers of the Soviet Union to believe that further pressure will result in further yielding, until at last a stand has to be taken which makes war inevitable.
There is one other warning I would utter. If we are determined to see this business through, as surely we must be, then conciliatory language ought not to deflect us. Only deeds should be taken into account. The gentler words of Marshal Sokolovsky, reported in the Press this morning, are no comfort to me without action to give effect to the words. It sometimes happens in diplomacy that there are alternative approaches to a problem, any one of which may lead to its satisfactory solution; but there are other occasions when only one possible course of action presents itself which can preserve peace. Sir, I believe that we have reached such a point today. If ever there was a time to stand firm, it is now; if ever there was a cause in which to stand firm, it is this.

3.49 p.m.

Mr. Frank Byers: I agree with the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden), that this is an occasion upon which the House of Commons should make its view felt. I do not propose to detain the Committee for very many minutes, but I believe that the Liberal voice should be


heard in this Debate on this occasion. I agree that the situation in Berlin raises issues as grave as any of those which confronted us between the years 1933 and 1939. We have become used to the Russians being difficult; we have become almost too used to the threats; but the threat to starve 2½ million Germans in Berlin as a means of evicting the British, Americans and French is one which must be resisted at all costs. I agree again with what the right hon. Gentleman said. We must stand firm now more than ever. At no stage must we give the impression that we intend to go in for weakness or appeasement of the Munich pattern, and the Foreign Secretary will, I am sure, have the full support of this House in any strong stand he proposes to take.
I do not under-estimate the difficulties confronting our military commanders in Berlin, as the Russians control the areas which contain the source of essential supplies, but nevertheless I think we must state categorically our intention to remain in Berlin, and, from my experience in war, I believe that it is quite possible to fulfil that policy. I also agree that we should now undertake a combined and united approach by America, France and Britain to Moscow, not to Berlin, because we want to raise this matter to a far higher level, and that we should demand the immediate restoration of the essential services in Berlin as a prelude to any further discussions. If the Russians accede to that, and if as a result the local and technical difficulties can be solved successfully in Berlin, then I think, and then only, should we be prepared to discuss the question of Germany as a whole. I believe that the restoration of the essential services is again the prerequisite of going into a wider field of discussion.
I do not believe that the situation in Berlin can be divorced from the general international outlook. In the last three years we have seen enough to make us realise that peace, unfortunately, is by no means assured, and we have also witnessed the fact that acts of force which might constitute aggression have come from one quarter only. We must, in my view, learn the lessons. We became very familiar between 1933 and 1939 with the pattern of the cold totalitarian war, and we learned some very hard lessons. One

was that appeasement never pays. The other was that peace can only be preserved if nations which are genuinely seeking peace get together very closely indeed in order to confront potential aggression with overwhelming armed force.
This is by no means a threat, but we must look to the defence of the democratic and peace-loving nations. I believe we must make quite certain that there is the maximum concerted force available to face potential aggression. That, after all, is the principle upon which the United Nations organisation itself is based. It is the principle applied by Russia in South-Eastern Europe today when she establishes the Russian bloc. Although I believe wholeheartedly in Western Europe, I believe that even that may prove too narrow a concept for the future. I believe that the time has now arrived when we should say, quite openly, that we wish to work in the closest possible association with the nations in the Western Union, with the British Empire and Commonwealth and with the United States.
I do not believe that we ought to make any apologies about it. The only criticism that will come will be from the Communists and their fellow-travellers, for they realise that Communism seeks to trade upon the disunity of democratic and peace-loving nations. If we make it clear that we are going to act in concert together, making no secret of the fact that we want intimate staff talks and that we want to spread the load of armament upon the basis of equality of sacrifice, I believe that, along those lines, we shall secure the peace of the world.
I should like to work in harmony with Soviet Russia, and I look forward to the day when we shall do so, but if we give any signs of giving in, then undoubtedly the chances of peace will not be as bright as they should be. I believe that we now have to stand firm in Berlin. Those nations which are prepared to recognise the Charter of Human Rights should keep together in order to preserve the peace of the world. We stand by the Atlantic Charter. We seek no territorial aggrandisement whatever. All we say is that we have a common interest in preserving the peace and standing firm together in the future.

3.56 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): There have been so many Debates on the German problem as a whole in this House that I do not think it is necessary today to take up the time of the Committee going over the matter in very great detail. I feel, however, that it might be wise just to deal briefly with a little of the background, because it has a bearing on the situation that has now developed in Berlin. When this Debate was arranged I understood that it was the wish to deal with the communiqué which was issued on the Western development—that is the London Agreement—and added to that, the tense situation that has developed in Berlin.
I must begin by dealing with the background first. As the previous speakers have said, this situation in Germany really flows from the failure of the occupying Powers to find a common policy for Germany. The Soviet Government proclaim that the fault lies with the Western Powers who, they allege, have repudiated the Agreement made at Potsdam. I reply that His Majesty's Government have made every effort to give effect to the Potsdam Agreement. The facts, if examined by any impartial person, will show that this allegation is the reverse of the truth, and that it is the Soviet Government who have consistently failed to operate the Potsdam Agreement and have, up to the moment, destroyed the possible unity of Germany.
May I first deal with reparations? Although the Potsdam Agreement provided for the payment of reparations by Germany, it laid down a fundamental principle for which both parties in the House are responsible. It was discussed with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) during the first period of the Potsdam Conference, and it was settled in the final stages. It lays down that the proceeds of exports from current production shall be available in the first place for payment of essential imports. The whole basis of our dealing with reparations in Germany has been this; that you take the total production, not of our zone but of the whole of Germany, and first buy your essential imports, pay for them with your exports, and then deal with reparations out of surplus.
That is the basis that everyone agreed to at Potsdam. I say that that has never been operated by the Soviet Government for one solitary moment. We have observed it or endeavoured to observe it. On the other hand, the Soviet Government have taken reparations from current production from their own zone. They have consistently refused to give any information about these unauthorised removals, which together with the removal of capital equipment and equally unauthorised acquisitions by Soviet cartels of German enterprises which are left in Germany, are believed to amount in value to well over 7 billion dollars. It is estimated that in the three years the Soviet have taken from the Eastern zone seven billion dollars. At the same time, the taxpayer in this country had to find money to keep Germany from starvation and the same applied in America. The consequence of this was that an enormous burden was thrown on the Western Powers.
Since the end of the war the United Kingdom contribution to the re-establishment of the German economy has been over £200 million. A high proportion of that had to be in dollars to buy dollar food and raw materials for Germany. I have not the figures of the United States contribution, but it is very substantial. I cannot believe that any Member of this Committee, given those figures and the reasons, would face his constituents and say that in every week we have been guilty of taking so much out of the pay-packets of the people of this country to keep the Germans because the Potsdam Agreement has not been honoured. I am entitled to ask if we are criticised, that the constituents should be told the facts, because that is exactly what has happened.
Secondly, the Potsdam Agreement—and this is very important from the point of view of security—provided for the demilitarisation, the denazification and the democratisation of Germany. In the Western zones, which are open to inspection, these aims have been reached. I repeat that our zones are open to inspection. The hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) inspects our zone regularly, and puts down lots of Questions about it. If I may I should like to thank him for it, because the Minister does not know everything and my hon. Friend keeps him


up to scratch in dealing with these things. I have no complaint. But in the Soviet zone a veil is drawn. However, we know from the Soviet-controlled Press that a new National Democratic Party is being formed, which is designed to attract ex-Nazis and has no democratic charactistic except its name. The Western Allies have been gravely concerned from the point of view of security to see well-known ex-Nazis being recruited again in this semi-Nationalist Party, which is called "The Democratic Party."
Thirdly, the Potsdam Agreement provided for the formation of free democratic political parties and trade unions, freedom of speech and of the Press, freedom from discrimination on the grounds of race, creed, or political opinion, and justice and equal rights for all citizens. I wish to emphasise that these principles have been observed by the Western Powers. On the other hand, it is bound to be admitted that they have been flouted in the Soviet zone, where the population have been subjected to mass deportation, arbitrary arrest, liquidation of independent political parties, and the suppression of free speech. I think I can understand the determination of the Berlin population. There is a good social democratic background still alive in Berlin in spite of the Kaiser and Hitler. Berlin should not be confused with Prussia. The work of Engels and many of the early Socialists still lives, and it is reflected in the views of the Germans today while this issue is being fought out.
The Potsdam Agreement provided for the economic unity of Germany. This principle has constantly been rejected by the Soviet Union at the Conferences in Paris, Moscow and London. We must not take what is said over the radio and by the Tass Agency as representing the attitude of the Soviet Government when a problem is being considered clause by clause in a Conference. It is answers, clause by clause which show the attitude of a Government and what they are prepared to embody in a final protocol.
Again, there is a great claim for a share in the administration of the Ruhr. I want to make one point very clear. Constant reiteration about Four-Power control in the Ruhr rather leads people to assume that there was an agreement about it at Potsdam. There was nothing of the kind.

When Four-Power control of the Ruhr was put forward at the last moment by Mr. Molotov at the Foreign Minister's Conference I declined to accept it on behalf of the British Government. When it was brought on later in the evening by Generalissimo Stalin, the Prime Minister declined to accept it. Why? We said that France was not there and one of the vital Powers affected by the Ruhr was France. Therefore, we could not determine the question of the Ruhr and security until the Potsdam Agreement was forwarded to France and we knew whether they agreed or not. The whole question of the Saar, the Ruhr and the rest of it had to be discussed in conjunction with France.
There was another condition which later became a basis of the consideration of the problem: should we isolate the Ruhr under Four-Power control and leave all the industries of the rest of Germany under single control? We declined to accept such a position, since the transfer to the Polish administration of great works between the Eastern and the Western Neisse, pending a peace conference, meant that they were virtually under the control of Russia. Therefore, we would have excluded one great industrial area of Germany and merely made Four-Power control in another. We could not accept the logic of that position.
The Council of Foreign Ministers in London last year demonstrated to the full that, while the Soviet Government kept up lip service to this German unity, they were still determined to destroy it by continuing to insist on policies and programmes which made unity impossible. In those circumstances, following that Conference I reported to the House and said that we could not wait for ever. At that time there was criticism on both sides of the House that I had shown too much patience and was delaying too long. I am prepared to wait for peace rather than take precipitate action to destroy it, and I do not apologise for having waited until the November Conference.
But we could not leave this great Western area, for which the United States, France and ourselves were responsible, as a slum—a great human slum—because all the resources capable of contributing to the standard of life not only of Germany but of Europe were lying there unrehabilitated and unrestored. We had to do


something. We called the London Conference. The aims of that Conference were (a) to secure against a revival of German aggression; (b) the incorporation of Germany in the European Recovery Programme; and (c) the economic rehabilitation of Germany. Those were the three fundamental principles. The result of that Conference is well known to the Committee. I have just a few observations that I think it is well to make upon it, to clarify the position.
We have always been the first to recognise—and I have publicly said so on behalf of the Government on many occasions—that France, and indeed the Benelux Powers, are fully entitled to security against German resurgence. France has been twice invaded in one generation and we cannot be surprised if she insists that every possible precaution should be taken against a repetition of that terrible ordeal. In the London recommendations every effort has been made to provide for French security and, if I may say so, Western security as well as our own. Security for the lot of us.
In trying to do that we worked with the idea of producing a federal Germany. We also agreed to deal with the French request for an international control of the Ruhr. We dealt afresh with the de-militarisation of Germany, which has been laid down. We and the Americans have undertaken far-reaching military commitments in regard to the occupation and supervision of Germany. I think the French people can be assured that, as M. Bidault said quite well when it was debated in Parliament, the arrangements made under the London Agreement give France much greater security than those which were made in 1919, when the United States withdrew and the subsequent events took place.
In addition, we have concluded the Treaty of Dunkirk, and the Five-Power Treaty of Brussels. This, in turn, has received from the President of the United States a degree of support which adds to its military value. It is customary to say that everything we do to get security and peace for years to come is directed against the Soviet. It is not true. What we want to do is to establish confidence in the West again—

Mr. Gallacher: And capitalism—

Mr. Bevin: —and we are entitled to have it. It is very tiring to have to listen to a parrot all the time. We stand by France, who will not be left alone. We have no desire to create a Germany which can ever be aggressive, but Germany cannot be allowed to remain a slum in the centre of Europe. On the contrary, our policy is that she must contribute to her own recovery and keep herself, and give her share to European recovery. That is the best way to get Germany to make reparations for the devastation that she caused in the war. In accordance, therefore, with the London recommendations, Germany has been incorporated into the European Recovery Programme, and is represented on the Paris Conference. She will receive her share of aid under this programme, but in turn she must produce and be enabled to pay her share into the common pool. She cannot do it unless we proceed apace with economic rehabilitation. We must give her the tools to work with if she is to make a contribution.
On the principle of political development, after careful study, we have come to the conclusion that we must give the Germans responsibility and the necessary authority. At present, political parties are reluctant to accept responsibility without authority. They are apt to disclaim responsibility and to ascribe all their failures and disappointments to the occupying Powers. The six Powers came to the conclusion that if this situation was to be remedied and conditions created in which Germany could profit from the European Recovery Programme and reorganise her economy, it was necessary for a responsible German Government to be established as soon as possible. We would have preferred a united one, but we must go ahead where we can.
I have already dealt with our attitude to the Ruhr. The main principle is that there is to be no political separation. That was a very great difficulty in the early days of the discussion of this problem. There is also to be no international ownership or non-German management. The Germans have been given the greatest possible freedom consistent with security for Western Europe. Here let me say that we think it better to proceed with these great Ruhr industries in this way. Under E.R.P. and with the integration and planned development of Western Europe, we can fit it in better in this way than


by any other means. We are convinced that international control is essential for security reasons and in order to see that the output is so allocated that it makes its common contribution to European rehabilitation as a whole.
Then we felt it desirable, and I think the Committee will agree that it was a wise step, to associate the Benelux countries with us. We have been chastised for not bringing in Poland and other countries, but what are we to do? We brought them in under the Marshall scheme. They wanted to come; they were ordered to stay away, and they had to stay away. They did not want to. Suppose we had sent for them to come into this. Statesmen in those countries are put in great jeopardy when such communications are sent to them. We thought that in all probability we might create an embarrassing situation for them. We recognise the bravery of the Polish people in the war. We recognise their struggle and what they suffered, and the price they paid. We have no desire to exclude them from the consideration of this problem, and it is not we who have excluded them; but we have to proceed having regard to the facts. Therefore, we took into account not only our own point of view but that of our partners—and indeed in the West we are not merely Allies now, we are partners. We have entered into partnership in dealing with this great problem. There has had to be give and take on all sides.
The House will have seen the Warsaw statement of Soviet policy issued after the meeting at Warsaw of Russian and satellite representatives. It shows that the Soviet Government, while invoking the need of Four-Power Agreement, continues to couple abuse of the policy of the Western Powers with insistence on Soviet predominance in Germany. We are willing to have Four-Power control, but we are not willing to have a façade of Four-Power control which is virtually One-Power control, and One-Power direction. That is the real, fundamental difficulty with which we are faced. The programme there laid down the establishment of a so-called democratic, that is to say Communist-controlled, central German Government. Well, I am sorry, but however much this word "democratic" may be abused His

Majesty's Government cannot accept the interpretation of democracy as it has been applied to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other countries. Therefore, we must get back to a more rational consideration. But we cannot do this when Soviet Russia issues the sort of programme they recently did at Warsaw. If it came to a conference, they would say all the way through "This is the basis which the Soviet Government put forward." Whatever proposals we put up for consideration, we should never make any progress at all. Unless they are willing to take into account all our points of view, I am afraid that progress is almost impossible.
That brings me to the position in Berlin. This is the most important question at this moment. I will explain to the Committee what the agreements and considerations are which have been the basis of our policy. First, it must be remembered that our troops reached Wismar on the Baltic and that the American troops overran large parts of Thuringia in the defeat of Germany In places we were a very long way from the boundaries of our zones as drawn in 1944 by the European Advisory Commission, of which the Russians were, of course, members, At the same time as the zones were agreed upon, it was agreed that Berlin should be occupied and administered on a Four-Power basis. That is the fundamental position.
Obviously then, the question arose of providing communications in order that our troops and the people of Berlin might have food and that industry might be developed. The first step which was taken was that arrangements were made between Field-Marshal Montgomery, General Eisenhower and Marshal Zhukov. They were carried out for a time until the Control Council met in August, 1945.

Mr. Churchill: I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will mention the fact, which is inherent in his argument, that the United States and, to a lesser extent, the British retired to a depth in many places of 150 miles on a front of more than 400 miles.

Mr. Bevin: Yes, that is why I mentioned where they reached. If one looks at the map one sees that they withdrew to the zone boundaries fixed in 1944 by


the European Advisory Commission before the battle was finished. As the right hon. Gentleman says, the Americans and ourselves gave up 150 miles depth on a 400 miles front. A part of all that business was bound up with the occupation of Berlin on a Four-Power basis.
The first arrangements were made by the military officers at the end of the war, but they had to be regularised and defined. The Control Commission had been set up, and on 10th September, 1945, the Control Council agreed a paper providing for the passage of 16 railway trains a day from the Western zones to Berlin. That is recorded on the minutes of the Control Council and accepted by the Governments. By an arrangement agreed on 3rd October, 1946, this number was increased to 31—seven passenger trains and 24 freight trains. On 30th November, 1945, the Control Council agreed a paper on the establishment of air corridors from Berlin to the Western zones. In June, 1946, agreement was reached by the British and Soviet authorities on the principles to cover barge traffic between the two zones. These were definite arrangements made.
Over and above these arrangements referring specifically to transport, the principle of free access is clearly inherent in the agreements which have been signed laying down the proportion of coal, food and other supplies which each occupying Power should contribute to the needs of Berlin. How can the Western Powers supply their agreed share of Berlin's solid fuel requirements, which amounts to 63 per cent., if they are prevented from getting it there? There is a further important point. For three years we have enjoyed uninterrupted use of road, rail and water facilities. Until recently there had never been a suggestion that we were not fully entitled to all these means of access.
As I have said, these arrangements, written and unwritten, continued until quite recently when difficulties arose about quadripartite control over Germany as a whole due to the fact that the Potsdam Agreement was not working. As I have told the Committee many times, the Potsdam Agreement was reached on the assumption that there would be economic and political unity in Germany, but this was never operated by the Soviet Union. In view of the fact that they have never

operated the basic principle of the Agreement, why should the trouble in Berlin be laid at our door We have gone on to the best of our ability carrying out our obligations notwithstanding the fact that the Potsdam Agreement has not been honoured. We have tried hard to get agreement but we have failed. As I have said, that failure has cost the taxpayers of this country £200 million. In consequence of all this, we have had to develop Three-Power action in the West.
Among the things alleged to be the cause of the present trouble is the question of currency reform. I was very glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) asserting that this had been too long delayed. This House pressed us, as I have indicated, over and over again It was patently obvious that we could not get production and could not develop the export trade and could not even give the Eastern zones what they required from us unless we could re-establish the wage system on a new currency basis. We had to get it and we could not be delayed any longer. In fact, we could not get a viable Western Germany at all unless this reform was carried out. We tried to get it on a quadripartite basis. The discussions went on for months and we were making a final effort when the Russians decided to walk out of the Control Council and all Four-Power negotiations on this vital matter ceased. I re-emphasise that right up to the last minute, we were trying to get agreement. When the Russians walked out of the Control Council, that made it unworkable.
What were His Majesty's Government to do? Just take it lying down and do nothing? We decided that we had to go on and that we could not leave Germany as it was. We have proceeded and the currency reform has been carried out in the Western zones. However, we took a great precaution over Berlin which is right in the middle of the Soviet zone. General Robertson informed the Russians that we had no intention of applying the new currency of the Western zones to the Berlin sectors and that we would still endeavour to settle that question on a Four-Power basis unless and until the Russians forced the issue. We were anxious not to complicate or embarrass the situation in


Berlin. The Soviet authorities were notified in advance of our plans. Then we had this claim, and I would ask hon. Members in the Committee to take note of it because this is fundamental.
I think I have said sufficient to prove that although we are occupants of the Western zone, we are also occupants of our zone in Berlin—our sector. In his reply, however, Marshal Sokolovsky intimated that in his view Berlin formed a part of the Soviet zone. Well, I do not think anyone who had to deal with this problem at the end of the war will accept that claim. That meant that we were there on sufferance and not there as of right. We were not able to accept this view, and we proposed another Four-Power meeting.
Then the Soviet claimed that they must have the right to issue their own currency with their own exclusive control in Berlin. We did not reject the proposal that the Eastern currency could be used for the whole of Berlin under suitable conditions. We were unable to agree, however, that in an area in which Four-Power authority was sovereign, any other authority but the Four Powers should be given the right to issue its own currency on its own terms. To have given way on this would have been to admit that Berlin was not under Four-Power government, but under Soviet government, and that was an admission we could not make.
Immediately after that meeting, the Russians told our people that they were proceeding with a currency reform plan of their own in the Eastern zone, and that this plan covered Berlin as well. At that moment we had to take a great decision. We decided that since all possibilities of agreement had been exhausted, we must tell the Russians that we had no alternative but to issue a separate currency for the Western sectors of Berlin—the French, the United States and ourselves—and that has been done.
As the Committee is aware, the irritations in Berlin have gone on for a long time, and I think there has been an attempt to see how long our nerves would last. There is no sign of snapping yet. It began with the stopping of traffic by road, it went on to traffic by rail, to waterways and so on, and we have put

up with it now for months. The claim of the Russians is that they are acting on technical grounds—that the railways needed repair, that something was wrong about the passes carried by barges, and that there were some difficulties about roads and the Elbe Bridge. We accepted that, we offered technical assistance and material to help repair the river bridge. We are also ready now to help to repair the railways and to keep communications going. We realise the difficulty of material, and all the rest of it, and we are really quite seriously ready to do our part. I make the offer publicly.
But one was bound to ask whether the real reason was currency, whether it was technical deficiency, or was it an attempt to make our position in Berlin impossible? Technically, as I have said, we can help the Russians over the difficulty very promptly, and certainly on the waterways and roads there need not be a moment's delay. The question of currency cannot be a good reason either now, because the old currency is now invalid in the Eastern zone and in Berlin, as well as in the Western zone, so the validity of that claim has gone as well.
If, on the other hand, the reason is political and the intention is to make trouble for us in Berlin, it seemed up to today—I do not know what will happen after Marshal Sokolovsky's letter today—that the Russians intended the ruthless starvation of 2½ million people in order to produce, I presume, chaos and revolt, to injure the health of people already underfed, to put pressure upon Allies with whom they fought in the war and who loyally carried out their bargains to them. His Majesty's Government cannot submit to that, and I am assured that our American and French Allies take a similar view. We cannot abandon those, stout-hearted Berlin democrats who are refusing to bow to Soviet pressure. The morale of the large Berlin population is excellent, and their determination to put up with any degree of privation rather than be surrendered to exclusive Russian domination must carry our fullest support.
The Committee will want to know what steps we have taken in dealing with these matters. We have been in close consultation with the United States and French Governments on each step, and in connection with the decisions made. The


Dominion Governments have, of course, been kept fully informed, and we have also given full explanations and information to the Commonwealth High Commissioners in London. Thus, everyone is fully alive to all the issues involved. It was obvious that immediate consultative machinery should be established to keep the three Governments closely concerted and, as far as the political situation is concerned, the representatives of the United States, French and United Kingdom Governments are meeting frequently in London in accordance with the requirements of the situation, and reporting, of course, to their Governments.
We are fully conscious of the task that is before us and all the hindrances that may be put in our way, but His Majesty's Government have decided to place at the disposal of the combined effort every possible resource they have. The United States who, as is well known, can provide a greater air-lift than the other Western Allies, is putting at the disposal of this combined effort very large resources indeed. The purpose of this decision is to prevent the stoppage of traffic and freight, and so to render ineffective the imposition of restrictions interrupting the flow of foodstuffs, etc., to Berlin. All I can say at this moment is that the plans for this great air-lift have gone ahead with great speed, and the results which can be achieved seem likely to exceed our first expectations. I cannot, of course, give figures, but I would ask the Committee not to accept the rather doleful calculation made on the wireless the other day.
We recognise that as a result of these decisions a grave situation might arise. Should such a situation arise, we shall have to ask the House to face it. His Majesty's Government and our Western Allies can see no alternative between that and surrender, and none of us can accept surrender. We have been informed that the United States Government, like ourselves, regard their position in Berlin as based upon definite agreements, and their intention to remain in Berlin is unchanged. There have been suggestions that the Berlin question should be referred to the United Nations, but the Charter requires that several steps should be taken before this matter could be referred. It has to I be dealt with between Governments as the first step, and the point made by the

right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington of dealing with it in Moscow at the appropriate moment is very much in our minds.
We must ensure, in this case, that every step taken is taken together. But the first step that has got to be taken—and I emphasise, the first step—is to make arrangements to feed the two and a half million people in our sectors in Berlin. As soon as the restrictions and interferences with Berlin's communications are withdrawn, then this immediate crisis will be at an end. The Berlin people can have their food, their coal and their other needs. It is all waiting in the Western zones and can be moved at once. As soon as the land and water communications, either singly or together, are opened, we shall proceed to move it with great speed and avoid any deterioration of the health and well-being of the population.
We have heard this morning that Marshal Sokolovsky has now indicated that some, at least, of the technical difficulties over communications can be overcome, but in addition—[Laughter]—Well, I agree with the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington; I am not deceived by language, neither, on the other hand, am I going to assume that everything they say is wrong. I have to keep a balance. But I shall be happier when the first train starts and when the barges start on the Elbe. In addition to these technical difficulties there has been a number of other issues. I am not making this a condition of starting the traffic but I must mention that he says there are a number of other issues affecting the general position of the Western Allies in Berlin, in regard to currency and these other matters and rights, which must be cleared up.
But I emphasise: let us get on with feeding the people and we can sit down at a Four-Power Conference and clear that up afterwards. The time is overdue, however, for allowing these things to continue with such irritating consequences that have gone on. If the recent difficulties over Berlin are completely removed we shall be ready to discuss the Berlin situation on a Four-Power basis. In the meantime, we must go on with all our plans to meet the situation. If that situation is eased so much the better, but we cannot take any risks.

4.43 p.m.

Mr. Anthony Nutting: It is naturally difficult for an ordinary back bencher to comment in detail upon the Speech just delivered by the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary. It is difficult for one to make much comment upon it for the obvious reason that he could not give to the Committee the facts and, in particular, the figures which would make comment easy. We must, therefore, at this stage—negotiations in this matter being obviously most delicate—accept his reassurance about the measures which have been taken, so he has told us, to deal with the Berlin situation. I would, of course, endorse and underline everything that has been said about the need for firmness in this position. My right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) has referred to the effect which capitulation in Berlin would have upon the morale of other nations and peoples. He has given examples of those countries where it would have a devastating effect. I have just been to Scandinavia and would like to enlarge a little upon the brief reference made by my right hon. Friend to that part of the world.
Those countries are hovering and dithering on the brink of Western Union, and I would say to the Foreign Secretary that any capitulation in this matter would mean an immediate withdrawal by all of the Scandinavian countries from any participation in Western Union. It would mean the end of any hope of getting the four Scandinavian countries into our Western arrangements. They are waiting upon the outcome of this situation. They are watching to see where lies the balance of power in Europe and in the world. They fear, not unnaturally but, I believe, unreasonably, that Soviet reprisals would follow an approach or a leaning by them towards the Western Powers. It was difficult enough to persuade them before the Berlin situation arose that they stood in no such danger, but if we capitulate and the Russians win the battle of Berlin, then we have no hope whatever of persuading them to come in on our arrangements.
It would be a blinding flash of the obvious to say that the Kremlin is making a very big effort at the moment. Whether or not it is the big effort we will have to wait and see by their performance in the years to come. But if I may say so,

I think the right hon Gentleman seemed to deal with the Berlin and German situation far too much in isolation from the general policy and activities of the Soviet Government and Communist Party led and inspired by Moscow. This is surely all part of a concerted Soviet and Communist plan. But whether it is the big effort or not, I believe the Soviet are particularly well placed to make a move this year by reason of the Presidential Elections in America, and above all, because they have been encouraged by the policy of drift which this Government have pursued up to date. I believe that that policy—or lack of policy—has been the greatest possible encouragement to the Soviet Union.
Let us take the question of currency reform which, as the right hon. Gentleman pointed out, is the main cause of—or the main excuse for—the present situation in Berlin. In the Debate on Foreign Affairs last January, the right hon. Gentleman proclaimed that currency reform was essential for Germany. When my hon. Friend the Senior Burgess for Cambridge University (Mr. Pickthorn) in the subsequent Debate asked when we could expect to know what was going to happen, and what the Government were going to do about currency reform, the Prime Minister, in winding up the Debate, said he could not possibly give any date for the institution of a currency reform because the question had not even yet been discussed. That sort of procrastination must have been the greatest possible encouragement to the Soviet Union, because what the right hon. Gentleman may have regarded as patience—what he may have meant as persistence—has been regarded by the Soviet as nothing more nor less than the utmost weakness on the part of this Government.
This blind pursuit of Four-Power co-operation when Four-Power co-operation was no longer a reality, the pretence that Germany was not divided when it was quite obviously divided; and the consequent refusal to set up a Western German government and make independent economic arrangements in Western Germany, have all encouraged and led up to the present situation in Berlin. And in all these things, it has been explicitly admitted by the Government, that they have failed to act, they have refused to act, because of the fear of countermeasures from the Soviet Government.
References have already been made in this Debate and in the country to the similarity to the present situation to that of Munich. It is a very similar situation, not only because it is almost certain to have a turning point, but because the present difficulties are largely due to past errors. But there are two differences. Whereas perhaps at the time of Munich the Government bore the burden of the errors of its predecessors and were the victims of the disarmament policies of the 1920's and 1930's, the Government of today are the victims of their own procrastination and their own mistakes. The second difference consists in the extent to which the aggressor may be prepared to go to achieve his ends. I realise that the Soviet Union is well placed in this situation because she can hold out without firing a shot and, if the issue is to be forced to the ultimate end, obviously we would have to do the firing. But in the long run I believe this comes to the same thing, that is, to the question: Will the Soviet Government risk a war with the Western Allies?
I am not going to ask the Minister of State what his information on this subject is, because I know perfectly well he cannot give it. But surely the information at the disposal of the Government is that the Soviet Government are not prepared to go to that length, not because they are necessarily frightened or unprepared for war—indeed the information seems to be to the contrary—but because they believe the capitalist Western world will ultimately destroy itself and that there is little need for them to accelerate its destruction, and, secondly, because the Communist fifth column is a very much more useful weapon at the hands of Marshal Stalin than the other four columns of the Red Army. Hitler had no such powerful fifth column with which to do his will.
Therefore, the present situation seems to be essentially different from that of Munich in that Marshal Stalin is advised that he can get what he wants without war, whereas Hitler knew he could get it by war alone. While this may add enormously to the long-term problems of foreign policy, it must surely simplify the answer to the immediate question of Berlin. Nevertheless, we must be prepared for a similar situation to arise elsewhere. This is not an act in isolation, this is not

an incident in isolation; this is part of a concerted plan and policy by the Soviet Government to dominate first Western Europe and then the world. So I ask, when we have got over the present difficulty, or even if it so happens before we get over the present difficulty, what plans have the Government for dealing with a similar situation in Vienna? Vienna is in exactly a similar position to Berlin. It is surrounded by a Soviet Zone of occupation and we have our sector of responsibility in Vienna the same as the Americans and the French. What plans have the Government to deal with a similar situation arising in Vienna in the near future? I hope we shall have an answer, because this is of vital importance.
The right hon. Gentleman has said, and it is agreed on all sides of the Committee, that we must stand firm in this situation. This is not an isolated act of obstruction, but part of a concerted policy, and if we lose this round we have lost an essential battle in the war for the survival of our Western way of life.

4.55 p.m.

Mr. Crossman: Naturally, in the Debate so far the problem of Berlin has caught our imagination because it is the central and most dramatic instance of the conflict in which we are now engaged. I have known Berliners now for many years. It is well known that even in the Nazi period theirs was the city which stood up best under the Nazi tyranny and one of them said to me last time I was there, "If we are not defeated by the domestic tyrant, we are not likely to be licked by a foreign invader." The spirit of Berlin is one to which we must all pay tribute.
But Berlin is only a sector of the battle we are fighting. The campaign is for Germany as a whole, and it will only be fought and won if we have a clear strategy and fight the various battles with a clear idea of the relation of one to the other. Our major object at the moment is to establish a provisional German government, to see to it that throughout Germany the Frankfort Government is recognised as the only genuine democratic government, the only genuine free government and the only genuine responsible government in the whole of Germany, just as the "dollar mark," as the Germans have already happily named the new mark, is the only currency considered


worth while. I am glad to hear that already in Berlin it is worth seven Eastern marks four or five days after it has been brought into the capital.
Berlin is important in the campaign precisely for the reason that we shall lose the campaign for the rest of Germany if we suffer any reverse in Berlin. But ultimately the battle of Germany is not going to be decided by dramatic battles in Berlin, but unsensationally in the factories, fields and homes of Western Germany. Its outcome will depend on whether or not we are building a free Western Germany sufficiently strong and prosperous to attract to it the länder of Eastern Germany. I do not apologise, therefore, for turning the attention of the Committee from the drama of Berlin to the very undramatic but extremely important social and economic crisis through which Western Germany is passing, because if we lose that campaign in Western Germany any victory in Berlin will be a Pyrrhic victory indeed.
I welcome the Six-Power Plan, and in welcoming it I would like to pay tribute to the French. The French have had to take a great many things which they do not like in the Six-Power Agreement and we, living on this side of the Channel, should appreciate the self-discipline of the French in accepting that agreement and cordially co-operating, although they have grievous heart searchings about the wisdom of certain clauses in the Agreement. It is a real expression of solidarity, because we do not get real solidarity until we can agree to accept things we do not wholly like.
In the London Plan, which is our strategy in Germany, there are three very clearly marked phases; the first economic, the second constitutional and the third the establishment next January of a full provisional government in Frankfort. That provisional government will have two buttresses to it. On one side there is the Occupation Statute. This is of first-rate importance. Instead of the Germans being given what powers the Allies choose to give them, they will have all the powers except those expressly reserved by occupying Powers. That is really a Bill of Rights and without it there can be no real government in Western Germany. Secondly, there is the European control of the Ruhr. I call that a buttress

of the provisional German government because I believe the Germans have to learn that there has got to be co-operation between them and the West, and it is not possible to have that unless we satisfy the French, the Belgians and the Dutch that the production of the Ruhr is not possibly going to be used in the future for a revival of German militarism. It is, therefore, a positive strengthening of the provisional German government to have such international control with which to bind Germany more closely to Western Union. So far so good. The strategy is sound.
Now I come to the currency reform, which is the first part of the implementation of that strategy. There, I must say to the Foreign Secretary and to the Minister of State that I have serious questions in my mind as to the wisdom of the methods which we are now using. Currency reform was absolutely essential for two main reasons. In the first place, we had to pull out the millions and millions of pounds worth of hidden reserves which Germans were refusing to put into circulation because they had no confidence in the old currency. Unless we pulled these reserves into circulation there was no hope of reviving the German economy. Secondly, we had to destroy the black market which was making impossible the recovery of Western Germany.
No one, therefore, disputes the need for currency reform. What I am worried about is that it has been introduced late and without any accompanying social measures to prevent what happened in 1924. In that year Dr. Schacht created the situation in Germany out of which Fascism grew. He created it by destroying the middle class. If one has a currency reform of 10 to one without any gradation, without leaving to the small man even 3,000 marks changed at par, the savings of millions of people are at once wiped out—the savings generally of honest people. The black marketeer does not keep his savings in marks but in goods. It is the honest people, mainly the old people who believed in war savings, who have their savings wiped out in this currency reform.
If we are democrats and want a stable and social basis for German democracy, a currency reform as brutal as that which


we have introduced requires complementary Social measures. This is particularly true in Western Germany, because in no part of the world is there a more distorted population structure than here. The young men have been killed resulting in far too heavy a proportion of old people being there. Added to this there are no fewer than three million refugees from the East, nearly all of them women and children. Therefore, there are more non-productive people in Western Germany who have to live either on public assistance or on their little capital than in any other part of the world. Millions of these non-productive people are completely destitute. They came from Eastern Germany each with his little bit of capital and a few things which they have sold one by one and thereby kept themselves alive.
I was told in Frankfort a few days ago by a British official that it is not our job to look after the social structure of Germany, that we have carried through the financial adjustment and that it is for the Germans themselves to introduce the social measures which will ease the injustice of the currency reform. I cannot agree. It was a grave mistake that we did not introduce currency reform, a capital levy and the necessary social measures together as parts of one comprehensive scheme, as I believe was originally planned some months ago in Frankfort.
It is a grave mistake for three reasons. First, there is not yet a German Government. There is no German government in Frankfort at all, just a number of harassed politicians of no political standing in a city which is not yet recognised as a capital. These poor men have no instrument with which to impose their will on the various länder—no powers of taxation. It is really disingenuous for us to say that we have done the currency reform—the easy part—and that we leave it to the Germans to tackle all the social repercussions, and that it is up to the Germans to carry through the necessary measures. These poor harassed men in Frankfort are, as each will tell one, incompetent to carry out those Measures.
In the second place, the Governments of the länder will be in no position to launch public works or use large amounts of public money for relief. Already under

currency reform taxation has been reduced by one-third, thus reducing the amount of money available to the länder for public works and municipal relief. Thirdly, it will be essential to put most of the limited amount of credit available into private enterprise and industry, and there will not be sufficient available for social purposes. Within a few weeks or months there will not only be large-scale unemployment, which is bound to arise as one of the short-term results of currency reform—that was inevitable, we had to face it—but there will be large-scale destitution, for which no adequate provision has been made.
This does not mean that we are licked. Of course not. All I am pleading is that we should not say that it is up to the Germans and that it is their fault, if a crisis occurs. There must be collaboration between the Allies and the Germans, not merely in tackling currency reform but in tackling its social repercussions. Otherwise, in a few months we shall have created in Western Germany neo-Fascism on one side, Communism on the other, and German democracy will be stillborn when it is due to be brought to birth next January. This is the crisis which we have to face. I do not say that we cannot face it. Of course, we can. I think that we shall face it and win, but it is reasonable to point out the dangers ahead and to suggest urgent and constructive action to meet them before they become insuperable.
I turn to another subsidiary problem which is aggravating the difficulty of carrying through the currency reform. I refer to the problem of Berlin. Viewed from the angle of Frankfort, Berlin is a dramatic problem but secondary, and it is dangerous because it diverts attention from the tremendous problems of Western Germany. I have been to Frankfort several times recently and I have not met a single British or American official, or German for that matter, who did not make the same complaint—that so long as the Allies try to run Western Germany from Berlin, so long as our headquarters' staff are in Berlin, it is impossible to get the quick action required.
I am not speaking about the problem of staying in Berlin. Of course we are staying, but the question is whether in staying we retain in Berlin all our headquarters' staffs as at present. By doing


so we are faced with two dangers. The first is that decisions about Western Germany are made in the tense atmosphere of Berlin. If I may draw an analogy, I once likened Berlin to Tobruk, but Auchinleck did not put his staff in Tobruk and try to direct Middle Eastern strategy from a bastion in enemy territory. What we need in Berlin are more soldiers and fewer officials, and many fewer women and children. Why have we thousands of officials in Berlin eating rations when they should be in Frankfort doing a job of work? And their wives and children should be there too.
For the sake of our efficiency in Berlin and in the zone, I beg the Minister to persuade the generals who are in command to give orders to their staff to go to Frankfort, which is now the capital of Western Germany. It is from there that their operations must be conducted. I believe the Berliners are intelligent enough to know that such a step would not be a panic measure or represent submission to the Russians. If in place of each official and each woman and child we put in one paratrooper that would be more impressive to the Russians than the numerous officials and young ladies. The atmosphere in Berlin is not the kind we require and the work in the zone is seriously hampered by that. The place for Generals Clay and Robertson, with their headquarters, is not it Berlin but Frankfort. For our main task is to make Frankfort more important than Berlin, to let the Germans see that Frankfort is the democratic capital of Germany, and to make them realise that we mean what we say when we say it will be the democratic capital of all Germany. Berlin has been built up by the Russians, but it is no longer the headquarters of democratic Germany. We are there because we have a Western enclave in Berlin, but the spiritual headquarters today are where we say, that is in Frankfort.
Broadly speaking, then, our strategy in Germany during the last six months has been completely right, but I believe that at certain points in our execution we have failed. We have failed through lack of forethought. I would like to have seen more of our headquarters staff sent to Frankfort six months ago, when we had our detailed plans for currency reform ready and knew that we would require men where they could, really do their

work. That is a lack of foresight which has to be remedied at the last moment. The most important thing we have to do, however, is to change our attitude to the Germans. We have had people there with three years' experience as members of a Military Government; they are not to be governors any more. They are to be advisers to the German Provisional Government. This is not a question of "axing" staff, but of completely reorganising the function of our Control Commission in Germany, of ruthlessly removing large numbers and of keeping back a highly select and trained staff of people, not to rule the Germans but to advise them how to rule themselves. That is a spiritual revolution which some of our people out there will never achieve. If they cannot, they should be sent home. We should only send to Frankfort those who can conduct themselves, not as rulers, but as advisers of the Provisional Government.
When I was in Frankfort last week, I walked through the ruins of the old city and was delighted to see one thing—that the Pauluskirche had been rebuilt. One hundred years ago, in 1848, something happened which was the cause of two world wars. German democracy failed. It failed in that same church in Frankfort because German democrats were weak, and talked too long, and the power of Prussia and militarism prevailed. Some people think the rebuilding of the Pauluskirche a bad omen. I do not agree. I am glad that it has been rebuilt, for if we cannot succeed now, 100 years later, in recreating German democracy in that very building, we shall never have any hope for Western Europe at all. The best encouragement we can give to the Berliners, apart from our presence in their city, and our determination to stay there, is to create a social basis in Western Germany in which democracy can be saved and secured as part of the Western Union. If we do that the Berliners' morale will be stiffened. But if we put our minds only on Berlin and the dramatic tension there, the help we can give will be nothing and we may lose the battle for the soul of Germany which is being fought today.

5.13 p.m.

Mr. Vernon Bartlett: I am particularly fortunate in following


the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) because I do so agree with most of the points he made, and particularly the importance of building up Frankfort as against Berlin. As far back as 1943 I wrote a book, one of the purposes of which was to urge that Berlin never again should be made the capital of Germany. At that time, the city was being destroyed very quickly, and why the Allied Powers should have placed their headquarters in Berlin, with all its associations with Prussian militarism, and not in a city of which the Germans could be proud, because of its literary or musical or other associations, I simply do not understand. It is extremely important that as soon as possible we should build up the prestige of the Western zone. But even though I personally opposed the idea of Berlin as a capital, I think it is vital that we should not dream of leaving the city now under any pressure.
I wish to take up but a very short time in speaking today, to put forward one argument for that, which I do not think has so far been made. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) referred to the effects which our withdrawal from Berlin would have on, for instance, Austria, and that is very important. The hon. Member for Melton (Mr. Nutting) referred to the effect that such a withdrawal would have in Scandinavia, which is also very important, but I suggest to the Committee that the most important result of all would be in Germany itself, on our efforts to build up a Western Europe which is strong enough to survive. It is absolutely out of the question that if we gave up Berlin we should find any Germans of any importance at all to serve in the Western German Administration, and all know how very difficult it is, even now, to find Germans who can worthily represent their country. If we left Berlin, they would be haunted the whole time by the conviction that within a very few months their part of Germany would also come under Communist control.
There is another factor, that if Berlin went, industrial unrest in the Ruhr would be immensely increased, so much increased, in fact, that we should not get the economic recovery of Western Germany that is essential. Not

only that, but Western Germany would continue to be an intolerable strain on the resources of the United States and ourselves. I feel sure, therefore, that we must defend Berlin at all costs. We have only to reflect for a moment what the world would look like if we had, as I think we would have within a short time, Communism coming right up to the Rhine. There would be that co-operation between Russian manpower and German industrial efficiency which has been the cause of a great deal of disquiet among people for a very long time.
What would be the effect in France? The French, as the Foreign Secretary pointed out today, have a very difficult psychological problem to solve anyhow, and if we had the co-operation, right up to their borders, of Germany and Russia, I feel sure that all efforts to build up any sort of Western Europe organisation would collapse at once. We have said in this House so many times that the whole of the European Recovery Programme cannot possibly succeed unless Western Germany takes part in it. We must have in Western Europe the resources of Western Germany. It is mainly because I believe the Committee should remember the absolute impossibility of getting useful Western German co-operation in a Western European Union if we were to leave Berlin that I have spoken today.
Finally, the Foreign Secretary made it quite clear that somebody must climb down in Berlin. He said that it will not be the British, and that can only mean that we expect the Russians to climb down. It is easy enough for us to feel a little jingoistic about it, to say that we must defend our status in Berlin at all costs, and make it a matter of prestige. But it is much too serious to be considered as a matter of prestige, and the one hopeful factor which I see is that although the excuses that are put forward by Marshal Sokolovsky for the breakdown of all communications may seem to us artificial and absurd, at any rate they are very welcome, because it means that, when the time comes for the Russians to open up communications again, that can be done without serious loss of face. We know so well from history that the fear of loss of face has caused dozens of wars in the past. I therefore personally look upon it as welcome and a fortunate sign that, so far, nothing has been said by the


Russians which would make it impossible for them to open up traffic again into Berlin without a dangerous loss of prestige.

5.20 p.m.

Mr. Bellenger: It is a pity that most of our Debate today has so far, and I presume will continue to be, centred on the so-called Berlin situation. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) that there is a much longer term policy that we ought to be considering. I think he underestimated the importance of this Berlin incident, because if it is not satisfactorily settled there is no hope whatever of accomplishing all those things which he outlined, with most of which I agree and the Committee will agree. The Foreign Secretary has given us the situation in moderately phrased terms, but he has very succinctly put it to us that the situation is grave. When a Foreign Secretary uses those words we can take it that the situation is very serious indeed.
There have been many commentators who have likened it to the position at Munich before the war and there are many hon. Members who will remember those Debates. What is happening in Berlin is a trial of strength in which we must not possibly fail. Let us make no mistake about it. The Foreign Secretary has put it to us quite frankly and plainly, and those who agree with him and cheer his words must be ready to face the situation as it develops. I cannot conceive that Russia would act in such a fashion as Hitler did, because she has so much to lose if she did. She has devastated provinces just as well as Germany. She needs her long-term plan of policy just as much as Western Germany or Eastern Germany, and I hope it may be possible through diplomatic sources to bring Russia in a conversational frame of mind to the green table. But if by any chance they are adamant, and we have plenty of evidence to show that so far they have not been too co-operative in these talks, then how are we to face that situation?
I do not believe that we can solve the important problem of feeding two and a half million people in Berlin by the use of the R.A.F. or the American Air Force. It is a physical impossibility. The right

hon. Member for Warwick and Learning-ton (Mr. Eden) who spoke in an optimistic tone was, I think, underestimating the situation. There can be only one way of feeding Berlin and that is by rail and road and barge, and on that issue the Russians will have to be more forthcoming. Moreover, if anybody is going to do that job it is going to be the Americans, because they have the transport planes, and not we. The right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington instanced the way that we helped to keep China going "over the hump," and Burma, and other areas during the war. But that was a war situation, with one complete objective, one combined command—which we have not got today—and everything was turned on to the military objective. Today it is no longer possible. The Americans have not the transport planes in Germany, and certainly the R.A.F. have not. I do not think the Russians are in any doubt as to our strength in the R.A.F. or the potentialities of the American Transport Command.
The Foreign Secretary has told us that there will be no surrender. So long as we make that quite clear to Russia I believe that she will be ready to talk at some time. Out of that I hope will come some compromise, which may not be entirely satisfactory for all of us, but the essence of compromise is that both sides must be prepared to go half way to meet each other. There is one suggestion I would make to the Committee and that is this. At present I have reason to believe that, in the military sphere at any rate, the American contribution in Germany is far less than our own. Therefore, if America is going to play, shall we say, fifty-fifty, she will have to reinforce her military forces in Germany, and very quickly.
That will not be taken as a threat against Russia any more than the maintenance of British military forces in, if I may say so, a far more excellent operational condition than the American military forces in Germany. I hope, therefore, that the Foreign Secretary will stress that point very strongly to his American colleagues if we are to implement that assertion of no surrender. I do not want to say any more on that issue at the moment. I do not think any of us can contribute much to the solution of this problem, or that flamboyant speeches are going to help towards settling


it. What we have to be certain of is that there is no surrender, but that we take every means of bringing the Russians to the conference table.
I will devote my remarks to what I would call the administration of Germany. The hon. Member for East Coventry has touched on one or two aspects of it. During the war we had what was known as S.H.A.E.F. That was a headquarters of British and American officers of all grades, from the highest down to the lowest, co-operating together for one end. Today we have not that in the civil or the military administration of Germany. Today we have separate zones, French, British and American, being run almost autonomously. It is true that at Frankfort and Berlin there is some co-operation at the high levels, but I go so far as to say that there is not enough co-operation at the lower levels. That is the reason why we are getting so much confusion in Germany today.
The Germans are looking to the British and American administration to bring them something better than they have had. So far, although we have helped to feed Germany, we have not given any outstanding instance of the efficiency of Western democracy. I believe that we can do more. I certainly believe, as does the hon. Member for East Coventry, that it would not do any harm to reduce the civil and military government forces in Germany. Indeed, it is inherent in any self-government that we concede to the Germans. We shall not want these large forces in Germany. Many of them comprise individuals—I do not wish to deprecate their efforts or intentions—who have no security of tenure whatever; and are always looking behind them to England for the time when they have to be deprived of their posts and come back and find another job. How can we create a Civil Service, because that is what the civil administration of Germany comes to, on those terms? I agree with the hon. Member for East Coventry that the present division—

Orders of the Day — ROYAL ASSENT

Whereupon, The GENTLEMAN USHER OF THE BLACK ROD being come with a Message, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair.

Mr. SPEAKER resumed the Chair.

Message to attend the Lords Commissioners;

The House went, and having returned—

Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

1. Animals Act, 1948.
2. House of Commons Members Fund Act, 1948
3. Radioactive Substances Act, 1948.
4. Companies Act, 1948.
5. Industrial Assurance and Friendly Societies Act, 1948.
6. Education (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1948
7. Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act, 1948.
8. National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1948.
9. Children Act, 1948.
10. William Brown Nimmo Charitable Trust (Amendment) Order Confirmation Act, 1948.
11. Church of Scotland Trust (Amendment) Order Confirmation Act, 1948.
12. Birmingham University Act, 1948.
13. Shoreham Harbour Act, 1948.
14. Railway Clearing System Superannuation Fund Act, 1948.
15. Round Oak Steel Works (Level Crossings) Act, 1948.
16. South Lancashire Transport Act, 1948.
17. Cardiff Corporation (Extension of Time) Act, 1948.
18. University of Sheffield (Lands) Act, 1948.
19. Ascot Race Course Act, 1948.

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

Again considered in Committee.

[Mr. DIAMOND in the Chair]

Question again proposed,
That a further sum, not exceeding £30, be granted to His Majesty, towards defraying the charges for the following services connected with Germany for the year ending on the 31st March, 1949, namely:


Civil Estimates, 1948–49



£


Class II, Vote 1, Foreign Office
10


Class X, Vote 6, Foreign Office (German Section)
10


Class VI, Vote 1, Board of Trade
10


Total
30"

Orders of the Day — GERMANY

5.42 p.m.

Mr. Bellenger: As I was saying when our proceedings were interrupted, my hon. Friend the Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) was quite right when he urged the desirability of doing something to improve the present division of duties between Berlin and Frankfort. Not only is it Berlin and Frankfort, but there are other areas of Germany, Minden, for example, where important parts of the Control Commission and Military Government are located. I do not know whether the reason today is entirely physical, but the consideration of housing did contribute towards the location of many of these administrative headquarters.
There was what was known as the Hamburg project, but I am bound to say, in the presence of my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) who, with others, was constantly raising questions of the displacement of the German occupants from their houses, that if we are going to bring the headquarters of the administrative organisations in Germany together and concentrate them, inevitably it will result in a certain upheaval in the life of the civil population, and, whether we locate it in Berlin or Frankfort, or in Hamburg, as it was intended to do, there is bound to be a good deal of displacement of the German population. The conditions in Western Germany, indeed in all Germany, are simply catastrophic. So far as I can see, very little has been done towards rehousing the German population and rebuilding their houses, and, until we can take some step forward in that direction, it is going to be very difficult to convince the Germans that we are

doing something to rehabilitate their country.
So far as reparations are concerned, I should have thought that the German population had paid very dearly already without being loaded with some burden at some far distant date which they will never be able to repay. On the whole, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has done his best to try to get some finality in these matters. After the first World War, it took a year before we made a treaty of peace with Germany, and, although I recognise that that is not possible today and that it may not be possible to have a formal peace treaty for several years yet, nevertheless, I would urge my right hon. Friend to try to get some agreement with the Western Allies, even if we can get none with Russia, so that we can present to the German nation, both East and West, something for which they can work and to which they can look forward. At the present moment, the only policy they can see is a hand-to-mouth policy, and mostly mouth policy.
Their thoughts are concentrated mainly on the wherewithal in order to keep body and soul together, and I am not at all satisfied that the import and export arangements at present in force in Germany are utilising sufficiently even the very limited manufacturing arrangements which Germany has been able, or has been permitted, to recreate out of the vast devastation which was caused to the industrial areas by British and American bombers. I feel that much more could be done to allow the Germans to work for themselves and to sell the articles which they can produce, but which through administrative red tape they are not allowed to sell.
I was talking only the other day, tot example, with a manufacturer from the Hamburg district, and he said, "You know, it is remarkable what ingenuity the Germans are displaying in producing something almost out of nothing." He showed me one or two little mechanical toys which had been created, not from essential raw materials, because Germany is short of timber and metal, but out of scrap which is not of use to us for our steel industry, but out of which they can make something which will sell in the markets of this country and in other markets. I have reason to believe that


there is a good deal of jealousy among the manufacturers of these and similar articles elsewhere, and I urge the Foreign Secretary to make sure, when he is discussing the limitations on production in Germany, that considerations of what I might call commercial competition between the victor nations and the vanquished do not predominate. If we are to get Germany on her feet, we must allow her to manufacture, because she was a manufacturing nation, and, like Britain, cannot hope to live unless able to manufacture. Unless she is able to sell her goods in foreign markets like ourselves, it will be impossible to recreate a Germany that will not be a liability on the Western nations.
I should like to say one or two other things in the name of humanity. At the present moment, under the beneficent and benevolent policy of the Home Office and the present Home Secretary, a lot has been done to enable Germans who want to visit relatives or friends in this country and others to do so, so long as they are not a charge on the British currency system, either in Germany or here. But what happens when an entry permit is obtained for people to come to this country? If these people live in the British zone it is not difficult, or not too difficult, for them to travel here, but, too often, if they live in the American zone—and I am sorry to have to say this—they have almost as much difficulty in getting an exit permit as they would have if they lived in the Russian zone. I say that that is inhumane, and, if the Foreign Secretary doubts this, I could quote instances to prove what I am saying. At any rate, it is quicker for German nationals to leave the British zone than it is for them to leave the American zone under almost equal circumstances, so far as travel arrangements are concerned.
There is another point which I would like to urge on the Foreign Secretary. I do not know whether it would be very popular, but my right hon. Friend has never sought cheap popularity or played to the gallery. I believe that we should not continue to visit the sins of the fathers on the children of Germany, and there is terrible under-nourishment among German children. Too often, when it might have been possible for them to get out of Germany try the exertions of friends, to Switzerland or Sweden for

example, or even to this country where the food situation is far worse than in Sweden or Switzerland, those little children are not allowed to leave their country. Whatever may be said about keeping adult Germans tied to their own country, there are thousands of people in this country who would welcome some of those German children in their own homes. I know that a lot is being done by organised effort in the schools and so forth. I have a few children of my own but I would gladly welcome some of those German children and provide food for them out of our own rations. If I could bring some of those children to live in my home among my children they would learn far more about democracy in a much shorter time than they will in some of these more or less isolated camps to which they are being taken. It would not cost much; I can assure my right hon. Friend it would be welcomed by the British and other peoples, but at present it is a very difficult thing to do.
If we continue to let the German people believe that they are going to be a leper colony in the heart of Europe, outcasts, all these finely laid plans will come to nothing. We must give the Germans hope. It is no good merely sending their prisoners of war to the P.I.D. camps here at Wilton Park or letting Germans see some of the working of our democracy by very nicely illustrated newspapers or by lecturers going over there and talking to them. We have to give them some faith in which to believe. I suggest that the best hope we can give them is hope and faith in themselves, and we should permit them to achieve what they can.

5.53 p.m.

Mr. J. Langford-Holt: One of the many undesirable things in the sphere of foreign affairs is for hon. Members who have paid one or two visits to a foreign country to come back to our Debates and fancy themselves experts in that sphere and able to speak as experts. I myself have been to Germany for the first time since the war; I came back two weeks ago, and I would not presume to discuss the many and varied features of that problem. But one thing which is manifest to anybody visiting Germany is the mood of the people. I think that is one thing which one cannot help noticing. Therefore, in what I have to say I will confine myself to the moods


of the three peoples most intimately concerned in this problem—the Germans, the Russians in so far as we can see the Russian mood, and the people in this country.
In Germany there are basically three main categories of individuals. There are those Nazis or ex-Nazis—not very many of them—whose only regret is that Hitler lost the war. Then there are the Communist sympathisers, whose numbers one is quite unable to assess; and lastly, and more important, there is the whole vast middle-of-the-road class who are looking round and hoping for something in their future. They are, above all else, looking to us in this country and in America. During the war we buoyed up their hopes through broadcasts and other means. As I have said, without going into the details of the matter, I should like to impress upon the Government and upon the Foreign Secretary in particular, the absolute necessity of providing for those Germans something on to which they can lay hold, because it is quite immaterial to them whether they fall towards Fascism, Nazism, Communism or some other "ism." The finest form of life which we can present to them is a democratic form of life, and the future of Europe certainly depends upon our ability to do so.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) did not press the Foreign Secretary to disclose any plan that he has got. I think I am right in saying that he expressed the confidence that such a plan exists, and on that I would like to follow my right hon. Friend. I would not press the Government to declare in this House or anywhere else their plans for the future, but I hope—indeed, I pray—that such a plan exists. I hope, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Melton (Mr. Nutting), that the Government have in mind the possibility, if not the probability, that a similar problem may occur again. I hope they have not shut their eyes to that possibility. If they have not done so, it is their bounden duty to have a plan ready to execute here and now if necessary.
I was very disappointed to hear some of the observations of the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger). I think he expressed the hope that we in this country should now meet the

Russians half way in this matter. I am one of those who feel that we have gone far further than half way, and, in view of the position which the right hon. Gentleman held, his observations will be given the widest publicity in the very quarters where it will have the worst result. I believe that, above all, we must keep faith now. Any withdrawal on our part at this stage will be misunderstood and misinterpreted by our sympathisers and by those who are out of tune with us. Let us establish once and for all that the setting up of the four zones in Berlin carried with it the absolute duty—the moral duty, certainly—to supply those sectors with the means of livelihood, trade and communication.
I was very glad to learn of the resolute declaration by General Robertson yesterday. I was equally glad to hear the Foreign Secretary make his statement this afternoon. The dangerous thing for us to do in the cause of peace is to carry out a series of bluffs. We should have learned by now, from experience, that it can only result in disaster if we rattle the sabre and show the scabbard when we have no intention of drawing the sabre should the horrible necessity present itself. Like many other hon. Members, I had hopes that at the end of the last conflict we might have started a new era of relationship between ourselves and the Soviet Union, but it became obvious at an early stage that those hopes were not to be realised by the methods under which we are at present working. The Foreign Secretary said earlier that he would not take precipitate action to destroy peace. I think it is the mood of this country that the Foreign Secretary should stand firm on the position which he has now taken up. To withdraw now may not necessarily be a precipitate action to destroy peace, but I believe if we do withdraw, this country will have taken the first, and an irretrievable, step towards the next world war.

6.0 p.m.

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: The hon. Member for Shrewsbury (Mr. Langford-Holt) must forgive me if I do not follow him in what he has been talking about. I think what he said very much over-simplified the issue and, as I see it, did not show that balanced approach which I myself will hope to bring to bear on the situation. Like some of my hon.


Friends who have spoken from this side, I do not propose to concentrate unduly on the present crisis in Berlin. It is, I know, of vital moment that it should be properly covered in the Debate, but there are wider issues to which we should address ourselves, and I think the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Cross-man) touched on some of them in a quite admirable way.
The moral and the spiritual issues which have been aroused in Europe in the last 15 years are, in my view, not adequately or fully appreciated as yet by the people of this country. There we have, in that continent at the present time, 350 million people, some of the most gifted and some of the most civilised people in all the world, floundering in a morass of poverty and acute misery. Most of them feel they have lost all control of their own destiny. That is the background to our discussion today and it was also largely the background to Hitler's rise and the appeal which he made to the German people of those days.
How can a sense of co-operation and a sense of purpose be restored to these fellow human-beings of ours? It is this question to which I want to apply myself for a few minutes and which I want to try to answer. That in Germany lies the key to the solution of the present international crisis is, of course, clear for all to see. I have myself just come back from a visit to that country and one rather encouraging sign, I think, was that although until recently the Germans have been unsure of our intentions—and many of them are still to some extent in that state—neither hunger nor over-crowding, nor the spread of disease, nor an almost valueless currency, nor the demoralisation of a huge black market, have led them to abandon faith in us or in eventually proving themselves to be worthy European citizens.
The German people may be—indeed, they are—hungry today in mind, body and estate. They are, in that condition, very much looking to us for sustenance and for encouragement and for a lead which, I believe, we alone can give them. After two and a half years havering and wavering, representing, as I believe, the measure of the divergent views between America and ourselves with regard to public and private enterprise in the future Germany, some of our ex-enemies have

naturally come to think that all we believe in is controlled chaos. Moreover—and this is very important—our publicity and our propaganda to the Germans has at times been remarkably bad. At a meeting which I addressed in Nuremberg about a fortnight ago, there were no less than 35,000 supporters of the S.P.D. present, and I rather startled some members of the audience by telling them that every man and woman taxpayer in this country has every year since the end of the war expended £2 per head to keep the Germans in the British zone alive.
In condemning, as I did, the almost exclusive concentration of the available building materials in Bavaria on restoring churches, I stressed our own building struggle here in Britain, again to the amazement of many of my hearers. That, I think, proves my point that our propaganda to the Germans has been inadequate and that they do not really know what we ourselves are up against. If the outlook of many in Germany is born of an over-developed self-pity, it remains true that we ourselves have not done all we might to preserve in their minds a true sense of proportion and to tell them of our own and other people's difficulties.
I have referred already to the uncertainty of what is to happen which is uppermost in many German minds. The Allies seem at one time in their policy—if it can be called a policy—to have decided on the destruction of Germany as a nation. At another time they seem to have decided on her rehabilitation. The recent six-Power Agreement, if it has done nothing else, has let everyone know where we now stand. Even now, and the hon. Member for East Coventry pointed this out, there are aspects of that scheme which are open to serious criticism. For instance, the maintenance under it of any continuation of dismantling in present circumstances seems to me to be quite crazy, and to German workers it looks more like an act of war than anything else. Production should surely be encouraged from to output which is not connected with militarism. It is very silly to continue, as we are doing, to cut off our noises to spite out faces, for that is what the dismantling policy seems to me to be.
I would like to mention reparations for a moment. Reparations are in many ways a doubtful asset any way, but if we


are to have reparations from our defeated enemies it seems to me that they can best come from the production of factories which are refurnished and supervised by German technicians and workers themselves, with a really remote and co-operative Allied inspectorate. In this matter, it seems to me that our attitude has been too Maginot-minded and altogether too self-defensive.
I believe that if a resurrected Germany is to play a proper rôle as a full partner in Western Union, we must say quite plainly what we think offers the best—yes, the only—hope of making it a going concern. While I know we cannot dictate policy to the Americans we should, I feel, support the viewpoint of the German workers themselves about the vital matter of socialisation. That view is quite clearly that the nationalisation of heavy industries means almost everything to them. That viewpoint is shared, too, by those of our French friends who regard with considerable alarm the fact that no measure has been proposed whatever to expropriate the big industrialists of the Ruhr and the Rhineland under the new Six-Power Agreement. Unless wide and firm central control is applied in relation to the economy of all the countries participating in Western Union, I personally can see no real hope of its ever being a success. It is this country which should say this quite plainly for all the world to hear, and say it quite openly. Our hands would at least then be clean if—as God forbid—failure to organise Western Union economically did put paid to all hope of creating that spiritually infectious conception of social democracy for which the whole continent of Europe is yearning.
I think people who are not Socialists in Europe would note our warning and would be willing to follow our advice. I think even America would come to see we did know what we were talking about rather better than they do, for they have—have they not?—shown themselves rather inept in recent diplomacy—to put it no more strongly than that. Inter-country planning which leaves ever open, as it must, the possibility of an economic merger with Eastern Europe is absolutely vital if a permanent split on the continent is to be avoided, and with it a third world war. To denounce the evils of Communism, as so many do, is no policy at all. Nor is it a policy to leave

Western Union dependent on the whims and caprice of capitalist and big business enterprise.
We must be positive. We must make Social democracy for all the world to see a living, vital, dramatic reality wherever our own influence counts. This, I believe, can happen only through the wide application of Socialist methods and principles. The alternative may well be—and we had better face up to it—that the Germans and others would come to prefer an end with terror rather than terror without end. We dare not alienate the best political elements in Germany. We are doing that to some extent. Already they see us in many cases being outmanœuvred. Already they are alarmed by the trend in some quarters to allow Western collaboration to degenerate into a policy for the military containment of the Soviet Union. Already they view with distaste the idea of replacing one set of capitalists with another. They know as well as we do that Communism can never be crushed by atom bombs, any more than Western civilisation can be or will be folded up by prods or pinpricks from Communists in Russia or elsewhere. The fatalists who talk of inevitable war waged by fearsome new devices are just as harmful to the cause of co-operation and peace as are the fanatics who pursue their cunning aims with an inquisitor's zeal and an inquisitor's cruelty.
I have not touched very much on the Berlin position. There the physical facts must be matched to considerations of prestige. I am not quite sure this so far has been done. As it is, and having committed ourselves, I entirely agree we must be and must remain absolutely firm, especially, I would add, as I think that Russia's hostility is technical and administrative only at the present time. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Russia does not want war any more than we do. If there are weak spots in our armour, so has Russia weak spots in hers. The Yugoslav developments of this week prove that Russia has by no means as yet fully consolidated her satellites.
We must surely in these circumstances take care to dissuade our American friends from any precipitate action, and we must at the same time with all speed press on with making Western Union economically and spiritually an outstanding success. Above all, we must continue


to be a steadying influence on the Germans by standing by our principles, and combining with that the exercise of a large measure of the patience so fully possessed by the Foreign Secretary. If we do not do that, and by a courageous example show that we believe in learning all over again to love our neighbours as ourselves—and our neighbours comprise the German people—the fearful alternative is that all of us, one day not very far hence, will be called upon to die with them.

6.15 p.m.

Mr. Godfrey Nicholson: The hon. Member for Shrewsbury (Mr. Langford-Holt) began by saying what a deplorable thing it is if Members of Parliament come here to pose as experts about a country after only one or two visits to that country. I agree with him; but I think Members of Parliament may fulfil a useful, if minor, function if, after such visits, they report in this Chamber the opinions of those who are experts, our fellow countrymen on the spot, people who know the facts. I think that as Members of Parliament we are qualified to collect opinions, even if not to become instantaneously experts ourselves. In the hope that that is the case I venture to detain the Committee for a very few minutes to try to tell hon. Members something of the frame of mind I found in Berlin within the last fortnight. I think the state of opinion in Berlin amongst our own countrymen, amongst our Allies and amongst the Germans, is somewhat different from that which exists here about the whole problem.
I found a very much greater anxiety on a certain score and very much less anxiety on other scores. The score upon which there was great anxiety and much questioning was the simple issue, Are the Government going to stand firm? The question was, "Are they behind us in determining to remain in Berlin?" The Foreign Secretary's speech today will successfully have relieved all apprehensions about that. The reasons have been enumerated by several speakers and so I shall not attempt to add to them. There was not the same anxiety in Berlin as there appears to be here about our ability to remain there, provided full and firm support is given from behind. It often happens in a crisis that there is greater calm and less apprehension at the nodal point than at the perimeter. I think that

is evident in this particular case, and for these reasons.
I believe that those in Berlin, the Allies and the Germans, are more aware than we are that the Russians are waging a war of nerves and not a war of blood. They realise that they are in an extremely isolated, and, militarily, quite untenable position, and they ask themselves why the Russians should wage a war of this sort when they could walk into Berlin at any moment if they mean to wage a war of blood. Let us remember that the state of public opinion in Russia is such that there is no need for the Russian Government to convince their people on the question of casus belli, so they can walk in when they like.
This war of nerves has been going on in Berlin at least since the beginning of April, and it has been marked by a policy of pinpricks on the part of the Russians, followed by minor concessions. I think I should be right it saying that the feeling in Berlin is, that once the Russians are convinced that the war of nerves cannot work, the concessions will be increased, and that the Russians have no intention of bringing things to a head. So I think we are entitled to feel rather more optimism than I have seen demonstrated so far here today. We find there again all the old manifestations of what used to be called "Oriental diplomacy." I am convinced that, if this is a war of nerves, the first thing to do is not to allow our nerves to be affected, and to take a calm view of the situation in the conviction that, granted 100 per cent. firmness at this end, Berlin will be held, and that we shall be able to stay there.
I believe that we in this country are not as aware as we might be that we have some very strong cards. The strongest card is the declaration of firmness, which we have played. There are other strong cards as well. I do not know whether the Committee are aware of the extent to which Eastern Germany is dependent upon supplies from Western Germany. The industries of Poland, the Russian zone and Czechoslovakia have not yet been mobilised sufficiently for the Russian zone to do without coal, steel and other supplies from the Western zone. I do not know if the Committee is aware of the extent to which Berlin industries are sending goods into the Eastern zone. Nearly 40 per cent. of the production of the firm of Siemens, the great electrical firm in the British sector,


goes into the Eastern zone, and the evidence shows that the Russians are not yet prepared to do without it. As part of their policy of pin-pricks, at the beginning of April, Siemen's delivery of finished goods to the Western zone was held up by the Russians, but not all the time. It was held up for a time, then a concession was made and several hundred thousand marks' worth of goods was let through, and then there was a further hold-up. There is a great deal of evidence that the Russians are not prepared to cut off their nose to spite their face and to do without further supplies from the Western zone. Coal and steel production in Western Germany, as well as other manufactures, are a very powerful bargaining card, so do not let us lose our heads too much and think that we have no cards at all to play against the Russians.
Finally, I wonder what steps we are taking to provide answers to the Russians' constant and powerful propaganda? If I may recount a personal experience, I was fortunate enough to have an entirely off-the-record conversation with two Russian officers, who spoke quite frankly. The first thing they said was, "Why are you always attacking Russia and being so difficult?" Then they said: "Take the case of Colonel Tassoev. Is it in accordance with Western diplomatic practice to kidnap an officer of an Allied Power, take him to a London police station, and torture him?" Naturally I contradicted them, but I wondered what steps we in this country had taken over the air to see that the truth of that extraordinary story was made known to those Russians who listen in. I believe that the B.B.C. are of the opinion that there is a fairly good listening public in Russia to British broadcasts. Do not let us ever forget that the Russians are fanatical believers in the theory that the Red Army is the greatest civilising force in the world. They think that Russia is always innocent; she never sins and is always sinned against; and that the Western Powers have not a single argument in their defence. We should wake up to the fact that it is time that we put our case in a non-tendentious way to the Russian people and to the Red Army. I hope that I have not detained the Committee too long, and that no one will think that I am trying to pose as an expert on Germany.

6.25 p.m.

Mr. Stokes: I should like to endorse what the hon. Member for Farnham (Mr. Nicholson) has said about the "wind up" being at this end and not in Berlin. Coming recently from Berlin, I agree that the atmosphere there is far steadier than it is in this country. That is, no doubt, largely due to the Press. There are few newspapers there, and what there are do not give any news. I should be churlish tonight if I did not pay my tribute to the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) and to the Chief Whip of the Liberal Party the hon. Member for Northern Dorset (Mr. Byers) and if, having so often complained on behalf of back benchers of the length of Front Bench speeches, I did not congratulate both of them on being brief and to the point. I commend that practice to Front Bench speakers on both sides, and particularly to those right hon. and hon. Gentlemen who wind up Debates and who have a nasty habit of getting up much too soon.

The Temporary Chairman (Mr. Diamond): I hope that the hon. Member is not forgetting the Votes which we are discussing—they refer to Germany.

Mr. Stokes: I felt that I must pay my tribute to the way in which hon. Members have reacted to the representations which I have tried to make on behalf of those who want to speak. I was glad that the two hon. Members who opened the Debate, and the Foreign Secretary, took such a firm line about Berlin. I am sure that is absolutely essential to our position in Europe. The excuses which the Russians are giving for cutting off the lines of communication are too frivolous for words. If we examine, as an example, the currency one, which the Foreign Secretary exploded, one of their points about that is that they must stop communications because currency will pour up the autobahn and wreck the currency in their sector and in the Eastern zone. It is far easier to carry all the currency one wants to the Eastern zone through the woods than to take it up the autobahn. No one in their senses would dream of loading lorries with currency and taking them along that 100 miles stretch of closely-guarded Russian road.
The second excuse was that the bridges were broken down and the railways out of action. It is an extraordinary coincide-


ence that those responsible for maintaining the lines of communication, as the Russians are, should find all the railways and bridges go wrong at the same moment. Of course, that is not true. The only consolation to be got out of this situation is that the Russians are making themselves more unpopular than ever in Germany, where they are quite seriously disliked. Much as we may be disliked, we are considered a sort of answer to a maiden's prayer in comparison with the Russians. When we think of the state of the people coming from the Eastern zone, the state of the returned prisoners of war, and the realisation by the German people, who have recently discovered from Red Cross reports and examination of people who have come back, that 1,600,000 prisoners of war had died in Russian prisoner of war camps, this on top of that is not causing a more favourable attitude on their part towards the Russians.
I find—and I speak not as a great authority on Germany but as a frequent visitor there—that things in Germany are better than they have been since the termination of hostilities. I regret that no one more important than myself has paid tribute to Lord Pakenham for the contribution which he has made to the state of mind in Germany. Whatever we think in this country—we none of us think much of our politicians, anyway, on either side—we do not attach enormous importance to individuals because that is not our way, but those of us who have studied the German problem know that very great affection and regard attach to Lord Pakenham for the contribution which he has made in giving the Germans inspiration and help in their great and. complex difficulties.
I welcome the change recently announced by the Commander-in-Chief with regard to the non-fraternisation regulations. I only hope that his instructions will be carried out by the Control Commission and by the Army in the spirit in which, I am sure, they were offered. I did not observe that they were being carried out when I was there. There was still far too much reluctance to accept the German people in the way in which they should be accepted, as brothers and friends in a joint effort to reconstruct the whole of Western Europe. I welcome, as did the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman), the currency reforms

and particularly the taxation relief. I am not sufficiently aware of the details of the currency reforms now proposed, to go into them in detail. My hon. Friend the Member for East Coventry discussed them at some length, and I do not want to be repetitive. The anxiety I think is lest we have not timed them right. I agree that it is urgent that the reforms should come about, but it does not need a Senior Wrangler from Oxford or Cambridge to make it clear that currency reforms without availability of consumer goods only means that there will be a worse disaster, and that there will have to be further currency reforms at a later date.
I know the theory is that the result of this currency reform now, will make the farmers bring their food on to the markets and trade in the normal manner in exchange for utensils, repair parts, and all the rest of it, which they are to be able to get; that manufacturers will disgorge from their sheds all the things they have been making, and of which they are now to be encouraged to make more and that more goods will appear in the shop window. I do not find among responsible Germans a real belief that raw materials are really backing up the situation sufficiently to keep that process going. If that proves to be the case, the situation will be absolutely disastrous.
With that in mind, and with the whole question of Western European rehabilitation in mind, I want to spend the few moments during which I propose to address the Committee on the question of dismantling. There is standing on the Order Paper in my name and that of about 20 other hon. Members a Motion demanding that dismantling should cease. I question the wisdom of continuing to dismantle useful works at a time when we are trying to rebuild Europe, and very much for the following reasons. First of all, so far as I have observed it, our American Allies have stopped dismantling altogether, except in so far as it relates to purely war plants—and none of us; I think, is suggesting that we should do other than continue to dismantle what are purely war plants. But I cannot discover, and have never succeeded in discovering, how this level of industry plan, which decides what is available for reparations, is measured. I have never found anybody in Germany or in this country willing to try to tell me until the other day. I am now quite satisfied that the method of


measurement is absolutely bogus, as I always thought it was. I do not believe that the people who measured it had the slightest idea what they were doing. They could not have had. I am in the business myself, and I could not do it, and I should not expect other people to try.
There is no difficulty, of course, in saying that someone shall or shall not manufacture motor cars, or shall or shall not manufacture a certain quantity of a certain type of goods. But when we come to this general engineering question—a thing very near and dear to my own heart, and a thing very essential in reconstruction—I find that what they have done is inconceivably stupid; they have assumed that the way to arrive at what could be dismantled was to take 75 per cent. of the value of the 1936 output, add the factories all together, and then take away 25 per cent. and call it a day. Well, of all the idiotic methods of approaching the engineering problem, that is the worst. The other day in Berlin I asked an official, who was put on to me, to explain how it was done, and that is precisely what he told me. That only confirms what I have said so often before: I do not believe anybody knew what they were about in that particular part of the dismantling programme.
I go further in support of my contention. The other day I discovered a document signed by the leaders of the mining industry in the Ruhr, in which as late as November last year they were complaining that the dismantling programme had been decided upon without any consultation of any kind whatsoever with the people organising the mining industry. I have it here, and I can give my right hon. Friend a copy of it if he likes. I would sooner not do so at the moment, for reasons which I need not disclose to the Committee. What really happened in consequence was that a set of bi-partite investigators was put on the job; they re viewed the situation in February, but after having been asked to report as a result of this complaint they did not even then consult the mining authorities in the Ruhr. What has happened? A number of factories which make mining equipment are still being demolished. Perfect insanity!

Mr. Bellenger: British officials?

Mr. Stokes: Yes, in the British zone.

Mr. Bellenger: Is the hon. Member referring to German miners or to the British officials there?

Mr. Stokes: I am referring to British and American officials in the Control Commission who complained; more British officials went on the job to examine the situation; they never consulted one another, and naturally arrived at the wrong results, as I will go on to explain in a minute. Mr. Hoover wrote a report—of which very little notice was taken in this House—on the whole dismantling question, entitled "Destruction At Our Expense," to which he wrote a very sensible short foreword, which reads as follows:
At a time when the world is crying, and even dying, from lack of industrial production we apparently pursue the policy of destruction of the gigantic productive equipment in the Western zones of Germany. It means less essential goods to all Europe, greater delay in recovery of the world and larger drains on the American taxpayer.
And, of course, that goes for the British taxpayer, too. He went on to analyse the situation, and said at the end of his booklet—which my right hon. Friend can have if he likes—that of the priority necessities reported on by the Herter Committee, 49 steel producing plants, 31 steel rolling mills, 53 pipe producing plants—of which there is a great shortage—14 road building plants—about which I have complained in this Committee before—and 47 plants manufacturing mining equipment in the British zone are all due for dismantling, which in Mr. Hoover's view it was necessary to get going, not only for German economy, but to help generally in the revival of Europe.
Mr. Hoover goes on to explain what everybody ought to know but nobody seems to know—that a factory cannot be pulled down and be expected to be of the same value when it is on the floor as it was when it was standing up. That is quite elementary. [Laughter.] Well, people do not realise it you know; they think a factory can be taken apart, packed up and sent off, and still be of the same value, and that everything will work when it gets to the other end. Were I in the Germans' position I might be tempted to make certain that nothing worked when it got to the other end. I have no doubt there has been a good deal of sabotage; the Germans are not fools.
That report also shows what happened to the Borbeck plant—one of the big steel plants in the Ruhr. Before dismantling it was valued at 120 million marks; when pulled down it was valued at 9.5 million marks—8 per cent. Any accountant could tell hon. Members the same thing. We know perfectly well what is the value of an engineering works as a going concern, but when it is dismantled it is scrap, and that is all. To imagine that thousands of tons of material which represented work for 3,000 workers could be pulled down and carted halfway across the face of the globe and put up again is fantastic nonsense. But this is still going on. When I ask Questions of my right hon. Friend on this, as I did this week, I am told that other people have suffered and must have some form of reparations. I am not disputing that; but I do dispute the form of reparations he is trying to give them.
I would say, generally, on reparations that I doubt very much if we are legally entitled to take reparations until there is a peace treaty. I should like to hear the opinion of an international lawyer about that. I believe that reparations form part of peace terms, and are not a consequence of the cessation of hostilities, even if that involves unconditional surrender. I believe that reparations taken before a peace treaty are loot, and nothing less. Hon. Members may not like the term, but that is what I believe it is in international law.
I now wish to say a little on the whole question of steel and the level of industry. While I welcome the Six-Power agreement on Germany a new situation has arisen. I must tell the Committee of a meeting at Dusseldorf last November of all the "big bugs" on the level of industry question, who fixed the amount of steel to be allowed in accordance with, I think, the Moscow agreement, namely, 10.7 million tons a year. What I emphasise about the Dusseldorf meeting as distinct from what was said in Moscow—or wherever it was that the figures were set—is that it was strictly stipulated at Dusseldorf that that was for Germany alone, and that there must be no export of semi-manufactured goods. That was a fantastically nonsensiscal thing to say anyway, because before the war Germany used to export 2½ million tons. How on earth is she ever to get upon her feet again, with a population of 55 million, unless she is allowed to export some of the obvious things like steel.

Now, very sensibly, the Six-Power Agreement recognises that that will not do, and it is laid down that the six Powers may, by agreement, export steel from the Ruhr. If that is so, I hope that my right hon. Friend will think again about this, dismantling because it is essential that the production capacity that is now being pulled down should be left up, otherwise it will be impossible to rebuild Europe on the lines no doubt contemplated by the six Powers when they signed this Agreement.
I know the old complaint, that if too much steel is left for the Germans they will build a war potential. If we examine the figures today it is really nonsensical. In this country we are producing steel at the rate of 15 million tons or a bit more, and we hope for more next year, the Americans something like 91 to 95 million tons, and the Russians 28 million tons, which they hope to increase to 50 million tons in a few years time. Is it really believed that to allow the Germans to go up from 10.7 million tons, which is what they want for themselves, to 15 million tons will provide a war potential? I think it is absolute bunkum. We shall never get ourselves and Europe going unless we allow the German wheels of industry to get going again.
It is no answer to me to say—and I hope that my right hon. Friend will not give it to me today—that Germany cannot under present conditions produce 15 million tons. I know that, but it is insanity to pull down the equipment needed to reach that output, with our eyes wide open, merely because they cannot produce that amount now. On the question of the control of heavy industry and coal, I should be happier, and my German acquaintances would be much happier, were the control of iron and steel and coal in the Ruhr made part of the control of iron and steel and coal throughout Europe. That seems to me to be the proper way of approaching the problem, which most of those with our way of thinking on this side of the Committee would equally wish to see carried out.
Why is it, despite definite instructions from the Under-Secretary—and a letter was written about this on 20th April of this year—that buildings of real value are being blown up and knocked down? I have not yet seen the answer to my Question which appeared on today's Order Paper about Eckenforde—perhaps


my hon. Friend can tell me what it is—but I have received a long telegram complaining that this very building which he guaranteed to me in writing would not be blown up, is down for destruction on 28th June.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Mayhew): The answer is that that is not so, and that my hon. Friend is quite misinformed.

Mr. Stokes: I am very glad to hear it. But I am not misinformed about this. I went to the Deutsche Werke at Spandau. I am not arguing whether the Deutsche Werke is a category 1 concern or not, but there was a magnificent block of offices which was capable of being converted into 200 or 300 flats and the whole thing is being knock down. Who is the lunatic who does this sort of thing, knocking down this beautiful building, when hundreds of thousands of people are without any decent living accommodation? I hope that my right hon. Friend will be able to tell me, or, if not, that he will look into the matter. It really has the worst possible effect on these wretched people; we all know that there is far too little building going on there at the present time. I conclude on that very unsatisfactory note in regard to dismantling and hope that I shall have some assurances from my right hon. Friend when he comes to reply.
It would obviously be out of place if I finished without saying a word about food. The rumour has now got abroad in Germany that from tomorrow the calorie level is going up to 1,800 [An HON. MEMBER: The figure is 1,750."] Well, it has gone down 50 already. A calorie value of 1,500 has been promised for years, but in May this year the North Rhine and Westphalia only got part of that value, and 1,500 calories is not a great amount. Now we are told that the figure is to go up to 1,750 for July. All I want to say is: "For Heaven's sake see that that is the amount the population gets, because people in Germany are fed up with being promised food they do not get." It really is a most unsatisfactory and depressing state of things for these poor people who have practically nothing to eat and have not had their rations for goodness knows how long. I hope that the amount will

be kept at the 1,750 level and will not be cut down.
I conclude with a few remarks about the Sixth-Power Agreement. I have had a doubt in my mind whether a federal form of government will work in Germany in present circumstances. Quite frankly, I do not believe that it will. I do not see how we can get the people who have the food, to send it to places which have not got the food, unless there is some central authority to force them to do so. I cannot understand how, under a federal system, the farmers in Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein can be made to turn out their food and send it to Westphalia, or wherever it may be. We have to have a central government whether the Americans like it or not. I do not think it will work, because history has shown that if a government is imposed on people they never like it and never keep it. The thing to impose on them is something which you do not like yourself, and then the chances are that the people will throw it out for something you do like. If only all these people who are talking in Washington about a federal government could be made to realise that what is wanted is a central machine, we should be able to get the best of two worlds—get the Government we like, and get the machine running now.
I say to the Control Commission in the end "For Heaven's sake clear out." I say that in no mean spirit. The Control Commission have been very kind to me and I have had every kind of help when I have gone there, and I have been there many times. The Foreign Secretary was most generous in his opening remarks in saying what a great help I have been. I did not expect to get that, but I am very much happier as a result. The fact is, however, that we have an idiotically large number of people there who ought not to be there at all. It is quite unnecessary to have 15,000 members of the Control Commission. It is not the fault of the Commander-in-Chief; the fault is here. We ought to have what we have been saying ever since the war ended, a handful of officers on top and ground observers if you like. I do not know what the grade would be, but we should not want more than 1,000 of them. We should, of course, have the Army of Occupation, but please let the Germans get on with the job. It is no


good these people interfering and treading on one another's toes, getting an overweening sense of their own importance. There are only about half a dozen of them whom I would keep there; the rest can be cleared away. I agree that that may be an overstatement, but what we want is a handful of men of the type I have described. I ask my right hon. Friend to get on to his right hon. Friend and really sit on his back until we get something done and put an end to this waste of the taxpayers' money.

6.48 p.m.

Brigadier Head: I do not wish to detain the Committee long, and I propose to confine my remarks to the situation in Berlin. For that reason, I hope that the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) will forgive me if I do not follow him. I hope he will also forgive me if I say that it seems, even from this side of the Committee, that he has made a very valuable contribution to this Debate. He appears to be in the rôle of someone who is the acting leader of an underground movement to bring common sense into the industrial administration of Germany, and in that he has, I am sure, the sympathy of many Members on this side of the Committee.
I do not think anyone will quarrel with the general statement of the Foreign Secretary concerning the present situation in Berlin. It struck me that it was a most welcome reassurance that we in our policy so far as Berlin was concerned, would stand firm. My fears concerning the situation in Berlin deal not with the present so much as with the future and how events may develop. It seems to me that so often in the past we have had trouble through a lack of realisation or a refusal to face the way events may eventually develop. I realise that any decisions of policy in this matter are not for this country alone; they must be reached collectively by the Western Powers. I also realise that this is a most delicate matter which should be discussed with care. Nevertheless it seems to me that it is important that in these Debates in the House of Commons we should say not what we think we ought to think, nor what we want to think, but that we should state quite frankly the way in which we think events may run in the future. Accordingly my succeeding remarks will be directed towards how it

seems to me that events may turn out. If they go well there is no problem, and what we are discussing about the situation in Berlin will disappear like smoke.
In order to discuss the future of this situation, I propose to make two assumptions. They are, of course, gloomy assumptions, but they are assumptions which we should be ill advised to ignore as regards the future. The first is that the Russians will remain obdurate in closing land communications to Berlin. The second assumption I make, without any specialist knowledge of the situation but based upon my own experience in the past, is that we cannot continue indefinitely to supply 2½ million people with food and fuel by air alone, especially with the winter ahead of us. Everything I know suggests to me that present stocks and concentrated foods may allow us to do that for a limited period but I cannot believe—and I believe it is wishful thinking to believe—that we can continue to do that indefinitely. It seems to me that the effort would be immense and that with the winter, unemployment and lack of fuel before us it will not indefinitely be practicable.
If those two assumptions are agreed upon, we cannot avoid coming to the conclusion that eventually we shall arrive at a period when the position of these 2½ million Germans in Berlin and our own position in Berlin will become intolerable. When that day arrives we shall be right up against a decision which will be forced upon us by events. That decision will either be to insist upon, or seize, a land line of communication or to get out. That is the ultimate crisis point, and in discussing the situation in Berlin I believe it to be wrong to turn away from facing that fact. We shall do good rather than harm by admitting the tact to ourselves today and realising that it may come to this.
It is easy, in the atmosphere which exists at the present time, to say that we shall stand firm, but might I ask the Committee to consider what the atmosphere is likely to be when this particular crisis point is reached? It seems to me that, as opposed to the comparative calm of today, we shall have a situation in which the population of Berlin will be cold, hungry, half starved and their morale very low. We shall have a situation where


Russian propaganda will be pumped full bore at those Germans to assert that the reason for their discomfiture is entirely due to the obstinacy of the Western Powers. We shall have a situation in which a war of nerves will be in full blast; quite likely a certain amount of troop movements will be taking place. We shall have a situation in which the entire Russian bluff machine will be turned on in order to try to frighten us out of Berlin by representing that if we insist on a land line of communication there will be a war. It seems to me that if the ultimate decision has to be taken in that atmosphere, we shall be immensely increasing two risks. The first is that through the Russians believing that we are still bluffing, we shall blunder into a war which neither side wants. The second reason is that through the pressure put on us, democracy might once again show its almost inherent weakness by buying time at the expense of honour.
It is my feeling, and these are not pleasant words to have to say, that it is the duty of everybody in authority in the free countries of the world today to do everything they can to prevent that ultimate decision having to be made in that dangerous atmosphere, because I believe if it is left until then, the chances of either a conflict or a withdrawal will be increased. Hon. Members may well say, "Those are easy words but how could such a course be implemented?" I say again that I have no expert knowledge of the situation, but I feel most seriously that something could be done now to try to avoid the arrival of that ultimate crisis point. It seems to me that the staffs who are at the moment concerned with the feeding of Berlin must, on the assumption that no land-line communication is available, be capable of working out an estimate of the time when our position and that of the 2½ million Germans in Berlin will be intolerable. That situation may be a long way off or it may not, I do not know, but they must be capable of making a fair estimate of that, taking into account the advent of winter and the necessity of fuel as well as food.
If one takes that ultimate crisis point as Z-day, it seems to me that careful consideration should be given to whether or not the Western Powers should not now say to the Russians—at Moscow,

not Berlin—that at a date at least a month, preferably longer, before that critical point arises, we, the Western Powers, demand that by our rights under Treaty, and in order to fulfil our obligations to those Germans, a land-line of communication be opened to us. In order to assist in that, there would, of course, be an offer of full facilities and technical aid. But let us fix that date well before we arrive at the moment of ultimate crisis. Then say, "If it is found impossible to clear the present technical difficulties of the land communications into Berlin, we shall consider it our duty, as part of our obligation to Germany, and by reason of our rights under the Treaty, to repair that land-line of communication ourselves." If that in turn is resisted then a very grave situation will have occurred which, it seems to me, cannot be viewed as anything but a casus belli.
These are grave words to use in this situation, but if Members say "This is irresponsible sabre-rattling," may I ask them to consider three points? First, the Western Powers, the democracies, have got into two wars in the past not through adopting a line like this, but through failing to adopt such a line. Secondly, it is my absolute belief that the Russians do not want war. From my experience, I think that for any country, however large, however dispersed, to consider going into a war in which there is the likelihood of unilateral atomic warfare is a crazy undertaking. If the Russians really want war, it is my fearful belief that there will be one. But at the moment it is my belief that they do not want war and that the greatest danger of war is that we should blunder into it by leaving the situation too late. Lastly, the third point which I bring to the notice of hon. Members is that if the easy course is adopted, and the easy course, especially with the American elections in the offing and the natural inertia of democracies, is in a crisis to say that we stand firm until the crisis point is reached, the dangers of blundering into a war when that crisis point comes are greatly increased.
I hope that the Foreign Secretary or the Under-Secretary will take these remarks in the spirit in which they are made, as an attempt to make some contribution to the Debate. I know that I have no special knowledge, but I suggest that some such line as I have suggested is worthy of consideration because the


lessons of the past indicate that the dangers to democracies often lie in a failure to square up to the way events may shape in the future. The utterance of tough words in the present, has not in the past always been matched by tough deeds when the crisis arrives. All I can say in support of my intervention, whether my views are accepted or not, is that I am certain that every free man and woman in the world today has his or her eye on those in positions of responsibility in the Western Powers for two things—courage and leadership. I only hope that those in responsibility in the Western Powers will not fail them and will give those things to them, because I believe that their deeds in the past deserve them, and their hopes in the future demand them.

7.0 p.m.

Mr. John Hynd: I am sure that the speech to which we have just listened and other speeches dealing with the Berlin situation, have impressed the whole Committee, and will impress the country and other people beyond the frontiers of this country, with the gravity of the situation which has been created and the readiness of our people to face that situation. It is a tragic situation, but for some time past it has clearly and inevitably been one which would be reached at some stage and on some issue.
It is the end and the outcome of a long tale of costly patience exercised by the Foreign Secretary on behalf of this country, with, I would tell the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher), the sole purpose of achieving a united Allied policy which alone would enable us to survive the perils of the peace as they enabled us to survive the perils of the war. The policy followed by the Foreign Secretary has been extremely costly for this country. He has given us the figure of £200 million. It has also been extremely costly to the Germans. That story should be told clearly and precisely to Germany in particular, in order that the people of that country may appreciate what has been done to try to secure a common, single policy for the occupation of their country. I do not want to elaborate the facts, which have been explained by the Foreign Secretary and are already common knowledge, of the costly extent to which we have been prepared to go to reach a compromise with our Allies in this matter.
The utter failure, the deliberate refusal, of our Russian Allies to implement the common economic unity which was laid down as the basis of the Potsdam policy has been clear from the beginning, as the Foreign Secretary has said. The hon. Member for West Fife may mutter, but he cannot gainsay the evidence that has been produced. I will give him more evidence. From the beginning of the occupation, our country and our authority, regularly and religiously, in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement on economic unity, reported the amount of coal and steel produced in the British zone to the quadripartite authority in Germany. We religiously shared out the coal among the four Allies. Equally consistently we were flatly refused even information as to the amount of food in the Eastern zone, let alone any share of that food, which was so badly needed in the West. We shared the coal and we had no share of the food.
The result was extremely costly to this country and to America—but mostly to us—in trying to prevent Germany from falling into utter starvation. I am afraid that my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes), with most of whose remarks I wholeheartedly agree, was a little unjust about the food situation. I think he knows how tremendously difficult it was in those desperate and difficult days, when India, the Colonies and large parts of Europe were threatened with famine, for us to reach the 1,500 calories which we intended to provide for Germany and for which we made great sacrifices in those days. I hope that the Germans will come to understand some of the story, although I am sure they will never learn it fully.
For three years that has been going on. We have been religiously observing the terms of the Potsdam Agreement. The first reparations deliveries that were made, were made to Russia. In fact, they were the only reparations deliveries that were made at that time. I have mentioned coal. The only response that has been made to those efforts on our part has been recriminations and more recriminations. I could tell many tales to the hon. Member for West Fife and his friends. There was the story about organised German troops in the British zone complete with tanks, air squadrons and everything else. When that story was first published, we offered the Control Council the opportunity for an impartial,


quadripartite investigation into all four zones. That offer was rejected by the Russians. They insisted upon quadripartite investigation into the British zone alone. For the sake of peace we accepted even that proposal. The report of that investigation—I do not think I am giving away any secret—was to the effect that there was no foundation for the story. That finding was rejected by the Russian representative on the Control Council who refused to accept the report. Yet for months afterwards we still heard repetitions of that story, from the hon. Member here and his friends.
The same is true about the story of Russian citizens being refused the right to return to their homes. That story was proved to be fantastic nonsense. Repatriation Commissions went into the matter and established that the people were Baltic citizens, never were Russians and had no desire to go to Russia. If they had wanted to go back to their Baltic countries, I am sure our authorities would have been only too glad to provide them with facilities for going home. We had no desire to be responsible for them.
All through these three years the situation in the Western zones, and particularly the British zone, has been sinking into deeper stagnation, despite tremendous efforts. Currency reform was already urgent in 1946. The measures to be taken were recognised, and we had almost reached agreement upon them in 1946. Yet agreement was not implemented until a few days ago. Why? Because we have been trying to achieve, above all things, a common policy with our Russian ally and because during all this time we have found it impossible to do so. Upon all that history, so far as the diplomatic situation is concerned, our Foreign Secretary is certainly beyond reproach in regard to his efforts to achieve accommodation with our Russian friends.
We had come to a situation where currency reform obviously could wait no longer. We could not possibly go on spending sums like £200 million subsidising a situation which could be avoided or at least mitigated by establishing a firm currency in Western Germany. The Foreign Secretary has explained how, because we could not get complete agreement, it became

necessary to accept the situation and to apply currency reform over that area where agreement was possible. Now we have the quandary which is arising in Berlin. Sufficient has been said about that. There has been such unanimity in this Committee as to make it unnecessary for me to go into the various aspects of the Berlin situation.
I want to say a few words about the new situation that arises from it. Whatever may come out of the Berlin situation, one fact stands out fairly clear. It is that we have now reached the point where we have given up, for the moment at least, the possibility of reaching quadripartite agreement upon a policy for Germany. We have no longer a reason for not carrying out a unilateral policy in Western Germany. For three years we have been able to say, with reluctance, that things have not been done because we have not been able to reach agreement about them. We accepted the principle of Cabinet responsibility in that respect. We have not that excuse now. I hope that we shall be given a clear declaration of the new line of policy for the West.
I was particularly glad to hear the Foreign Secretary refer for the first time—I hope it is as significant as I think it was—in complimentary terms to the firm democratic attitude of large numbers of Germans in Berlin and elsewhere. I hope that is to be the new keynote of our approach to German policy. I hope that in place of the past groping futility of policy in Germany, for which I do not blame any single Power in the West, we shall now have a positive policy. We are still awaiting a declaration of it, and I hope we shall get it today. In spite of the fact that in a recent Debate in this House the Foreign Secretary rejected the old Morgenthau conception, which was the first approach to the policy for the control of Germany, the fact remains that that policy still overclouds our actions in Western Germany, as is only too clear from the remarkable speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich. Has that policy actually been abandoned or not? Are we now, in fact, ready to use every resource in Western Germany in manpower, material and equipment in order to begin that drive for Western rehabilitation which was again suggested in some of the remarks of the Foreign Secretary?
What is our attitude with regard to Article 115(f) of the American Foreign Assistance Act, which is not referred to in the White Paper issued yesterday. Article 115(f) makes this remarkable statement:
The administrator will request the Secretary of State to obtain the agreement of those countries concerned that such capital equipment as is scheduled for removal as reparations from the three Western zones of Germany shall be retained in Germany if such retention will most effectively serve the purposes of the European Recovery Programme.
Do we accept that principle or not? If we do not, it seems to make nonsense of the declarations made by the Foreign Secretary today in regard to giving Germany the tools and insisting that Germany should be able not only to feed herself but to make her contribution to Western European rehabilitation.
What are we doing at the present time in regard to the level of industry, to which reference was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich? Does that suggest that we are trying to give Germany the tools or does it suggest that we are trying to destroy the tools? The basis upon which the level of industry has been reached was explained by the hon. Member for Ipswich. He mentioned some of the industries which we are forbidding Germany to engage in. He mentioned some of the industries which we are deliberately restricting in Germany. There is, for instance, the prohibition of the production of such essentials for peace-time industry as roller bearings. Roller bearings are needed in Germany and the rest of Europe, and Germany can produce them in considerable quantities, and yet we are deliberately stopping that production and forcing her to import them. Germany has been told in so many words that she can import roller bearings, synthetic ammonia and other things because if she were to produce them they would become a war potential.
We are forcing Germany to import goods which she could produce in sufficient quantities for her own purposes and for export as well. While we are increasing her necessity for imports, we are the people who are subsidising the situation which we are thus creating. Similarly, there is a complete suppression of any mercantile activity in Germany. Germany has a seaboard and a great mercantile experience, and she has an economy which makes provision for

it. We are forcing Germany to employ foreign ships to carry all her cargoes while the British taxpayer subsidies the German economy until Germany reaches a balance of payments which we are deliberately preventing her from reaching. The same thing applies to the restrictions on fishing vessels, and so on.
Have we said good-bye to that policy? Are we going on with the shadow of the Morgenthau policy, or are we altering the policy and getting on with something more constructive. A very fine article in "The Economist" the other day summed this up fairly well. It said that there was no half-way house between repression and co-operation and whichever policy we intended to follow, we must follow it without restriction, and we must make up our minds in which direction we are going. That is true. I hope that when the Minister of State replies to the Debate, he will not tell me and the Committee that we are not in fact restricting German production because we are allowing for 11,500,000 tons of steel and Germany is producing only about 5 million tons and that there is thus no real restriction on the level of industry; or that the restriction of the production of German cement, which is regarded as a war potential, is not likely to be restrictive because the Germans have not enough coal for it anyway.
If we are not restricting production, why bother at all about the level of industry, because the only effect it can have is to depress and discourage German production and the German psychology upon which we must depend if we are to get any co-operation at all? I suggest deliberately that the level of industry should be dropped altogether as far as the Western zones are concerned, and we should say to the new German authority, "You produce a level of industry plan which will utilise to the best advantage all the resources you have in coal, steel, factories, machinery and manpower, and we will look at it and see if you are going to build any battleships and pillboxes with the steel." The Germans have more desperate needs than the building of battleships or pillboxes at present, even if that were permissible. If we are now promoting the establishment of a Western German Government, there is no reason why we should not give them the substance of democracy as well as the shadow.
I do not want to be misunderstood in regard to security. I still cannot understand why so much emphasis is put upon the interpretation of security which means the complete disarmament of the country and the permanent control and supervision of production when on top of the Five-Power Treaty—which in itself would be enough to prevent German aggression for as long as we are likely to prevent it—we have the new Six-Power Agreement plus all the restrictions and the controls still provided. Why should it be necessary to prevent the production of heavy motor vehicles, which are so necessary to the German economy, or roller hearings?
It is true that France and other countries have a special angle on the security question, but I should like our French friends to consider seriously in which direction real security lies. Does it lie in the continued repression of Germany and the building up of such a legacy of hatred and bitterness that, at some stage or another, a revitalised Germany will become an unhealthy neighbour; or does it lie in the development of that spirit of mutual confidence and co-operation on which the whole conception of Western Union is based? If it lies in the second, let them drop the fears and get on with the policy of enabling Germany to improve her economy.
I want to say a few words in regard to the currency reform and the new Six-Power Agreement. In regard to currency reform, I want to ask one or two questions. How far has it got? How far do we propose it should go? I heard most of the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for East Coventry (Mr. Cross-man), and so far as I understand it, he is correct. This is not the currency reform which was originally planned. In fact, this is not a currency reform at all. It is a depreciation of the note issue, or very little more. It does not provide for any adjustment of the value of capital holdings. It does not provide for the adjustment of the taxation arrangements in Germany.

The Minister of State (Mr. McNeil): Yes, it does.

Mr. Crossman: Yes, it relieves the capital of tax.

Mr. Hynd: I am giving my impressions. I am talking about deliberate and con-

structive taxation. It does not provide for the protection of small incomes and people living on small savings. Is that intended, or not? So far as my information is concerned, it is not I understand that we have rejected it as something which the German political parties should fight out. We cannot do that now. There is not time. What will happen if this currency reform is an incomplete operation, is that the depreciation of the notes in itself will not substantially influence the production of the necessary consumer goods which must be the basis of any currency reform, and within a short time, there may be again such an unholy mess that we shall have to begin all over again. I hope we shall have some reassurance on that.
In regard to the Six-Power Agreement there are one or two short questions I would like to ask. In regard to the new Consultative Assembly that is being set up, why has it been impossible to agree that it should be a completely elected assembly? Can we imagine the peculiar situation, the acrimony and bitterness that will be created, if members should get up and say, "We are the elected representatives of the people and you on the other side are only nominated representatives"? I cannot see that discussions will be on a sound basis if that is to be the position, but more serious than that, can we expect that any future German government, popularly elected, will consider itself bound by a constitution framed by an assembly of this kind?
Surely, in such an important operation as the setting up of a German constitution, which we hope will become a permanent basis for German administration and external relationships, we must be certain that the foundations are secure and that there will be no excuse later on for any popularly-elected German government to be able to reject it by saying it was never established as a result of discussions between representatives of the people. I would also like to know what will be the position of any of the Länder in Germany which, after the constitution of Germany has been framed, decide that they will not adopt it. It is a point that puzzles me.
My second point is in regard to the Ruhr Control Authority. We are told that this provides for German participation but, as far as I can see, it is not German participation at all because we are told that the German representation


will be nominated by the Commander-in-Chief or by the Allied Control Authority for the area, and that their votes will be exercised by the occupation authority for the area. That is not German representation, and if that is what we intend to do, why do we not call it by its correct name? Why do we seek to impose a fraud? It is not likely to be received with great enthusiasm in Germany, nor are the decisions of this authority likely to be accepted by any responsible group in Germany.
I suggest that these are important points because, as I said at the beginning, one of the factors upon which we must base all our hopes for success with Western Union and the rehabilitation of Western Europe is the whole-hearted co-operation of the German elements. At the moment we are not getting it. I hope it is not a question of turning round and saying that they started two wars, so why should we be so sentimental about it. That is not the issue, and I think the hon. Member for Ipswich made that clear. It is a question of whether we are going to get on with a constructive job, whether we are, in fact, going to give Germany the tools and, having done that, whether we are going to encourage their full co-operation in getting on with the job. They are not getting on with it at the moment. The political parties are suspicious, the political parties are hesitant, and we on these benches ought at least to understand the position.
At the end of the war we knew that whatever party got into power in this country would have a sticky time for a number of years. There was talk about a Coalition Government, and our party took up the attitude that if we were to accept responsibility for that situation, we must have power to deal with it. We would not accept a minority position in a Government where the other side would have the majority control, and where we would have an ineffectual voice. We said, "Give us the authority and we will get on with the job." We were given the authority. It is not surprising to me that the German political parties who are being asked to take responsibility for representation on the Ruhr Control Authority, where they are to be nominated by and their votes exercised by the occupying Powers—or, if they are asked to take part in a Western Germany where

they have no real authority, where they are subject to the control of the occupying Powers, where they have to depend on the occupying troops to carry out decisions and so on—are at least reluctant to take part in this peculiar set-up.
Having said that, I hope nevertheless that the German political parties, despite all these disadvantages and the criticisms I have made and the questions I have asked, will realise that they, too, should be prepared to make allowances as well as other people; that if they are not getting a perfect deal, at least they are getting something, and that there is good will behind the offers we are making. I hope they will realise that the situation is too dramatic and too urgent at the present time to play politics, and that whatever their own feelings may be at the moment, whatever they think is faulty or imperfect about the arrangements, they will nevertheless come in and be as ready as, for instance, the French Government have been to accept things that they do not like in the interests of the unity of the Western democratic Powers. I believe that if they will do that, and if we respond by giving them encouragement, incentive and the tools to which the Foreign Secretary referred, we can still make a success of Western Germany and of Western Union, with Germany playing an important part. If we do not, the question which will be raised inevitably will be, who is to blame?
One thing is clear; since Potsdam, when the economic unity of Germany, central administration, and these other principles were laid down, the Foreign Ministers have not been able to agree on the implementation of these principles. They have failed completely, and the history of the conferences in Moscow, Paris, London and elsewhere has been a story of failure to agree. I do not blame anybody in particular at the moment, but it is a fact that they have failed to agree on the implementation and interpretation of the principles laid down by their Presidents and Prime Ministers at the Potsdam Conference. Is it not time that the Presidents and Prime Ministers who laid down these principles got together to see whether they can interpret them and whether they can make a basis of agreement upon which the Foreign Ministers can begin to operate a practical policy?

7.26 p.m.

Sir Ralph Glyn: I want to remind the Committee, in support of what has already been said by many hon. Members, that as long ago as last September, currency proposals were being considered. It was clearly stated by Sir Brian Robertson that the position was so near agreement that only trivial points were outstanding. It seems to me that it is of great importance in this Debate, as the matter turns on currency reform, to remind the Committee of the seriousness of the position unless this monetary reform was carried out. It affected the wages of every single German workman, it prevented the taxpayers in this country being repaid because of the impossibility of exporting products, and it also made it, difficult for the schemes that have been considered in connection with the level of industry plan to be made really effective.
The Select Committee on Estimates visited Germany, and, if hon. Members are interested, the whole of the details, as stated by those responsible both for the level of industry and for currency reform, are all contained in the Eighth Report of the last Session. However, there is this new feature which has arisen now—which has perhaps not been emphasised very much in this Debate—the impact of the European Recovery Programme on the position, and the reason why the Berlin situation has become so acute.
I do not think that anybody in this country, the Dominions or anywhere else, will do anything but welcome the very firm statement made by the Foreign Secretary today. The speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head) was of very great importance and is one with which I entirely concur. But there may arise in Berlin a problem which will be difficult to meet, should the situation in the British, American and French sectors reach a state where it is very difficult to supply food and then the offer is made by the Soviet to supply food on certain conditions. It is much more likely that in the background of this plan is the idea that if the Germans want food, they can go into the Russian sector and get it. The question then would be how many of the Germans who had gone into the Russian sector would come back. We must be prepared for a new situation,

which will be extremely difficult to meet should it occur. What is much more important, I am convinced that the consequences of withdrawal would be not only catastrophic, but would immediately create a similar situation in Vienna. If that situation arose it would be an impossible one to retrieve. What would be even more serious, it would inevitably delay any prospect of the European Recovery Programme getting under way as we expect and hope.
The level of industry plan has been criticised by the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) and others. Those of us who on several occasions have been to Germany and have had the opportunity of seeing this process in action ought to feel that it should be stopped here and now. I am perfectly convinced that, if ever it was right, it is utterly wrong to pursue it at this time of European recovery. The hon. Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) quoted the White Paper and the powers given to the Administrator in helping Germany—Western Germany at any rate—to make a fair contribution towards European recovery. Some of the essentials, for instance, ball and roller bearings, have been ruled out by people who frankly do not know much about industrial recovery. It is ludicrous to tell an industrial country that it can have a recovery, but prevent it from making the essentials for that recovery.
Furthermore, it means they are using our money to buy those things, of which we ourselves are extremely short, either from this country or from elsewhere outside their own bounds. Not only are we destroying the hope of German industrial operatives to get back to work, but we are actually delaying the whole programme of European recovery.
Nothing would do more good than to make use of this very grave situation, to take the thing boldly by the throat and say, "Now, this is a new situation that has occurred. It has been put on us by your action, which we regret. We stand perfectly firm but will not now hesitate any longer in going right forward on the lines we believe to be necessary, not only for Germany, but for the recovery of Europe"—which means the prosperity of the world. Nothing will make me believe that the Russians are anxious to precipitate an immediate war. I believe that by


their actions they are testing us and testing our courage. If we fail at this time, if we fail to give support to all the Germans who have stood by us, the results will be disastrous.
There is another matter which I ask the Minister of State to consider seriously. I hope that in making this proposal I will not be accused of swashbuckling or anything of that sort, but there is no getting away from the fact that Russian military strength at present is very great. We should not underrate the intelligence of the Russian General Staff. They are fully aware of the whole position. I believe it would be an enormous help in bringing back a better feeling, if we had a combined staff—and, indeed, a supreme commander, if necessary—for all the Allied forces in the various occupying armies in Germany on the model of S.H.A.E.F. Hon. Members may forget there are contingents from Norway, Belgium and other countries, besides the Americans, the French and ourselves. In a way they are all living off the German people. Something like 300,000 Germans are engaged in one form or another on work in connection with either the Services or C.C.G., or are engaged in pulling down the reparations factories. All those people are taken away from the German economy and are not able to make their contribution.
I beg the right hon. Gentleman to consider whether this is not the moment when, besides standing firm on the Berlin position, we should also go forward in what we know to be right and what, from our experience during three years of taking charge in Germany, we know the Germans want. We have trusted them up to a point: do let us trust them that little bit further; then let us withdraw at least 75 per cent. of the Control Commission and establish such a form of inspection that will make it quite impossible for the Germans to prepare for another war. If those things are done and we can convince the Russians—as we all wish to do—that our one object is to have Germany as one economic whole; that all our plans were laid with that idea, it is not too late now—if they realise we will not be bluffed out of the situation and are ready to welcome them into the joint partnership—to put forward the recovery in Germany at a time which is most opportune.
The Germans who are taking a leading part in the Länder Governments of the various zones have taken on an immense risk, as have their friends in Berlin. The Russians must realise that, whatever our faults may be, it will never be said, I hope, that we desert our friends or forget what they have done. The only way in which we can now show that is by a united front here—and not only here, for I was delighted to hear the Foreign Secretary say the Dominions had been closely consulted. It is of the utmost importance that all those who worked together to win the war should stand together now in one common policy to see that we do not lose all the fruits of war, which, in my belief, is a very great risk.

7.38 p.m.

Mr. Gallacher: The Foreign Secretary and others who followed him—and one who preceded him—said that we have a right to be in Berlin. Never in all my life have I heard such a miserable, childish proposition on which to take the risk of sacrificing millions of lives and putting the finish to the history of this country. With all this talk of war, let there be no mistake that, if ever there were another world war, this country would never come out of it. We have seen what happened after the first world war and we are now experiencing the conditions existing after the second world war. We are told that we cannot stand on our own feet and that we need the dollar crutches to keep us up. We are told, "We have a right to be there," and, in order to provide a cover for this absurd proposition, we hear talk of Munich.
The other day at Luton the Leader of the Opposition spoke of Munich. That was utterly shameless of him. Neither he nor any other hon. Member who sat in this House at the time of Munich should dare to mention it. They had read before them from the then Prime Minister, a letter which had been sent to Hitler, and on the basis of which he was going to Munich, proposing a deliberate betrayal which was the grossest possible treachery towards a small nation. I happened to be the one voice that protested, supported by my hon. Friend the Member for Dumbarton Burghs (Mr. Kirkwood), the hon. Member for Stoke (Mr. Ellis Smith) the then hon. Member for Ince and the then hon. Member for Leigh.

Mr. Ellis Smith: And the hon. Member for Spennymoor (Mr. Murray).

Mr. Gallacher: The situation in Berlin has no relation whatever to that situation, that deliberate, calculated betrayal of a small nation. The hon. Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn), who always speaks in a reasonable and balanced manner, said he did not believe that Russia wanted war. No, I am positive that the one thing Russia does not want is war, and she will make every sacrifice to avoid war. How can anyone talk about Russia wanting war with most of her country devastated, 10 million of her population slaughtered, and when it will be generations before she can recover from the last war?
Does America want war? I was in America two years ago and I found every important newspaper like "The Times," the "Daily Mail," "The Express" and the "Telegraph," every paper had on its front page "War, war, war, get at Russia now that we have the monopoly of the atom bomb." Statesmen were going to the Legionaires' gathering in California in 1946 and working up hysteria for war against Russia at that conference. Not only did we find that in the Press, but there was Bullet's book and Byrnes's book and other books proposing that America now that she had the monopoly of the atom bomb should make war on Russia, and that America should not wait until Russia got stronger. That had been worked up into an hysteria in America until one could hear nothing else. Has there been any newspaper, or statesman, or anyone in the Soviet Union who has suggested going to war? This drive has not only come over Berlin; it has been going on for nearly three years. It is a terrific campaign, and is still going on. Everyone knows that the Press of America was and is full of that sort of thing and that statesmen of America are continually talking of war. The Minister of State used to go round talking Socialism in Glasgow and on the Clydeside. If one asked him a few years ago what was the main cause of war, what would he have replied? Will he deny that he would have said that the main cause of war was the ruthless drive of capitalism for profits and for spheres of investment? Would he deny that?

Mr. McNeil: I never deny saying that that is one cause.

Mr. Gallacher: The main cause as he knows, and everyone knows, is that, and the great, problem before America—with a terrific industry which was not affected by the war, but was intact and built up to the highest point of efficiency during the war—is that America has accumulated investment capital greater than anything that existed in the world before. America must get markets for goods and spheres of investment for accumulated investment capital. For that purpose she must make a drive into Europe and break down any possibility of the working class of Europe advancing towards Socialism. If the countries of Western Europe and this country brought about Socialist economy, capitalist economy in America would be finished. Is there any question of that in the mind of any Socialist? Capitalist economy in America would be finished if this country and Western Europe went Socialist. So America must use all her power, military as well as political, in the drive to prevent the workers of Europe going Socialist.
Today the Foreign Secretary said that he tried to get economic unity and some other hon. Members who, presumably, are authorities on the question of Germany, are supporting him. Of course everything done by the Foreign Secretary, everything done by us, and by American capitalists, has all been good and highly desirable, and everything undesirable has been done by the working-class country, the Soviet Union. The capitalist country, America, has never done anything to which anyone could take exception. The Foreign Secretary and the Minister of State can talk quite roughly and resolutely about the Soviet Union, but in America did the right hon. Gentleman take any stand against the ruthless character of American capitalism? What a situation it is when so-called Socialists find a basis of unity with the most ruthless capitalists in the world.
When the Foreign Secretary stood at that Box and declared that he was going to nationalise the industries in the British zone, he made a declaration which prepared the way for economic unity with the Soviet Union but not for economic or political unity with American monopoly capitalism. But he did not carry out that pledge. He has a nice excuse now. The


excuse is democracy. It is an amazing word, this democracy—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Yes, it is an amazing word. Some hon. Members will recollect that when I drew attention to the fact that the Leader of the House refused to fight in the first world war when he was of military age, the Leader of the House got up and said, "Yes, I was bitterly opposed to the first world war." What was the first world war fought for, according to the Labour leaders in the Government, as well as the Tory and Liberal leaders? It was fought for freedom and democracy. Freedom and democracy; but what did the Leader of the House say? The Leader of the House said that freedom and democracy was a sham, a mask behind which was hidden the ugly face of Imperialism. Now we get the same talk about democracy. What happened in Philadelphia last week? Was that democracy?

Mr. Blackburn: Or in Yugoslavia?

Mr. Gallacher: I would gladly make a digression and talk about that, but the Chairman would rule that out of Order. I consider that interjections of that kind represent the meanest and most cowardly type of interjection. [Laughter.] Yes, because the hon. Member making a speech is not allowed to reply to them. I do not mind interjections and I would not for a moment mind if it was in Order for me to reply.

Mr. Eden: Since we put down the Vote, I think it might help the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) if I tell him that on the Foreign Office Vote, it is completely in Order.

Mr. Gallacher: It is Germany with which the Vote deals.

The Chairman: I am sorry but the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) is not strictly correct. The Votes set down have to be connected with Germany.

Mr. Gallacher: Hon. Members know me long enough to know that I do not mind interjections.

Earl Winterton: On a point of Order. If the Debate is confined to the subject of Germany, what was the relevance of the remarks of the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) on the American Constitution? Perhaps, Major

Milner, you can answer that point of Order.

The Chairman: No relevance at all. The hon. Member was digressing and I had my eye on him. He probably appreciated that.

Mr. Gallacher: The point I was making at the time of the interruption was that there could have been unity in Germany if the Foreign Secretary had carried out his pledge, but he ran away from it. Now he talks about democracy. What is the actual situation? The Foreign Secretary said that the Russians wanted Four-Power administration and a central Government, which is true. Just the other day the "New York Herald-Tribune" made a similar statement—that the Russians were trying to bring back again Four-Power control and a central administration for Germany. The "Herald-Tribune" said that that condition would sooner or later make Germany a satellite of the Soviet Union. Here two things are admitted—one that the Soviet Union wants Four-Power control and a central Government in Germany; and, second, if there were Four-Power control and a central administration in Germany the unity of Germany would mean that American imperialistic schemes should never be carried through.
The Foreign Secretary said that we are not prepared to be part of a Four-Power grouping where one Power is dominant. I would be in accord with that in general, and I would be prepared to accept it from the Foreign Secretary, if it were not a fact that he belongs to a Three-Power grouping in which one party is completely dominant. No one is going to make me believe that of the three Powers, Britain, France and America, America is not the completely dominant one. Not one word of criticism or objection has ever been registered by the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of State or by our military commander in Berlin about anything that has been done by the Americans, either militarily or politically. The Americans are dominant so far as the Three-Power grouping is concerned.
In Berlin what is the situation? Berlin is part of the Soviet zone. All this talk about so much territory being given up over such a length of front is beside the point. I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition is not here. Not so many months before


the end of the War the right hon. Gentleman who shoved this handful of rubbish over to the Foreign Secretary, sent a telegram to Stalin begging him to launch an offensive under most terrible weather conditions.

The Chairman: That subject cannot come under the Estimate which we are now discussing. A good deal of past history has been mentioned which has nothing to do with the present Vote.

Mr. Gallacher: But excuse me, Major Milner. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition chipped in when the Foreign Secretary was speaking and drew his attention to the fact that the British and the Americans had retired 150 miles over a 400 mile front. I am only trying to show that they were able to retire for that depth because, at the request of the present Leader of the Opposition, the Soviet Military High Command decided to start an offensive under the most terrible weather conditions, and by that means relieved the British and American forces of the pressure which was directed against them. That is perfectly true and was followed by a telegram from the Leader of the Opposition giving expression to his most grateful thanks to Marshal Stalin and the Red Army for the great services rendered to the British and American forces at that particular time. If the history of the events of those days is studied, it will be seen that that actually happened, and it will be seen how they were in such an advanced position.
Berlin is part of the Soviet zone. The agreement was that the Four Powers should have their headquarters in Berlin and that it should be a Four-Power grouping to administer the whole of Germany. That was the sole reason for being in Berlin. It is not a question of rights. There is no other justification for being there. Now that the Four-Power control is ended, this talk about rights to be there has no relation at all to the matter. There is no reason for them being in Berlin.

Mr. McKinlay: Does the hon. Gentleman suggest that there is no reason for us being there in Berlin at all?

Mr. Gallacher: I agree in general with the suggestion of the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. McKinlay: In 1941 when the hon. Gentleman and others who think like him were chasing me thoughout Dumbartonshire, did he then think that anyone should be in Berlin? Was he not continually saying that it was a capitalist war.

Mr. Gallacher: Do not keep repeating that. It is pathetic that the hon. Member for Dumbartonshire (Mr. McKinlay) should keep repeating this. This is not the first time he has raised the point about being chased about Dumbartonshire. Who is going to chase the hon. Member anywhere? What can one do when one gets interruptions of that kind? The idea of me chasing the hon. Member through Dumbartonshire is just nonsense. The hon. Gentleman reminds me that someone published his photograph in an evening paper in Glasgow and said that he had the head of a philosopher but forgot to mention that there was nothing in it.
It has been decided to set up a government in the British, French and American zones which is under the control of the American monopoly capitalists. American monopoly capitalism is going to see that unity is not restored. They propose to set up a certain kind of government in Western Germany. I ask any hon. Member here to deny that, if the exigencies, which arose at the end of the war, decreed that the Four-Power control headquarters should be in the British or the American zones and a situation arose when those three Powers decided to set up a separate control, currency and Government, they would have allowed the Soviet Union to remain within their zone? Would there have been any question of the Soviet Union remaining there? No, certainly not.
The situation with Britain, America and France is that without any reason, but under the domination of America they insisted on remaining within the Soviet zone. That is a very undesirable situation, and one that the people of this country should never under any circumstances be asked to support. We are faced with a situation in which we are remaining in Berlin only because we wish to continue provocation. We can decide to remain there, or withdraw, or work for the real institution of Four-Power control and the central administration of Germany. Woe to the House of Commons and the people of this country if we continue at the heels of American monopoly


capitalism, If, as a consequence of that, a new world war is launched on the people of Europe and the world, it will not only mean appalling slaughter and devastation, but the finish of this country.
I insist that what I said at Question Time is correct, that any talk of war on the part of the leaders of this country is talk of national suicide. I ask the Government and the Foreign Secretary to weigh well the serious situation they have got us into—[Laughter.]—yes—in their association with the monopoly capitalism of America. How can men on this side, who claimed at one time to be Socialists, who have expressed their belief in fighting capitalism, and who have declared that until we got rid of it there could be no proper freedom and hope for the workers, associate with the most ruthless and brutal capitalist country that the world has ever known? It seems that the Opposition are prepared to betray the country to maintain their own class, but that is no reason why Members on this side should do so. The working class and Members on this side of the House—

Mr. Blackburn: And Tito.

Mr. Gallacher: —must break our association with the monopoly capitalists of America and must carry through a policy of nationalisation, not only in this country but throughout the British zone of Germany. If that is done, a firm basis will be laid for unity between the working classes of the Soviet Union and this country, and a firm foundation laid for peace.

8.3 p.m.

Mr. Spearman: My enjoyment at the amusing speeches of the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) is always a little spoiled for me by the apparent anxiety of his near neighbour, the right hon. Member for Dumbarton Burghs (Mr. Kirkwood), who tries so hard but so unsuccessfully to check him sometimes. If the hon. Member for West Fife really and truly thinks that America wants war, if his imagination is so fantastic that he believes that he has read such things in the American newspapers, I think that is perhaps an explanation for some of the wanderings of his mind.

Mr. Gallacher: Is it the case, or is it not, that a terrible war hysteria has been worked up in America?

Mr. Spearman: On the contrary, I would say that the tragedy of our time is that Russia still maintains the old-fashioned and restrictionist outlook that the economic claims of nations contain the seeds of conflict. Throughout this country and on the other side of the Atlantic I hope that wiser views are held, and that we realise that wealth is not something limited but that the more is made the more there is for everyone. I am firmly of the belief that if Russia was submerged, the economic interests of nations would be fundamentally in harmony.
It is interesting to note that those Members who appear sometimes to show that they are more concerned with the interests of Russia than with the interests of peace are, with certain exceptions, noticeably absent today. I believe that is a very significant indication of the very great measure of agreement among Members of the House on the subject of Russia, and I hope that that is widely realised in the cause of peace throughout the world. I must, of course, exclude the hon. Member for West Fife who, with a courage which I have never denied, will always get up and say his piece. It is perhaps true that his noisy and persistent bark is much worse than the bite which his good nature would permit and I think the result of it all is that he is a more likeable than important advocate of an altogether despicable policy.

Dr. Morgan: Is that in Order?

Mr. Spearman: I was very interested in the admirable speech of the hon. Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd), which gave me great satisfaction because it seemed to me to be largely what has been said on this side on so many occasions, notably by my hon. Friend the Member for Flint (Mr. Birch), during the years that the hon. Member was responsible for the policy of which he is now such an effective critic.
I would like to refer to the hon. Member—I always have great difficulty in not referring to him as "my hon. Friend"—for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes). He gave us, as always, a speech both vigorous and amusing, and I feel that the tragedy of events in Germany has afforded him an opportunity for speaking with more good sense than I invariably associate with


what I hear from him. I would like to express my entire agreement with some of the things said by the hon. Member, in particular with three points. The first is his criticism of the federalisation of Germany. I believe that without a free economy that is an impracticable proposition. If, of course, we had an entirely free price mechanism, and no tariffs, no doubt the goods would move from one part to another but without that the federalisation of Germany will inevitably entail hoarding by the producers of particular States, to the detriment of the country as a whole.
Secondly, I would like to express my agreement with the hon. Member in his views about dismantling. It is almost criminal folly at this time of starvation in Germany and poverty everywhere in Western Europe that we should be destroying buildings which might well be wealth-producing. I sometimes wonder whether the machinery of Government moves so slowly that instructions on the subject of dismantling have not reached the proper sources and have not been carried out, and whether we are not suffering in Germany from actions which are contrary to the wishes of the Government. I also join with the hon. Member in paying a tribute to Lord Pakenham. I believe his achievement in changing the whole outlook of the unhappy German people is something quite remarkable, which does not seem to me to be an altogether good reason for translating him to another sphere.
I think impartial observers among all parties and in all countries realise the quite remarkable patience displayed by the Foreign Secretary. Three years ago, I think we all hoped that Russia would co-operate with us in making a great, prosperous and peaceful world. Two years ago many of us realised that that was not so, and that Russia did not want a prosperous and peaceful Europe. Therefore, many of us were dismayed at the policy of the Government who failed to reconstruct the economy of Germany and failed to take those measures of modernising taxation, reforming the currency, preventing dismantlement and modifying de-nazification which were vital if Germany was to have a decent economy. It may well be that the Foreign Secretary was right to go on with his

course long after it was obvious that Russia did not want those things. It may have been right for him to go on aiming at a united Europe, though many of us thought it was better to have a divided than a ruined Europe. Whether that is so or not, everyone now knows that the Government have exercised the most extreme patience and have done everything conceivable—I think much more than they ought—in demonstrating patience with Russia. It is, therefore, very clear whose is the responsibility for the present situation.
At present we are more concerned with peace than with anything else. That, of course, does not belittle the gravity of the economic situation. I wonder whether we always remember quite how dependent this country is on Europe. Thirty-five per cent. of our exports before the war went to Europe. Europe was dependent on Germany. I do not believe that this country can be safe or prosperous with an impoverished Europe, and I know that Europe cannot be safe or prosperous with an impoverished Germany. For that reason I, like every other hon. Member, except perhaps the hon. Member for West Fife, was delighted with most of which the Foreign Secretary said today, because I think we know that if we left Berlin, the chances of retaining Western Germany would not be good. Without Western Germany, Europe would not recover, nor could we.
Of course, far more important even than that is the question of war, and I can think of no single step which would bring war nearer than to leave Berlin at this time. Therefore, I was more than delighted to hear the Foreign Secretary say in such absolutely clear and irrevocable terms that in no circumstances would we leave Berlin. I wish he could have seen his way to tell us more clearly how he intended to carry that out, but we must rely upon him to take every measure, knowing that he has made a statement on which he can never go back.
I would like to make a comment which, perhaps, is not quite irrelevant. A very serious strike has just been finished. I do not want to try to make bad blood by any reflections on what the strikers did. I would rather think that they deliberately chose to go back to work yesterday because they realised that they were endangering the peace.

The Temporary Chairman (Sir Basil Neven-Spence): I am afraid the hon. Member is out of Order. This subject on which he is embarking has nothing to do with Germany.

Mr. Spearman: What I am trying to say is this. I can think of no way in which the peace of Europe would be more endangered than by strikes occurring at this time, and I want to appeal to hon. Members opposite—

The Temporary Chairman: This really has nothing to do with the subject of Germany.

Mr. Spearman: May I say this, then? If strikes took place at this juncture, it would be a most direct incitement to Russia.

The Temporary Chairman: I am warning the hon. Member for the third time, and I must ask him to keep off that topic. It is out of Order.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Is it not the case that one of the Votes down for discussion is Class VI, Vote 1, Board of Trade, and is it not quite relevant to mention a situation which might well result in a diminution of trading supplies in this country?

The Temporary Chairman: It would be in Order if it was connected with Germany.

Mr. Spearman: I was not casting any reflection upon anyone, but I was asking hon. Members to realise that nothing could make a greater contribution to war than a strike at this time. I will now leave the subject.
I conclude with a reference to the future. If this peril which we are now in is to be avoided—and I trust and hope it will be so—and if Russia—I will not say "climbs down," because that would look as if Russia were making concessions, but if Russia permits peace to be maintained, then I hope and trust that the Government will take a far more urgent line in reconstituting the economy of Germany than they have ever done before. I believe that that is absolutely vital, that the Germans should be given an opportunity of working their own way, preventing themselves from starving, and ceasing to be a hideous liability on this nation instead of the asset which they ought to be. These steps, which I think the Government have been so slow in

carrying out in the past, are vitally necessary if we are not to have a repetition of the crisis which we are now enduring. It is, therefore, vitally necessary to set about, far more expeditiously than we have ever done before, the economic reform of Germany.

8.16 p.m.

Mr. Paget: I should like to apologise for having been absent from some of this Debate. I was called out to a very important meeting, but I do not think I have missed many speeches. I wish to emphasise that this Berlin crisis is part of something very much larger. It is part of the struggle for Germany, and that struggle is part of the struggle for the independence of Western Christian civilisation. One cannot concentrate upon one particular feature, because it will not be sufficient to win in Berlin if we do not achieve a superior alternative to Communism in the areas which we administer.
I wish to say something on currency reforms, as I had the opportunity of seeing that measure in operation in its initial stages. I think we all agree that it was a highly necessary measure, and indeed, we welcomed it tremendously as being the first and essential measure to deny the frustration and chaos which we have allowed Russia to create during the years since Potsdam. However, I would draw attention to some of the consequences. The reform itself is going extremely well. The way in which goods came into the shops was quite amazing. For the first time since 1943, the Germans found themselves with real money in their pockets. Bicycles with tyres were on sale in shops in Hamburg for as little as 120 marks. The money was well issued and there were any amount of goods. How that will continue to succeed depends upon the quantity of consumer goods which there will be to back that money.
My impression is that the supply under the German counter is very large indeed. For three years we have created the extraordinary situation in Germany in which the producers of consumer goods have had a loss precisely in proportion to the amount they produced. They had costs and prices imposed upon them which meant a loss on every article they produced. It is not very surprising in those circumstances that every device was adopted not to put goods on the market


which could be sold only at a loss. The supplies are probably pretty considerable. Again, the Americans are bringing forward some consumer goods further to back that currency. I think there is quite a reasonable chance under the currency reforms that, provided the other things go well, money will retain its value. It certainly is inspiring great confidence at the moment.
There are, however, consequences which I do not feel have been fully anticipated. There is a certain amount of feeling in Germany that there could not be agreement as to the social and economic measures which should have accompanied the reform and, therefore, that they were simply shelved or pushed on to the Germans without the Germans really being given the powers to deal with them. The hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) dealt with the social implications, I think, very well. I entirely agree with what he said about that point.
I would like to say something of the economic consequences. In Germany we have an economy which has been built up upon an inflationary basis. That meant that it was estimated that something like half the German population were engaged on frivolous occupations, either producing things which were really valueless or engaged on the black market or on the various grey markets which grow up under an inflationary economy. Thus there was an unreal full employment. None the less, it was an employment which enabled people to get by and to go on living. Now, quite suddenly, we have all that swept away. We have a potential unemployment which I heard estimated at varying figures from 6,500,000 in the next two months down to an unemployment of about one million. But the pessimism of the prognostications which I received were much in measure with the opportunities for information of the persons who were giving them to me.
What has been done is to sweep away an existing inflationary economy and to trust that another economy will build up, by the play of the natural forces of economics; redeployment of labour and goods upon the basis of a sound currency. That is what Dr. Schacht did in 1923. It succeeded economically. It had certain very grave social consequences, leading to Fascism, but it succeeded economically. At that time labour was

mobile. Today we have labour which is more immobile, probably, than any labour force ever has been in history. Lack of accommodation prevents anybody from moving at all, and it is not only in that sense that labour is immobile. Lack of clothing to a very large extent makes it impossible for people to change their jobs. People who have the sort of shoes and the sort of suits with which they can do a little dealing on the market have not the sort of clothes to enable them to go into building operations or the moving of rubble. We have that intense immobility of labour which is quite unlike the position in 1923.
Again, in 1923, loans were coming into Germany and goods were available. There was a supply of goods, which were more or less moving in a free market. That is not occurring today. Again, credit was controlled from the Reichbank through the Government by the people who were responsible for dealing with the problem. That is not occurring today. In addition, there was international trade. It seems to me that in the existing situation we are relying on the natural economic forces to build an economy while we have hamstrung those forces. The forces upon which we are relying do not, and cannot, operate, and it seems to me that the actions which should have been taken when the currency was reformed will have to be taken later on and will be taken in circumstances of great distress and when a tremendous lot of political harm has already been done.
The credit position at the moment is that the creation of credit, which must be necessary to re-employ all those people, is wholly out of the control both of the Länder Governments and the German Economic Council at Frankfort, so that the people who are responsible for coping with the unemployment are denied the credit weapon which alone could be used in dealing with the problem. Again, and this is causing great anxiety amongst the people who are responsible for heavy industries, the credit, such as exists, is by the issue on orthodox banking lines. There is great anxiety in case this credit will go to the people who have the goods which they could put in as security against the credits for which they were asking, thus operating against the currency reform, which is designed to force those goods on to the market, and against the heavy industries, which it is essential to


build up but which would not be able to get the necessary credits because their securities would not be so good as they would require them over longer periods.
I would suggest that, if this policy is to succeed, it is quite essential that some credit-creating central body should be formed for the purpose of directing credits in the direction where they are needed to rebuild the economy. That body is lacking today, and I would suggest that it is essential and is something which His Majesty's Government must consider. Further, I think it is absolutely necessary, if we are to face the situation, that there should be a public works programme and that the Germans in the Länder—and anybody who has been to Germany must have seen the immense amount of work to be done; the rubble has not been moved yet—should provide work, which must be work which is close to the people. Moreover the clothing must be made available for the people to enable them to do the work. The necessary credits must be made available in order that the people can be moved into employment in these necessary directions.
Finally, I would say there must be some opening of the frontiers for German trade. The Germans must be allowed to charge world prices for their goods instead of being forced to sell them at vastly below world prices. We cannot get this economy built up again on a sound basis if we force the people to export at uneconomic prices, either in German terms or in world terms. This seems to me to be an essential thing which must be introduced in this reform. Figures seem to indicate that the German economy is really working only at about 40 per cent. of its potential at the moment. That would indicate that there is great scope for re-employment within the productive industries, but we shall not cope with the problem unless we can direct the credit in the right way and unless we give to the people who have to cope with this problem the power to cope with it—that is, the Germans themselves.
We must regard all this as part of our policy to create a better system than that of the Communism across the border, but there is one other factor which I think is of the greatest importance and that is the question of the nationalisation of heavy industry in Germany. On purely economic lines, I have on previous occasions been very critical indeed of it. I

have looked with the gravest suspicion on nationalisation proposals which vested the ownership of industry in public bodies that did not appear to have the financial strength to provide the working capital necessary to keep those industries going.
On those sorts of grounds I have on previous occasions been extremely critical of nationalisation proposals for German heavy industry. I am entirely convinced now on political grounds that nationalisation is absolutely necessary today. I talked in Germany to a large number of British officials, from all parties, many of whom were opposed to nationalisation in England. I did not hear a single one who did not say it was absolutely necessary in the circumstances of Germany. In the present position the Military Government have taken industry over, but when the Ministry Government release it, it goes back to the old owners. Military Government have created German bodies under their supervision to carry on these industries on their behalf. Those German bodies do not know to whom eventually they will have to account, and, therefore, they are far less anxious to push up production than to maintain assets. That is a thoroughly unhealthy situation. We cannot get real co-operation from German managers until they know to whom they will have to answer.
Equally, on the question of the political situation there, we shall not be able to hold the Ruhr against Communism unless the workers are completely assured that they will not go back to their former employers. That is the situation there. I think very few people have been better friends to our system than has Buerckler, the leader of the Ruhr trade unionists. He has, all our people over there agree, done a very remarkable job. He certainly assured me that he simply could not hold the situation unless the workers did receive that assurance and receive it quickly. What they want is the creation of trustees—until we have a central German Government—in whom the industries will be vested. There, trustees acting on behalf of Military Government, will hold ownership until there be a Central German Government to vest it in. It will not make any practical difference from the economic point of view, but it will make an enormous political difference in that area. We must see that we are in this fight to win against Communism, and we must not put the people


working with us, such as the German trade unionists, in an impossible situation.
One other thing. I would urge the Government to stop this policy of demolitions. Surely to goodness that has gone far enough now. I do not say that there is not in some directions plant surplus to German requirements. If there is, let that plant go abroad by all means; but let it go at world prices; let the money come in to help in the rebuilding of the German economy. Let us get over to the Germans the idea that this repression is finished, that we have brought them in on our side, that we are working together. We can never persuade the Germans of that while we are blowing up their factories. One does not believe a man is one's partner if he spends his time blowing up one's assets. This has got to stop now. If it means finding some money to compensate some of the Dutch or Belgian recipients, it is overwhelmingly better for us to find that money than to continue this policy of demolition; we shall be repaid in terms of the co-operation and goodwill of the Germans. I beg the Government to reconsider this matter.
I want to say something in regard to Berlin. Let us be quite clear about this. If we do not hold Berlin, it does not matter in the least what we do in Germany, and it does not matter what we do in Europe: we can clear right out, because nobody east of the Pyrenees will dare to be our friend. If we wanted the Germans to work with us, it was very indiscreet to shoot Laval. They are in peril on the one side from their own nationalists, and from the other side from the policy of the Communist totalitarians. The Germans who have come forward to work for our western way of living are pretty brave men. He is a pretty brave man who is a Social Democrat in Germany, within an hour or two by tank of the Russians. A good many of those fellows have had 12 years in concentration camps, and they are pretty brave men to risk it again. The ones in Berlin are really being heroic. They have stood by us, and stood by us amazingly well. I believe they do deserve a tribute from this House for their courage in their situation. We cannot let them down. If we are not to assume the shame of a Chamberlain Government—and worse—we cannot let those people in Berlin down

No settlement of the Berlin problem is a real settlement unless it assures our capacity to supply the wants of those people. An air lift may be able to do a great deal, but to coal a city, an industrial city of 2,000,000 inhabitants, by air is a really fantastic proposition. Nor shall I be in the least satisfied if the Russians tell us the technical hitch on the railway is over, and we can pass through a few trains, just to enable us to get enough supplies in to postpone the evil day, and to keep the people in Berlin in circumstances of distress. That is only postponing the evil day. No solution of this problem can be a solution unless it gives us control of the means of supplying Berlin. I believe no other solution should be acceptable to us.
It would be fatal if my right hon. Friend's patience were mistaken for an inclination, when he comes up against an issue, to postpone the evil day. He has a certain facility for resolving the perplexities of his audience while leaving their problems unsolved. One hopes he does not apply that process to himself. He is a great and powerful force. It would be terribly dangerous if he were a force for indecision in this matter. There is no case for postponing a decision, and a decision over Berlin is no decision if it merely enables the Russians to put the squeeze on again when it becomes more convenient to them, and to vary the squeeze to the extent of creating as much distress and discontent in Berlin as they dare at any given phase. I would say we must not only get our supplies in, but that our agreement must include control of at least one of the means of getting them there, whether by water, rail, or road.
I can see no cause for postponing the show-down. At the present moment we have the French with us, and we have the Americans with us. The Russians, for their part, are having certain internal difficulties on their front. What prospect is there that postponement will put us in a stronger position? There is every case it seems to me, for having the show down now and getting a settlement which will be a permanent settlement. We should put privately to the Russians, so that we do not involve their prestige, the necessity for an agreement. We must make it clear that the agreement must put in our power and control the means of supplying Berlin, and we must make quite


clear to the Russians what is the alternative to agreement and that the alternative to agreement shall be in our time now and not in their time later on. If at some time the choice has to be made—and it is a choice which must be made by the Russians—whether it shall be peace or war, they are far more likely to choose peace now than on a later and more unfavourable occasion. We must bring this matter to the point where we can get a real decision, because now and not later is the most favourable time for us to do it.

8.41 p.m.

Major Legge-Bourke: I am glad that the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) finished in the military vein because I propose to deal mainly with that aspect in my speech. It is a pity he missed the speech of the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) on the subject of the demolition of perfectly usable buildings, because I think that he would have found that he was in great agreement with the hon. Member, and that would have strengthened his case. I think that both hon. Members have been most convincing in this Debate on that particular situation. So far as currency is concerned, I have no expert knowledge whatever of Germany, and I do not propose to talk on that aspect, but I would like to make this one criticism of all those hon. Members who have dealt mainly with the economic aspect of Germany. I do not believe that we can expect the economy of Germany to recover with the situation in Germany and in Europe as it is, unless we have assured something else first.
The restoration of the economy of Germany means the restoration of the prosperity of Germany. That is what we are aiming at. We cannot hope to get that prosperity unless we have established peace, and we cannot establish peace until we have established justice. It seems to me that this Berlin matter has brought this to a head. I would say here and now that the closing remarks of the Foreign Secretary's speech today were a great relief to me. I believe that he has cleared the air and made it quite clear where this country stands. I believe that must have a stabilising effect, but there is one aspect of it which is important. The hon. and learned Member for Northampton touched upon it. We shall make a very great mistake if we issue anything in the nature

of a challenge and if we are not able to implement that challenge. In fact, we shall make just as big a mistake as was made between the two wars by pledging ourselves to do something which we were not fully able to carry out. There is the classic example of Poland.
On this matter of Berlin, I believe that the situation there has reached the pitch visualised in the excellent speech made by the hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head), with which I am in entire agreement. If it ever should reach that pitch, then I would say to the right hon. Gentleman who is to reply to the Debate and to the whole of His Majesty's Government, that, if they agree with what my hon. and gallant Friend said, it is incumbent upon them to make certain by the time they have to issue any challenge, if they do have to issue it, that they are ready to implement that challenge, because if they are not, their bluff will be called, and if they are found wanting, it will be disastrous for the future of this country and indeed for world peace.
I have only one criticism to make of the Foreign Secretary's speech today. I believe that when he said that he was prepared to wait any length of time for peace he may give a false impression. I think that we all admire, even if we have criticised him from time to time, the patience which he has exercised over the German problem. I am sure that peace does not come merely by waiting for it. I do not believe that peace is a natural state of man. I believe that man has to fight for peace and win his peace by honest hard work as he wins his wars. I think that there is a very great danger in what the Foreign Secretary has said in letting the world suppose that while he has a plan to deal with the present situation in Berlin, he has no plan beyond that.
I believe that it is imperative and of the utmost urgency that His Majesty's Government should not merely work out a plan to deal with the present Berlin crisis, but also work out what they are going to do after that. The right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) said that he did not expect His Majesty's Government to produce their plan in this Debate. I do not think that anyone expects them to do that, but I think that we expect something more


than merely dealing with the Berlin crisis. We expect His Majesty's Government, in conjunction with other Western Powers, to do everything in their power to regain their initiative in the whole of the German problem, because ever since the end of the war, the German problem has been a battle for initiative. There is no question, in my opinion, where that initiative lies at the moment. I do not believe that by merely stating that we are going to stay in Berlin we shall regain that initiative.
We have to go further than that. We have to try to produce some proposals which will overcome the circumstances which have led to the present situation. I think that one of the obvious things which has to be solved somehow concerns the strip of Germany which lies between our zone and our sector in Berlin. We have somehow to find some way of overcoming that. The hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton has suggested one way. I am inclined to think that that may be the only way. There are other alternatives, and I should have thought that after the indictment which the Foreign Secretary made today of the Russian failure to honour the Potsdam Agreement and Four-Power Agreement, there was a strong case for us to give a date by which the Russians now should honour their obligation under those treaties and agreements.
At the same time, we should tell them definitely—perhaps secretly, as has been suggested, in order not to make it too difficult for them—what we shall do if they do not implement the policy laid down as their obligation under the Potsdam and the Four-Power Agreements. The time has now come when we must go a little bit further than merely saying we are going to stay put. We must try to regain the initiative, for, as long as we have no initiative in this matter, we shall not instil confidence in Western Germany, which at the present moment depends very largely on how able we are to match the Russian strength.
Now, when I refer to the Russian strength I mean military strength. I shall not ask the Minister of State what our military strength is today in Western Germany. If it is what I think it is, the less said about it the better. I ask him to remember that if the situation deteriorates and we expect to be able to

issue any form of challenge to regain the initiative, if we expect to restore confidence in Western Germany it is essential that we and our Western Allies should make certain that whatever we say we are able to implement militarily. I do not say that we will have to use the military in order to implement our policy. I, personally, believe that the one hope of preserving peace is for us to be in a position militarily to implement what we say we will do. That probably is the only way in which we shall avoid having an open clash.
I do not believe the present situation to be at all satisfactory, to put it mildly. Our American Allies, in particular, and we ourselves must get down to this business at once, and work out our military strength, what we could implement at the moment, and what we can do in the time we have available, to put ourselves in a better position to regain the initiative.
This is a very grave Debate—probably the gravest Debate we have had in this Parliament. I have hesitated to speak on Germany, because I do not know it well; but in this matter I am inclined to think that we should perhaps look to our constituents rather than to anybody else, because I believe that our constituents are watching this Debate with some interest. We should remember that it is not merely the troops in Germany at the moment, or the Allied Control Commission, but every man, woman and child—and particularly the women and children—who will be affected by what we decide in the next few weeks. I hope that His Majesty's Government, although obviously not able to reply tonight to the points I have raised, will bear in mind what I have said, and believe me when I say I am convinced of this above all other things in this regard, that the greatest crime we could now commit would be to say we will do something which we are not able to implement. We dare not now risk having our bluff called.

8.57 p.m.

Mr. Harold Macmillan: For a variety of reasons, partly Parliamentary and partly personal, this Debate on Germany has been delayed until rather later in the Session than had been anticipated. When the Opposition asked for a Supply Day for that purpose, we did not, of course, anticipate that the situation in Berlin, although already ominous, would


have blown up into this first-class crisis. We should, therefore, normally have asked the Committee to join with us in one of those periodic examinations of the British administration in Germany, which it is both the right and the duty of the Committee to have.
I would remind the Committee that it is nearly a year since the last Debate—I think it was in August, 1947—on the general British administration in Germany. A very large number of important issues were then raised, not only by the Opposition but by hon. Members in all parts of the House, and we were then demanding an immediate policy to deal with some of the outstanding problems, both economic and political. Although, as the Foreign Secretary explained to us in the first part of his speech today, some steps—and very important steps—in the six-Power Agreement, currency reform, and in many other directions—have been taken to deal with some of the points that have been raised continually in Debates during these three years. Yet there are many questions on which my hon. Friends and I would certainly have asked for explanations, and raised criticisms.
For instance, there is the whole question of the alleviation to certain classes of the full effects of the currency reform, to which reference was made by the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman). There is the whole question as to how far a federal Germany can be made effective. In my view, it can only be made effective if it is combined with a free economy. There is the whole question of the responsibility for day-to-day affairs. I should like to join in a well deserved tribute to the work done by Lord Pakenham during his tenure of office. I cannot, of course, say anything of the work he did here in England, but I do know that its effect on the morale and hopes of the German people has been a very valuable one, and for that we are grateful.
Then, we would perhaps have raised the whole question of the tightening up or the scaling down of the officials of the Control Commission—that slimming process for which we have often asked, and which is really necessary if they are to be suited to their new functions of advisers and not of administrators. Then we might have raised the question of de-nazifica-

tion and the continuing trials, and how these were being operated now that they are handed over to the local German government themselves. There are many questions on the subject of land reform which my hon. Friends would have liked to raise, and the effect of the break-up of economic farming units on agricultural production—a very wide and important question.
Then there is the question of dismantling factories, to which reference has ben made by hon. Members on both sides of the Committee; and, still more important, as to how far, if at all, reparations are still being sent from the Western zone into Russia. This, after the figures given by the Foreign Secretary in his speech, today, would seem to be an almost fantastic operation if it is still continuing. We would have raised the very serious problem of Western Germany becoming what might be called a dollar country, the effect not only upon the claims of British creditors in respect of past transactions, which must not be neglected, but also the effect upon the flow of trade between Germany and Great Britain and the trade relations which can be built up in the future. That opens up a very important economic problem.
All these and other questions would have been raised normally, and in some detail, particularly by many of my hon. Friends who have given great personal study and attention to these problems. Nor do we abandon our right, since we cannot abandon our duty, to raise them on an appropriate occasion; but it seems to us that today, in the circumstances in which we now are, one question, and one question only, fills the minds of all of us inside and outside this Committee, and at this great crisis we on this side are anxious that one simple and single message should go from the House of Commons today to our comrades in Berlin, to our own people, to our Allies, to Germany and to Russia, and that this should be the message: the inflexible determination of the British people not to yield to blackmail. Hence the character of this Debate. That has been the broad question to which hon. Members have given a very large measure of attention.
I was particularly comforted by some robust contributions from the Benches opposite. The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) put it very


admirably, but I was not quite so happy about some of the others. The hon. Member for East Coventry touched rather dangerous ground. I took down his words. He said that the campaign for Germany as a whole was what mattered, and it would not be decided by the issue of the dramatic battle of Berlin. I am not so sure that he is not inadvertently saying precisely the opposite of the truth, because I believe that unless we win this battle in Berlin, all the rest goes.

Mr. Crossman: I also said that Berlin mattered, because if we came out of Berlin it would have disastrous repercussions in Western Germany. If the right hon. Gentleman reads HANSARD tomorrow, he will see that I said that.

Mr. Macmillan: I hope I am not misrepresenting the hon. Member.

Mr. Crossman: The right hon. Gentleman is.

Mr. Macmillan: I was just a little unhappy about that phrase. It is quite true that he went on to say that we ought to stay in Berlin. I am very anxious that a unanimous view of this subject shall go out from this Committee. If he says that I misunderstood his remarks, I will most readily withdraw. In the rest of his speech he dealt with other matters. He devoted a very small part of it to the Berlin issue. He spoke mainly of currency control, and I was glad to see his newly-found interest and care for the middle classes. It is quite true that currency control hits the middle classes, but the inflation which precedes it is the thing that ruins the middle classes. I suppose that when the hon. Gentleman is above the Gangway he has great care for the middle classes, but when he is below the Gangway he wants to liquidate them.
The hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Skeffington-Lodge) was the only other hon. Member who spoke in that strain, except the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher), who made the contribution we expected, although I think he fell into some danger in his speech because it left him open to a charge of Trotskyism, deviation and inordinate ambition, and at one moment I thought even of grandee-ism. The hon. Member for Bedford, again unintentionally I am sure, seemed a little lukewarm. He said that he approached this problem between our-

selves and Russia and between Communist Russia and Western Europe with a balanced mind. If I might adapt a very old phrase, he balanced so long upon the curtain that he allowed the iron to enter into his soul. I was not very sure what was his wish as to what we should do in this particular crisis.
But in the main the dominant theme, the note which has gone out from this Debate is that we must be firm. Those who did not share that view, with few exceptions, have not spoken or have absented themselves. We are grateful, for I am sure that that is the note which ought to go forth from this Committee today. The Foreign Secretary, in one of the most powerful speeches which he has ever made in this Committee, spoke for all of us. He spoke not as a party leader but as British Foreign Secretary to the British people and to the world. In the account which he gave us he certainly revealed much of what we had surmised and also some things we did not know. If his account of the long series of prevarications and evasions, which have been committed by the Government of Soviet Russia since 1945, could be widely read and studied, as it ought to be in every part of the world, every fair-minded man or woman must admit that the patience of the Foreign Secretary and of his colleagues has indeed been remarkable.
Never was there a more devastating exposure of bad faith. During and at the end of the recent war we were ready to hold out to our Russian comrades, a most friendly welcome. It was a universal feeling and far beyond party. We felt that perhaps some new world or some new relationship would begin, and we were ready to play our part in it. If confidence is to be maintained it must be repaid. It cannot live if it is fed on nothing but bad faith in return. The story which the right hon. Gentleman revealed today was one which shocked us and made us feel that the criticism was not that he had been too impatient, but that he had held on for too long.
The right hon. Gentleman gave us in a single phrase, in words which I took down and venture to repeat, what seemed the most essential point of his message. It was this: A grave situation may arise, if so we must ask the House to face it; none of us can accept surrender. Sir,


none of us will—for what would be the effect of a surrender now? What would be the consequences, either of a total evacuation of Berlin or of the acceptance of a compromise formula which would render our occupation ineffective? First, what would be the effect upon the Germans? In Berlin itself there would be panic and despair, as two million people would be handed over to Communist rule, that is, to oppression and tyranny. The 20,000 or more leading citizens who have lately co-operated with the Western Powers and have courageously stood up against Communist pressure would be abandoned, perhaps to the torturer or to the executioner. It must be recognised, as has been stressed by many hon. Members in all parts of the House, that there has grown up in Berlin a policy not always associated wth the German character, of resistance to oppression and a sense of civic duty. If we are to abandon them now, to be duly liquidated, it would be a stain upon the honour of the Western Allies from which they could never recover.
Outside Berlin in the Western zone, in Bizonia, there would be a total loss of confidence among the German population. There would be immediate repercussions in that zone and they might take the form of passive or active resistance. All the administrative reforms, political and economic, on which the Western Allies are now embarked would be prejudiced and probably ruined. We have had in our many Debates over these three years differences of view as to the value and the nature of some of these plans. We have had from different parts of the House criticisms of the slowness with which they have been developed; but we have all, in every part of the House, been pressing, broadly speaking, for progressive, imaginative policies by which the German people could be restored to a higher level of economic and political existence and brought into the family of civilised Western people.
To abandon Berlin—that is out of the question. To abandon it now would be to abandon all Germany, for it would produce a sense of despair and disillusion among the whole German people in this critical period in their history, and from that despair they might see the only means of escape and the only method of restoring their position by throwing themselves, in spite of everything, into the

arms of Communism. A year ago in the Debate on Germany I used a phrase which I venture to repeat:
If some would assess the dangers of a militant Communism, as the greater, and others would put the dangers of a revived militant Nazism as the greater, I think all must agree that the greatest danger of all would be an aggressive combination of the two."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th August, 1947; Vol. 441, c. 1004.]
A retreat now, or even a diplomatic defeat, on this Berlin issue might well precipitate so terrible a result. Whatever may be said as to how the Western Allies have got into this position, whatever may be the criticism as to how far they ought to have foreseen it and how far they ought to have taken more adequate provision to deal with it, whatever may have been the apprehensions—I think, perhaps the legitimate apprehensions—of our French Allies, one thing is clear—now that we are in this business, we have got to see it through.
I have spoken of the effect on the Germans, but what would be the consequences of retreat now upon Western Europe? Tragic indeed, and an almost fatal setback to the whole movement for the unity of Europe. The supporters of Western unity would be shaken, the waverers would be alarmed and the opponents would be encouraged. As my right hon. Friend said, Scandinavian countries just on the brink of decision would become more and more hesitant. Attentism would become the policy of every doubting Government. In France and Italy, of course, the Communist Parties would gain dangerously and even fatally. The Greek rebels would take heart. In some countries, wholly now or even partially engulfed, those elements of resistance which still remain and upon which we still place our hopes, would lose all hope. In Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia—in these countries Communist control would be still more consolidated. What about Austria? The loss of our position, or even the weakening of our position in Berlin, would make our position in Vienna almost untenable. Look further afield—in Asia, India and Malaya. The propaganda of Communism would grow with increased strength until it became perhaps too formidable to overcome. Finally, in the economic sphere in Europe itself—since we all agree that the economic revival of Germany is an essential part of the economic revival of Europe, why


then, we ourselves would be equally injured by such a blow.
Therefore, the only course open to us—the only course open in safety and wisdom—is the course dictated by honour, and if it has obvious dangers, I think it also has the advantage of being the only prudent course. The Western Allies cannot enforce their will in this matter unless they are prepared to accept the risks of war. In my view, we cannot even with an air lift alone, even an air lift developed to the highest extent, keep the people of Berlin warmed and employed as well as fed by importing coal and raw materials as well as the necessities of life. We shall, therefore, have to insist upon the right of access which the Foreign Secretary proved beyond doubt was inherent in the Potsdam Agreement—a right of access by road, by canal and by rail.
Fortunately the Russians have left open, as has been pointed out, some lines of retreat without loss of face. All sorts of things might happen—technical improvements might suddenly lighten the present dark transport situation, railways thought to be unusable might suddenly be found to be really in quite good order, and bridges believed dangerous might, after all, be found able to carry their load. Nevertheless, I think it is obvious that we must take the risk that our access will be opposed, and opposed by more than argument or procrastination. Therefore it may be that the test of wills—the will of the Western Allies and the Russian will—must be made, and we must face, if we are frank with ourselves—for it is a serious and solemn moment in this Committee—the risk of war.
However, I must say for my part, and I think that of my hon. and right hon. Friends, that grave as that risk is, the alternative policy—to shrink from the issue—involves not merely the risk, but almost the certainty of war. All history and, above all, recent history teaches us this: to yield to aggression may give a breathing space, a year or two, but it is the fatal step that leads sooner or later, and generally sooner, to war. For aggression, like appetite, grows with its exercise, and there finally comes a point where resistance becomes inevitable.
Even to speak of war is so terrible a thing that one shrinks from the words. For a third war, with all the horrors of modern, scientific progress—I believe the

word is—might well prove the war to end war, in the sense that it would be the war to end human life. Nevertheless, we do not solve a problem or avoid a danger by merely withholding our eyes from it. We must face this issue. Peace is elusive. It is not to be secured by wishful thinking or by much protesting; it is not to be won by itself, for it is a by-product of freedom and truth and justice. And in the policy which His Majesty's Ministers are pursuing on this question of Berlin, I wish to say, at the end of this Debate, that they have the full support of the Conservative Party. So long as they are true to it, that support will be genuine and will be loyal. We do not, of course, relinquish our right and duty to criticise from day to day and time to time the administration of Germany. We shall continue to criticise it, I hope constructively, on appropriate occasions, but we prefer that the note of today's Debate, so far as we have been able to guide it, shall be that our party is united in support of the Government, and that the voice that shall go out from the House of Commons today shall be a voice of national union and national concentration.

Mr. Gallacher: Count me out of that.

Mr. Macmillan: The hon. Member for West Fife is the exception; I hope and pray he may be the only one. This is perhaps a turning point in history, one of those great moments when, for good or ill, a decisive resolution must be taken and pursued. At such a moment, although there is much that divides us from right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the Committee, there is much that unites us as fellow citizens and fellow subjects, and our message to them and to Ministers is: Be strong and of good courage.

9.20 p.m.

The Minister of State (Mr. McNeil): I should like at the very outset to associate my right hon. Friend and myself with the deserved and pleasing things said about my right hon. and noble Friend the Minister of Civil Aviation for the part he played in relation to the problem we have been discussing. As the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan) has said, it has been a notable Debate. Whatever criticisms there have been have, with one exception, been in a minor key. Hon. and right hon.


Gentlemen have displayed great restraint and spoken with great soberness but, on the central theme of the Debate, have spoken with enormous unanimity of voice.
The Debate, I think, fell roughly into three parts. There was the minority represented alone by the hon. Gentleman the Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher), who is against our policy not only in Berlin, but in Western Germany. Secondly, there were those hon. Members who, while approving the conclusions which have emerged from what has now been called the London Conference and our intentions relating to it, are none the less critical in varying degrees of our treatment of the peoples in the Western zones, politically and economically. Finally, from all parts of the House, there were hon. Gentlemen who from restraint did not make criticisms but raised queries and offered remarks on the situation in Berlin and its eventual settlement.
Before passing to the substance of the Debate perhaps I may be permitted to say a word to the hon. Member for West Fife. I had great difficulty in following his argument. As far as I could follow it, apparently we have no rights in Berlin. He said that clearly enough, but he did not stop to deal with the evidence of my right hon. Friend. It seems that we have no rights and that we have one obligation—to conform to Soviet wishes in this place at all times and in every respect [HON. MEMBERS: No."] I do not find that dogma any more attractive because apparently, from the most shabby and braggart communique from the Com-inform, Yugoslavia has been put into the same category, in this respect as the United Kingdom.

Mr. Gallacher: Will the right hon. Gentleman excuse me for a moment? Regarding the question of rights in Berlin, I said that the only people who actually had rights in Berlin were the Berliners and that the others must have reasons for being there.

Mr. McNeil: The rights of the Berlin people are one thing. What we are here discussing are the rights of the Occupying Powers. All that we are concerned to say is that we have a right, which by signature, by statement, by practice and by usage we share in conformity with the other three Powers in Berlin. We have never attempted to claim singular rights. My right hon. Friend made it plain that when with our two Allies we

departed from the attempt to secure Four-Power government in Germany that was not a matter of choice but a matter of necessity.
I was very indebted to my hon. Friend the Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) for recalling the various occasions on which we have attempted, in quite simple things like figures relating to coal production, to work in a quadripartite way, and how that has been refused. The main reason why we could not pursue our attempt was the obligation to our taxpayers and the other is explained by the figures which have been displayed to M. Molotov of the reparations, both capital and current, which have already been taken from Eastern Germany and which we estimate as being valued at more than 7,000 million dollars. If we are wrong in these assumptions, the reply is easy. The Soviet authorities could permit, as we encourage, inspection by reliable and equipped people of these dismantling and reparation activities. They do not; they shut out everyone and the conclusion is one, therefore, from which no one can escape, that there is something to hide and that our figures are correct.
No one who has looked at the hours that have been spent at the highest political level in an attempt to secure Four-Power agreement upon the subject of Germany can be otherwise than appalled at the prospect of resuming it. That does not mean for a second that we will not be available whenever there is a reasonable prospect of resumption. But, before coming to the Committee, I took the trouble to look up the meetings on this subject. There have been five sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers, two devoted exclusively to Germany. In addition, there have been 61 meetings of the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers devoted exclusively and completely to Germany. Altogether, I estimate that a minimum of 300 hours has been spent on this one subject of how we could proceed in a quadripartite way to govern and move towards a settlement in Germany. I repeat that the London Conference was not of our choice. It was a necessity forced upon us by the non-co-operation of the Soviet Government at all these conferences, and in actual operations in Germany and in Berlin particularly. I wish to add that the conclusions of the London Conference are of an


interim kind, calculated to give the German people, as they are entitled to have, an increasing responsibility in the government of their own country, and calculated to hasten the approach in Western Europe to political and economic normality. But the agreement is neither final nor exclusive. It can be adapted to government for all Germany whenever the Soviet Government are willing to enter into international conference to co-operate on this subject and not to enter in to insist on dominating this subject.
The next group of questions with which I would like to deal consists of those coming from people who approve the conclusions of the London Conference, but have suggestions and minor criticisms to make. For example, on the political side two points were made. We have been asked why the delegations to the Constituent Assembly should be both elected and nominated. The truth is that there was a difference at the Six-Power Conference upon this subject and we attempted to find a compromise. It has, therefore, been left to the Ministers' President to decide how their delegations will be composed. It is a matter exclusively for them, and I will not attempt to predict what kind of decisions they will take.
Another point related to the composition of the German representation upon the Ruhr Board. It must be plain, I think, that for the period of the occupation the occupying Governments must retain the responsibility of deciding what representation there shall be. What happens afterwards at the end of the occupation, of course, is a matter for whatever German instrument is appropriate.

Mr. J. Hynd: Does that mean that there will be no independent German representation on the Ruhr Control Board or any other of these joint boards until the end of the occupation?

Mr. McNeil: I do not think it is necessary to draw that conclusion. I prefer to stand where I am—that is, that the occupying authorities for operational reasons must retain the right to decide what the representation may be or will be.

Mr. Stokes: It is the same thing.

Mr. McNeil: No, it is not the same thing. Perhaps, if my hon. Friend reflects upon what I have said, he will see that

there is, if not a substantial, at least a nice and an essential difference.

Mr. Stokes: It is too subtle for me.

Mr. McNeil: Perhaps I shall have the opportunity of explaining that point to my hon. Friend afterwards. I want to have a word with him, anyway, about his explanation of the calculation for the level of industry. It was a highly humorous and entertaining explanation, but I assure my hon. Friend, to whom I am often indebted, that he could not have been listening to our officials in Berlin—the officials who, as my hon. Friend has told us so often, have been so very kind and helpful. I thought he was confining his remarks to the figures—

Mr. Stokes: I would like to have a word with my hon. Friend about the food rationing which, I understand, has dropped another 55 calories since I spoke to him this afternoon.

Mr. McNeil: My hon. Friend is inaccurate even there. The difference between 1,715 and 1,750 is 45. [HON. MEMBERS: It is 35."] Turning to the food situation, I could not accept all the criticisms that have been made. I never pretend that anyone on the Government Bench can be or has been easy in mind about the food situation in Germany, but it should be conceded that the position is now better than at any time since 1945. For this month I am told the normal consumer ration will average out at about 1,550 calories, and for July it is going up to 1,715. Moreover, that is scarcely a fair calculation, because other additions have to be made. Taking into account the supplementary foods and the non-rationed foods, I am told that it will probably average out at about 2,400 calories per day.

Mr. Stokes: It is no consolation for a chap who gets only 1,715 calories to know that somebody else is getting 600 more.

Mr. McNeil: Again, I would agree that the system has never worked entirely equitably, nor quite with the results for which we hoped, but when there is only a limited amount of food we must distribute it in relation to production and to the needs of the whole community, and that we have been attempting to do. Perhaps I may be permitted to quote to my hon. Friend just a phrase from a nutritional survey which has been concluded by a British Government-United States


team. The British scientists were Sit Jack Drummond and Professor Cowell, and the experts reported that
generally the nutritional state of the Germans has improved during the past year and is now at a level which permits the maintenance of a fair state of health, although it does not in all cases enable the supporting of full working capacity.
There are no reasons for complacency and the anxiety of the Government on this subject will continue, but there is reason to take some little pride in the fact that, despite all the puzzles of difficult distribution and much more difficult buying during a period of world shortage, an improvement over the year is attested by experts.
A great many questions were raised about production and in not all cases have I the time or the information to deal with the questions at the present moment. I would like to say that coal has been puzzling and not altogether satisfactory. We think we know two reasons, one relating to the ineffective working of the incentive scheme and another dealing with individual management in the mines planning on a long-term basis, rather than for immediate production. Over the last month we have been addressing ourselves to the second problem. I would like to tell the Committee that, perhaps as a result, the latest figures for last Monday gave us an output of 300,000 tons, a performance previously achieved only on one day in March.
Turning to steel, about which my hon. Friend told us a great deal, again any success is comparative, but it is not negligible. Production in the first half of this year will reach almost two million tons.

Mr. Stokes: For half a year?

Mr. McNeil: Yes, for half a year. This figure compares very favourably with the 2.9 million tons which was our total output for all last year and not unfavourably with the 4.1 million tons for this year, which was the target tabled with the Committee for European Economic Co-operation in Paris. It does not, of course, compare in terms of the six million tons which is our target and up to which we must move for normality. We hope that the currency reform, which again in varying degrees has been criticised, will contribute, not immediately perhaps, but eventually to strengthen production in the three zones. There will be, undoubtedly,

pockets of unemployment and areas of dislocation due to this change-over. These are being worked upon, though not with the singlemindedness we should have hoped, because of the major dislocation at present in Berlin.
In what was otherwise an altogether admirable speech, the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) was quite wrong in saying we had made no discrimination in our measures of currency reform between the small saver and the large capitalist—the small saver and the black marketeer. It is true we have not sought to provide escape clauses at this moment, because we were anxious to have an over-all reduction as quickly as possible. But, as part of the over-all plan, it has been laid down that by 31st December this year a capital levy must be imposed. We could not impose it at this moment.

Mr. Crossman: Why?

Mr. McNeil: Because we have had to try to secure the immediate and over-all reduction, and we were advised that if we discriminated and differentiated we should open so many gaps that our major object would elude us.

Mr. Crossman: Surely, it is the fact that the plan for a general capital levy and currency reform was, in fact, worked out in detail at Frankfort and postponed only at the last moment? Surely, it is untrue we could not do the two together? How does my right hon. Friend suggest that a German administration, the taxing authority, could carry out in six months a capital levy?

Mr. McNeil: It is not true there was a plan for providing for a capital levy. It is nearer the truth to say that we have had a score of plans. We have had the advice of all the experts we could lay hands on in this complex business of introducing a new currency. The proceeds of the capital levy are designed to deal with the most obvious cases of hardship, which, perhaps, were the type of thing that my hon. Friend was thinking about when he talked about the effect of the reform upon the small saver. It is tempting, too, as I think he and my right hon. Friend suggested, to say we should have delayed this altogether until we could introduce coincidentally, social legislation. We could not do that because we had no instrument for social legislation, and it seemed to us that if we delayed currency reform any


longer the position would further deteriorate, that commercial dislocation would increase, and that much misery would be visited upon the peoples of the Western zones; and, of course, almost certainly a higher tax burden would be visited upon the people for whom we are responsible.

Mr. Bellenger: It is quite obvious that at the moment we can discuss only one very small part of the reform of the currency in Germany. When are we to hear of the total plans, and how far are the Government to have an influence on them?

Mr. Gallacher: Very little.

Mr. McNeil: The hon. Member for West Fife says "Very little." My hope is that we always defer to the wishes of the democratically elected representatives in matters which we think concern them. So I am not able to say how far the whole programme will be on our hands. We knew from the beginning that it would be complex and, in some respects, hazardous. There are indications that the initial steps have not been unsuccessful. For example, consumer goods are now available in the shops which were not available before. The important point is to find out whether the new level will be an incentive to increase production of those consumer goods.
There have been a good many questions on dismantling. For example there are already capital plants which have been removed from Germany, and which could not have been put into operation in Germany, which are operating in this country and other countries, and will, therefore, in the immediate future, be making a contribution towards European recovery.
The four principles upon which we have proceeded with reparations have already been enunciated, but I say to the hon. Member for Ipswich and to the hon. Member for Attercliffe that there can be no suggestion that we have discriminated against German production in favour of British trade. Dismantling is taking place primarily in relation to security. The order of priorities has been related to production in the manner to which I have already alluded. Destruction of property worries me a great deal more, and I shall be very glad to look at the examples to which my hon. Friend drew

attention, but it should be known that it has already been agreed and is being acted upon that no destruction of property shall take place unless it is specifically military construction; anything else which is useful to the economy of Germany is in the meantime being left.
There is not a great deal which I can add about Berlin. No one asked me for detailed information about our plans. It would be embarrassing and improper to hint about them. Let me say that not all the comments made conform to the information available to us. The right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) asked about publicity. I am told that the papers in the three zones have responded very well indeed, and that today there are headlines upon the British, French and American proposals for the feeding and building up of reserves in the city.

Mr. Nicholson: In the three sectors?

Mr. McNeil: In the three sectors. In addition, we have had a good service from the radio. I am also told that the best organs for disseminating good news in Berlin just now are the engines of the transport planes which are going in and out steadily. There is one other point which I should make. Hon. Members have no doubt read newspaper reports suggesting that concentrations of balloons, accompanied by Soviet fighters, have been seen in the air corridors today. There is no official information confirming that at all. The air safety officers in Berlin have issued a statement explaining that no pilot has seen anything of them. I would be the last person to suggest that any newspaper man from a reputable British newspaper or news agency would behave irresponsibly, but I am sure that they will all appreciate that there is a great need and great obligation upon them to be cool and more than careful in their reporting just now.
There is one other piece of news which I should give to the Committee. This afternoon, since the Debate began, His Excellency the American Ambassador has informed my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that Mr. Marshall will make a statement saying in unambiguous and forceful language that the United States will stand firm upon its right to remain in Berlin. That, of course, expresses the attitude of all of us upon this subject.
As my right hon. Friend has said, the message this morning from Marshal Sokolovsky may mean something new, and is receiving the closest study just now by my right hon. Friend and his experts. I say that because it must be clear to the whole Committee that we do not exclude any method of ending this impasse in Berlin; but when I have said that, it must be equally clear that whatever method is adopted nothing can relieve us from our obligation to exert ourselves to the utmost to meet the obligations we have towards the two or two and a half million people in Berlin. As is known, there are not inconsiderable stores in Berlin. We are already, we hope, moving towards the point where, in no great period of time, we shall be able to take in daily an amount of supplies equal to the essential needs of the people in the three sectors.
We are, as my right hon. Friend said, proceeding in the closest association with the United States and with France, and with the democratic elements in Berlin to whom so many hon. and right hon. Gentlemen have most properly paid tribute today. We are in the closest association with them as well as with the Powers with whom we collaborate. The Commonwealth countries are fully informed, and no information is being denied to any friendly country obviously seeking such information.
I should not like to close without paying tribute to the morale and the common sense which the population of Berlin is displaying in this emergency. We have no reason to believe that as long as information is available to them their attitude will be otherwise. Two hon. Members complained of what I might describe as local ignorance, and levelled criticism against our publicity methods. The test of publicity is not whether this or that item of information is known to everyone, but whether at this moment our policy is fully understood by the people of Berlin. There is no doubt about the reply to that question. It is fully understood; and it is because it is fully understood, and fully approved, that the Berlin people are displaying this outstanding morale and approval of our policy at this time.
I repeat that His Majesty's Government will consider any suggestion or any approach; but no one should confuse our caution with timidity; and no one should

mistake our moderate attitude for weakness. We not only have our obligations in Berlin, which we will discharge, but we also have our rights, and we shall see that these are honoured to the limit of our capacity, and with the equal firmness which we attach to our obligations.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—[Mr. Snow.]

Mr. Nutting: Might I repeat the question which I asked the right hon. Gentleman about Vienna? I do not want to exalt the importance of my own question, but I did ask him whether he would stale whether His Majesty's Government are prepared for a similar situation there.

The Chairman: That does not come within the purview of the Question.

9.55 p.m.

Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore: The right hon. Gentleman, just before he sat down, indicated that he would receive any suggestions that might possibly assist the Government in dealing with the very difficult question which exists now in regard to our relations in Berlin. I have pleaded once or twice before, and I repeat the plea, that definite action should be taken by His Majesty's Government to bring it home to the Soviet Government that we have decided on a certain course of action, and that action is to preserve peace, but at the same time to be ready for war. I would suggest again that either the Foreign Secretary, or indeed the Prime Minister, Mr. Marshall and my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition go to Moscow and put the question straight to Marshal Stalin, which we all know to be the truth: "Do you want peace or do you want war? If you want peace, we will co-operate and work steadily to that end, but if you want war, or even to preserve this tension which exists in Europe and the world today, we will have to accept your decision and you will have it." It is no good standing by and waiting for things to happen. Positive action is needed. The Secretary of State has made a very handsome contribution towards the solution of our difficulties, but they are words, and I believe that the Soviet Government will only understand action, and today the peace of the world may depend on the action His Majesty's Government take.

The Chairman: The Question is—

Mr. Nutting: On a point of Order. May I draw your attention to the fact, Major Milner, that it is still Three Minutes to Ten o'Clock, and I have asked what is, I think, generally regarded on this side as an important question of the Minister of State. May I put it to you, Major Milner, that it is of vital importance that the Minister of State should, if possible, give an assurance on this point tonight? There is widespread nervousness in other countries bordering on Germany about the situation which may arise in their country. Therefore, may I ask whether the Minister of State will give a reply on this vitally important question?

Mr. McNeil: I was most anxious not to answer, because I think it most unfortunate that Vienna should be taken in the same context as Berlin.

Mr. Eden: I quite disagree with the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. McNeil: I have expressed my opinion. It is not a question of military occupation but is a question of a civil government which is being undertaken through the four Powers concerned. Since I am asked particularly to answer, my answer is that the subject has been carefully and fully studied, but that we do not think there is such a parallel, nor do we foresee such a contingency.

Question put, and agreed to.

Committee report Progress; to sit again Tomorrow.

Orders of the Day — WIRE DRAWING INDUSTRY

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Snow.]

10.0 p.m.

Mr. Martin Lindsay: After the solemn and sombre Debate to which we have just listened, it is rather an anti-climax to have to descend to the more mundane consideration of the wiredrawing industry. This industry is suffering from difficulties which are serious, which have been going on too long and the amelioration of which will be of benefit to the economic position of this country.
There are two questions involved, first, the total allocations of steel for the rod rollers who supply the wire drawing industry; and, secondly, the distribution within the industry of what steel is available. Correspondence and Questions in Parliament have revealed, I

regret to say, a lack of knowledge on the part of the Minister which is unfortunate. For example, when asked on 1st March whether he would make available increased supplies of wire rods to the wire drawing industry, the Minister in the course of his reply said:
New rod making capacity is being provided as part of the industry's modernisation plans, but there will be little substantial production of this before 1950."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st March, 1948; Vol. 448, c. 10.]
To have implied that the wire drawers are short of raw material because rod rolling constituted the bottleneck is most misleading and entirely untrue. The fact is that several companies have installed new continuous rod rolling mills during and since the war, which are far from working to capacity owing to the shortage of steel supplies, while owing to the maldistribution, to which I have referred, some other high cost mills, one of which is over 50 years old, is not only working to capacity but is having to work overtime in addition. Again, writing to me on 7th May, the Minister said:
Adjustments are being made all the time to direct the flow of steel through the various manufacturing stages to where it is most needed, but this is a very complex business, and changes cannot be made too rapidly.
It is all very well to say that changes cannot be made too rapidly, but this is no new situation which has suddenly arisen. This maldistribution has, in fact, as I am sure the Minister will agree, been going on since the end of the war. The fact is that many other sections of the steel industry are relatively far better supplied than the wire industry, which has received no benefit whatever from the increased home production of ingots.
If I may, I should like to take the home trade as an illustration of what I mean. It is a fact that bedding manufacturers can get all the angles which they need, and are building up stocks, which will be of no use to them unless they can get increased supplies of wire. Exactly the same story comes from the bucket industry, where we find no shortage of steel sheets for making the buckets, but they need that little extra bit of wire which is used to reinforce the rims. Another classic example of the wire shortage is provided by the cable industry. It is a fact that there are literally thousands of drums of cable lying in store awaiting the necessary sheathing wire. These are instances which clearly show that maldistribution is taking place between the


various sections of the steel industry. It would seem another case of the muddle of planners, whose performance falls short of their promise, and whose preoccupation with nationalisation is, I fear, blinding them to the facilities provided by private enterprise, which is not allowed to be fully employed. I believe there is a very great need for a diversion of steel from other sections to the wire industry and that such a diversion would be in the national interest.
Having just mentioned the home trade let me now turn to the export trade. There we find the same situation. Table 19 of the Monthly Statistical Bulletin, published by the Iron and Steel Federation, provides a comparison of the average monthly output of the various steel products in 1938 as compared with the first four months of 1948. One finds that exports of the various steel products have increased to a substantial degree, whereas wire manufacturers are unable to approach the 1938 figure. For example, the average monthly export of bright steel bars was approximately 500 tons in 1938 and it has increased to 2,200 tons on the average of the first four months of this year. Similarly, other steel bars and rods have increased from 8,500 to 9,100 tons. Yet wire carries a higher conversion value than either of those classes of product.
I hope that the Minister, whose speeches upon the problems of the national economy have earned the respect of the whole nation, will, when he replies, be able to tell us why the export of such low exchange-value steel products as bright steel and other bars, angles, shapes, sections and sleepers, are permitted at substantially above pre-war levels, at the expense of more finished steel products such as wire, which is being exported at considerably below the pre-war level. I hope that the Minister will give us that information and the assurance that he will reconsider both the total volume of steel allocated to rod rollers and the distribution within the industry of the steel which is allocated.

10.8 p.m.

Mr. Erroll: I am indeed glad to have this opportunity of drawing attention to the difficulties confronting the wire-drawing industry. Before proceeding further, and in accordance with the custom of this House, I should like to declare my interest in the industry. I am associated with one of the

leading firms of wire manufacturers in this country and my information is therefore based largely upon their experience.
I find it difficult to understand the Government's policy in this connection. In compelling the steel industry to concentrate on tonnage production, regardless of quality, and tonnage exports, again regardless of their export value, the wire industry has gone extremely short of available steel supplies. Exports of wire, as has been pointed out by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull (Mr. M. Lindsay), are running at less than the pre-war rate, whereas exports of lower valued steel products are running at a much higher rate than before the war. The figures are there in the bulletin of the Iron and Steel Federation. I am sure my hon. Friend opposite—and I call him a friend—will agree with me that wire has an indisputably higher exchange value than the comparatively low-grade steel products which we are exporting in greater abundance than before the war. It just does not make sense.
In the home trade as well we are finding that there is something approaching a glut of angles and sections in the more popular sizes. Steel makers' salesmen are going round touting for orders in the Midlands, although His Majesty's Ministers are complaining of the steel shortage. They are touting for orders because of the faulty Government system of steel allocation. The Government's insistence on tonnage production regardless of what is really required has caused this confusion and this maldistribution. It is far more serious than any domestic inequalities of distribution and stock holdings. It is in the export trade that the problem is so serious. We are losing very valuable export business at the present time through the difficulties which the wire drawing industry is facing. I was fortunate enough to visit Sweden a few days ago, and there I learned, although that was not part of my business, that the British cable-making industry had lost a very valuable order for high voltage cables to France and to Italy because British cable makers were not able to supply the cables in good time. As my hon. Friend has already pointed out, British cable makers are faced with a very serious problem in regard to armouring wire for armoured cables.
To move from the far North to the far South, in New Zealand we see a simi-


lar situation. Only this morning a letter has arrived in this country describing what has just happened in New Zealand. This letter says that four weeks ago an area of New Zealand suffered the worst flood in living memory. The fences were down for miles around and areas were flooded out. The relief committee which had been formed can muster only 80 coils of wire to replace the fences which have been destroyed. Fancy, in one of our Dominions they can muster only 80 coils of British wire to put right flood damage. The letter goes on:
We are a loyal country and one of the biggest sources of the supply of food.
The writer could not help feeling that New Zealand was having a raw deal because he could not get the wire supplies which he so urgently required to develop farms and properties in New Zealand which would benefit ourselves.
To quote another Dominion, one is faced with the determination of South Africa to set up a wire-drawing industry of their own because they cannot get supplies from Britain—supplies at the very time when other steel exports are bigger than they were before the war. Our Dominions cannot understand this when they read of steel production in Britain being at greater levels than ever before. Why, they say, is wire production below the pre-war level as far as exports are concerned?
It is almost as serious in the home trade as it is in the export trade. It is not just a matter of supplying wire, as the Minister will agree, but a matter of the quality of the wire. Take spring steel wire, for example. Several of our leading motor car manufacturers are in dire straits through bottlenecks occurring over very small tonnages of vital spring steel wire. One maker of steel springs has had several letters in the course of the last four weeks. One was from the biggest motor manufacturing company in this country saying that their production lines would be stopped and the men dismissed if they could not get the spring steel wire supplies which they required. It is just as bad as that. These suppliers are getting wire, it is true, but they are getting wire of the wrong quality. They only require a few tons a month, but it is of the wrong quality.
I submit there is something seriously wrong with the system of allocation of

steel supplies. We know there is an overall shortage but let us at least ensure that the supplies which are available are wisely and sensibly distributed. One firm of wire drawers were actually no less than 1,600 tons of steel down on their paper allocation in the month of April alone. No wonder the Government do not publish the steel allocation figures: they know that their allocations do not mean a thing, if a humble wire drawer can be as much as 1,600 tons down on the allocation figure for a single month.
The Government as I submit, are allocating steel wrongly. A comparatively small additional tonnage for the wire industry, and of the right qualities for individual firms—because that is just as important as tonnage allocation—could remove some of the worst bottlenecks in the engineering and allied trades today, and it could secure the most valuable export markets which we require. Steel at present exported in simpler forms, could yield much more foreign exchange if sent abroad in the form of wire. Of course, the Minister will be entitled to ask me, do I know where the trouble lies? I will put one or two possible solutions to him. First, I can assure him that there is no shortage of rod rolling capacity—

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply (Mr. Jack Jones): indicated assent.

Mr. Erroll: I see that the Minister nods in agreement. There is no shortage of billet rolling capacity, and there is no shortage of steel in the quantities required for this industry, because the export figures show that one could quite well divert a little steel from certain low-grade exports to supply the needs of the wire industry. I suggest that there is really no reason why the system of allocation should not be revised to ensure a better export quota and a better export allocation for this essential industry. Finally, I hope that any improvement in allocation which the Minister may be able to announce tonight will be permanent, so that supplies run on a permanently higher level. Anything less will be but a temporary palliative.

10.18 p.m.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply (Mr. Jack Jones): I should like at the outset to thank the two hon. Members who have spoken


on this matter for the kindly and courteous way in which they have put their case and especially for the kindly reference to the effort that, as an individual, one makes to bring about the economic recovery of our nation. As the hon. Members know, there is an over-all world shortage of steel, and to try to compare present-day conditions with what wire drawers, and those who pull wires to get additional supplies of wire, had before the war is, of course, a difficult thing to do successfully.
I am hoping that nobody in this House will accuse the steel industry of not doing what it can to produce steel for all purposes, and I am just as certain as I stand at this Box that if we tomorrow or, indeed, today, were to divert certain types of steel away from certain industries to accommodate the wire drawing industry some hon. Member, either on the other side of the House or on this would be claiming the Adjournment to put a similar case for the industry which suffered because of that diversion.
Hon. Members opposite, of course, know the national position. They know the international position. There is capacity for rod rolling, there always was, but one cannot roll the rods without the billets to roll them from. The continual cry for more and more material, with which our people wish to work, is an indication of a successful Socialist administration. I remember the time when, as a very humble but very successful maker of specialist steels, I was not allowed to go to work to produce steel; that was in a world crying out, as it is today, for more and more. This may be beside the point but it is connected with the present-day case.
Hon. Members opposite know as well as I do that there are two different types of firms involved. One is the integrated firm, which rolls its own billets and produces its own ingots. It is absurd to suggest that the Government actually allocate the amount of steel to the individual firms. Industry itself allocates the amount of steel required. As a man who has spent the whole of his working life in the steel industry, I know there is a lack of synchronisation. In some places it may be said that certain industries should have more, and other less. This cry comes from all the users of steel. It is a coincidence that only this afternoon I received

a letter from a man with whom I once worked. He is not a steelworks owner or a trade union official, but an ordinary workman. On behalf of his mates in a works where I had the privilege and the honour to be employed for 32 years—one of the finest in the country, judged by its record—he was complaining that in his works—producing steel pit props—his men can work only four shifts out of a possible 17. He blamed this state of affairs on to the fact that his firm was devoting its production to rolling mill billets. The hon. Member for Altrincham and Sale (Mr. Erroll) knows of the works to which I refer.
On the one hand, complaint is made in the House against the Government for not diverting sufficient quantities of rods or billets to the right places. On the other hand, the artisan complains that we are devoting too much to certain works and causing unemployment for four days a week, because of which the men are sent into labouring work for less money for the rest of the time. Hon. Members opposite may complain that we are not importing the amount of steel we used to import. Of course, we are not, and we cannot import all we would wish. The position of other countries is like our own: the internal domestic demand is greater than the internal output. Part of our troubles is due to our no longer being able to buy from abroad the amount of rods we bought before the war. Hon. Members complain that we are exporting certain quantities of steel—

Mr. M. Lindsay: Of lower conversion.

Mr. Jones: —of lower conversion value. In a world of bilateral and conditional agreements, it is possible that we are bound by agreement to export what may appear to be a low conversion article to get the vital necessities from which we make our steel. We are no longer in a position to dictate our import policy. We would, if we could, buy more rods to satisfy the capacity of our industry.

Mr. Erroll: This situation prevailed before the settlement of the bilateral agreements, which have apparently resulted in a disastrous state of affairs, although it was said to exist even before the time of the agreements.

Mr. Jones: If the agreements are wrong, no doubt something equally wrong was done prior to their completion. I shall


never claim that this is a perfect Government. Even if tomorrow we had a better Government than that of today, it would not be perfect—that is logic. Hon. Members opposite complain that the capacity for rolling rods is greater than the capacity to produce the steel to be rolled, and that buckets, for instance, are being unnecessarily produced. If I may offer a humble suggestion, it is of no use providing a farmer with double wire fences with which to enclose his guaranteed T. T. herds if afterwards he finds himself short of the necessary material with which to milk the cows and so obtain the milk for which school children are waiting. It is all a matter of balance, of diverting the right quantities into the right places. Hon. Members opposite know that that is a difficult proposition. I wish to assure hon. Members opposite that we are not as unmindful of these facts as they appear to believe. We know of these complaints, because they arise day by day. What hon. Members opposite are advocating is more control rather than less—

Mr. M. Lindsay: Better.

Mr. Jones: I would not accept that there could be better control. We have an industry in which practical men are meeting individual concerns and individual members of the industry and doing what they can to give fair answers to fair questions. We cannot do better than that. There are difficulties which are very hard to deal with. It is alleged that we have not given the industry the same amount of steel as heretofore. That is absolutely incorrect. In 1938 wire rod production in this country was 439,000 tons which is a percentage of the overall steel production of 4.2. In 1945 wire production was 556,000 tons, a percentage of 4.7; in 1946 it was 634,000 tons, a percentage of 5. That was a steady but gradual increase. In 1947 it was 628,000 tons—that was a period when steel works had to close down owing to the blizzard; when coal production was interfered with and there was a recession which was no one's fault. The percentage was 4.9. In the first quarter of this year, production was at the rate of 736,000 tons, which maintained the percentage of 4.9.

Mr. Erroll: rose—

Mr. Jones: I know what the hon. Member for Altrincham and Sale is going

to ask. The wire drawing industry is getting a percentage increase of the increased total production of steel in this country, and no one could ask for more except at the expense of some other industry. If hon. Members opposite can give any indication of wrongful use or storage or stocking of billets which is against the interest of firms they have in mind, I am ready to investigate.

Mr. Erroll: rose—

Mr. Jones: The hon. Member has had two bites at the cherry and cannot have another, although I know cherries are plentiful at the moment.

Mr. M. Lindsay: That is not a very bright one.

Mr. Jones: It is brighter than it was under the Tory Government. If it is any solace to the hon. Member to know, we have been promised 8,500 tons of wire rods by Belgium and Luxemburg in the near future and we are hoping for more hard steel rods from Sweden. Sweden exports specialised steel and imports mild steel. We are further hoping that France will be able to supply 6,000 tons of billets in the second half of this year and possibly 500 tons of rods.
At the Ministry we wish to be looked upon not as the enemies of production, nor of the wire drawing industry. Our job is to make it possible to give every section of the industry a fair allocation of the over-all production of steel. That is running at a higher rate than ever in the history of this country. Peculiar as it may seem under a Socialist Government, we are producing more steel under difficult international and national conditions than ever before in our history. If any friends of the hon. Members have any immediate troubles which we can help solve by acting as their friends rather than their enemies, if hon. Members bring those troubles to our attention we will do everything possible to help, as we are just as much concerned with our economic recovery as are the Opposition. We wish to use the over-all production in the best interest of national recovery and least of all do we wish to injure the wider interests of the country.

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Half-past Ten o'Clock.